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11. Introduction
If the Cultural Revolution (CR) is considered ”a watershed” in the history of the Pepole’s Republic
of China, a tumultuous decade that ended the Mao Zedong era and a disaster big enough to lead
to major reforms and development, its regional manifestation in Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region (IMAR) can be considered to have been of similar importance but with strong local
characteristics and meanings.
In Inner Mongolia the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 was the end of the leadership
era of a local strongman, Ulanhu (乌兰夫 23 December 1906 – 8 December 1988), who had been
the highest regional leader and Communist Party of China (CPC) representative in the IMAR since
its establishment in 1947. Soon after the purges in the Party Center had begun, he was purged
as a “national splittist” (minzu fenlie zhuyizhe) destroying the unity of the nation and opposing
the party, socialism, and Mao Zedong thought. After Ulanhu was removed from Inner Mongolia
and stripped off his titles, the CR developed towards the most violent part of the era in Inner
Mongolia and the whole of China, the purge of a hidden enemy, the Inner Mongolian People’s
Party  (Neimenggu renmin gemingdang, IMPRP and Neirendang)1 , an exclusively Mongolian
party that had agreed to the establishment of a Mongol autonomous region under the
leadership of the CPC, but whose continued underground operations with splittist intentions
were now “discovered”. During its most disastrous phase between late 1967 and early 1969 at
least more than 16,000, most of whom Mongols, were killed and more than 300,000 persecuted
in a campaign “to dig out and purge” the alleged splittist party that was threatening the unity of
China. To stabilize the strategically important frontier region, Beijing decided to split large parts
of the IMAR in late 1969 and place them under the control of the surrounding military regions.
What was left of the IMAR was ruled directly by the 65. PLA corps from Beijing.
Ulanhu survived the CR and was able to return to politics on the national level. The IMAR was
also eventually returned to its pre-CR size in 1979. But the Cultural Revolution period continued
to create tensions in the region and between the Mongol and Han population – not least due to
the central government’s reluctance to punish the main leaders of the area during the most
violent period of the CR. Ulanhu himself never returned to Inner Mongolian politics, but held
important positions in Beijing, being especially influential in minority affairs. After his death in
1988, he has been regarded both an Inner Mongolian hero and the founder of the IMAR and a
patriotic communist leader who brought Inner Mongolia under the CPC and contributed greatly
1 In this thesis the abbreviation ’IMPRP’ refers to the pre-PRC party that seized operations by the establishment of
the IMAR, and ‘Neirendang’, short for the Chinese name of the IMPRP, Neimenggu renmin gemindang, refers to
the alleged underground existence of the IMPRP “exposed” and purged during the CR.
2to the unity of the Chinese nation, a manifestation to his ambiguous role between Mongol and
national (or CPC) interests.
The main part of this thesis discusses how Ulanhu was denounced in materials procuded by rebel
organizations (zaofan zuzhi) between June and September 1967, before the name Neirendang
was first brought up as an underground splittist threat in October 1967. The aim is to describe
what kind or crimes and errors of Ulanhu the rebels exposed in the documents, and in what way
the documents differ from the first document that listed the crimes of Ulanhu, the Qianmen
Hotel Report of July 1966. Through this descriptive discussion with a comparative aspect, one is
hopefully able to observe what kind of content the rebels’ document contribute to the attack
against Ulanhu, and if the documents include any clues about how the Inner Mongolian CR
developed into a purge of the hidden enemy Neirendang, targeting mostly Mongol cadres and
population.
As the documents studied in this thesis “expose” Ulanhu’s crimes during a period of
approximately twenty years before the CR, it is necessary to discuss some of the developments
in Inner Mongolian history that provided “evidence” for the attack against Ulanhu. Therefore,
after short introductions to Ulanhu (chapter 2) and the source materials of this thesis (chapter
3), the fourth chapter will discuss some aspects of Inner Mongolian history and the underlying
conflicts that played significant roles in the Inner Mongolian CR. The main part (chapters 57) will
then concentrate on the discussion of the attack against Ulanhu in the rebels’ documents.
1.1 Notes on the Text
The source material of this thesis consist mainly of English and Chinese (both simplified and
traditional characters) sources, and within the English sources, many of the Mongolian personal
and place names appear in various forms2. For the sake of clarity, for most of the proper nouns
the Chinese pinyin form is used for clarity, also for Mongolian names. An exeption is the syllable
er that frequents pinyin forms in Mongolian names, which is replaced wih an r (e.g. Chaha’er ->
Chahar; Temu’erbagen -> Temurbagen). Also the apostrophe differentiating syllables is left out
in  names  like  Hafenga  (pinyin  Hafeng’a),  but  in  these  cases  the  complete  pinyin  form  is
presented in parentheses by first appearance. The various other written forms that appear on
the sources are also presented the first time the names appear in this thesis. In the cases when
another form is used (e.g. Ulanhu instead of Wulanfu), also the Chinese pinyin form will be
shown in front of the other forms presented by the first appearance.
22 E.g. The Inner Mongolian league Xilinguole (Chinese Pinyin) appear also as Siliin Gol (Atwood 2007),
Shiliingol (Sneath 1994), Silingol (Bulag 2012).
3The Chinese source material include volumes in both simplified and traditional characters. In
this thesis the Chinese characters are all given in their simplified form, with the exception of the
bibliography, where the original form of the Chinese source materials is presented (after pyinyin
form) in forms they were published. An exception in the bibliography are the Chinese quotation
marks (『』and 「」) used in publications in traditional Chinese characters. They are replaced
with quotation marks (“ ”).
The text includes a lot of short citations from the source material, both from secondary sources
and the primary sources consisting of the rebels’ documents. In the case of short citations from
source material in Chinese, a translation is give directly in the text. For proper nouns the Chinese
characters are given in parentheses by their first appearance. To avoid confusion and to expose
possible flawed translations, the pinyin forms of many translated expressions and concepts are
also presented in parentheses (round brackets, but square brackets in citations).
The original documents originate from a time when the simplified characters used as a standard
in the Peple’s Republic of China (PRC) today were still developing.3  The citations starting the
subchapters of the chapters discussing the rebels’ documents include some traditional
characters and obsolete simplifications that are written in the standard simplified form in this
thesis. Some comments on the original forms are included in footnotes.
3 “The First Scheme of Simplified Characters was officially released in 1956”, “a General List of Simplified
Characters” (2,236 characters) with some revisions promulgated in 1964, “a Second Scheme of Simplification”
formally published in 1977 but withdrawn the next year and repealed in 1986… (Wang & Sun 2015: 539.)
42. Ulanhu  a Short Biography
Ulanhu4 (Wulanfu乌兰夫., also Ulanfu (Brown 2006), Ulanov (Atwood 1992)) was born on 23
December 1906, into a Tumed Mongolian peasant family in a small village in Tumed Left banner
(Tumote youqi) not far from the nowadays capital of the IMAR, Hohhot. The area had received
spontaneous migration starting from the late 17th century by Chinese peasants making the area
ethnically and economically mixed, and the early 20th century forced land reclamation for
agriculture by the Qing court to pay for the Boxer indemnities brought masses of peasants from
the inland to the region and forced the Mongols to give up pastoralism and take up agriculture.
According to Bulag, Ulanhu could not speak Mongolian; an example of his “hybridity”, living
“betwixt and between two worlds, Mongol and Chinese”5. This hybridity would later manifest
itself  in  his  political  career,  maneuvering  between  his  different  roles  as  a  Mongol  leader,  a
minority politician, and a representative of the CPC.6
At the age of 13, after receiving basic education in his native Tumed banner, Ulanhu was sent to
Tumed primary school in Guisui (归绥 nowadays Hohhot) for four years.7 Driven by the dream
of becoming a mathematics teacher and contributing to the “rejuvenation of the Mongols”,
Ulanhu devoted himself to studying. After successfully graduating the Tumed primary school he
was accepted to the Mongolian-Tibetan School (Meng-zang xueyuan) in Beijing in 1923.8
The Mongolian-Tibetan School was also a target of recruitment for the early CPC leaders like Li
Dazhao (李大钊, 1888 ̶ 1927), who became Ulanhu’s revolutionary mentor. Especially the idea
of China proper (benbu) and the three democratic autonomous states (minzhu zizhibang) of
Menggu (Mongolia), Xizang (西藏 Tibet), and Huijiang (回疆)9 united under a free federation
(ziyou lianbang) was appealing to Ulanhu and many other young Mongols determined to change
the destiny of their homeland struggling under Han-chauvinism (da hanzu zhuyi). During his first
4 Ulanhu was known as Yun Ze (云泽)  before  adopting  the  name  Ulanhu  (乌兰夫, pinyin Wulanfu), which
according to Bulag (2002) translates as “the red son of Communism”. Atwood (2004) suggests two possible origins
for the name: “either the Chinese for Russian Ulianov (Lenin’s original surname) or for Mongolian Ulaanhüü (red
son)”. Yun is the Chinese surname shared by many Tumed Mongols. (Atwood 2004: 570; Bulag 2002: 207, 213.)
5 Bulag 2002: 207.
6 Bulag 2002: 220; Wang 2007: 1 – 3.
7 Wang 2007: 4, 6; Atwood 2004: 570.
8 Qi Zhi 2010: 31; Atwood 2004: 570, Wang 2007: 4 – 6.
9 The aim to establish a federal Republic of China (Zhonghua lianbang gongheguo) was expressed in the Manifest
of the Second Naitonal Congress of the Communist Party of China (July 1966) (Qi Zhi 2010: 33). There is no clear
definition of the territory of Huixiang in Qi Zhi (2010). The Wikipedia article for Huixiang (also Huibu) of the
Qing dynasty defines it as the Tarim Basin region, the part of Xinjiang south from the Tianshan Mountains and
the adjacent regions nowadays parts of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. (Wikipedia A.)
5year  in  Beijing,  Ulanhu  became  a  member  of  the  Chinese  Socialist  Youth  League  and  in
September 1925 a member of the CPC.10
The talented and devoted Ulanhu was sent by the CPC North China Committee (Huabei quwei)
to  the  Far  East  University  (Dongfang daxue) in Moscow for further studies. Ulanhu studied
Russian and Marxism-Leninism in Moscow until 1929. During this time he also made
acquaintance with Wang Ruofei (王若飞, 1896 ̶ 1946), Zhou Enlai (周恩来, 1898 ̶ 1976), and
other  CCP  figures  who  played  important  roles  in  his  later  career.  In  1929  Comintern  (Third
International) and its representative Qu Qiubai (瞿秋白,  1899  ̶ 1935)  sent  Ulanhu  back  to
western Inner Mongolia to his native region to engage in underground work for the CCP.11 After
returning to Inner Mongolia, Ulanhu worked underground in western Inner Mongolia under the
name Chen Yunzhang (陈云章 ), setting up a CPC cell and communication lines with the
Comintern. He gained reputation by instigating rebellion against the GMD and the Japanese. A
major success for him was the instigation a rebellion and desertion of mostly Tumed Mongol
troops from Prince De’s (De Wang 德望, 1902 ̶ 1962)12 army in 1936, which was symbolically
important for the Chinese Communists as it was the initial attack against the Japanese and the
Mongols collaborating with the Japanese.13
Following the second coalition of the Communists and Nationalists against the Japanese in 1937,
Ulanhu was successful in recruiting CPC members from the Mongolian army under GMD control
and led them to battle against the advancing Japanese troops in western Inner Mongolia. To
avoid GMD punishment for his Communist activities he was summoned to Yan’an in 1941 where
he ”became the most trusted ‘minority’ communist within the ranks” of the CPC14. He worked
as dean of studies at the College of Nationalities in Yan’an (延安), survived the 1942 rectification
movement and, thanks to recommendations from Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei, became an
alternate member of the Central Committee in the Seventh Congress of the CCP held in AprilJune,
1945.15
10 Bulag 2002: 220; Qi Zhi 2010: 33 – 34.
11 Bulag 2002: 2002; Qi Zhi 2010: 38 – 39.
12  For  more  information  on  Prince  De,  see  chapter  2.N  in  this  thesis.  De  Wang  (Prince  De)  is  a  respectful
abbreviation for Prince Demchungdongrub (1902 ̶ 1966), who was a conservative prince from Xilinguole (Shiliin
Gol) league in central Inner Mongolia. First a Qing loyalist, later favoring educated young Mongol nationalists, De
Wang became “the leader of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement under the Japanese” during the late
1930s and early 1940s. (Atwood 2007: 141.)
13 Bulag 2002: 220; Qi Zhi 2010: 46 – 47.
14 Bulag 2002: 220
15 Bulag 2002: 220 – 221; Qi Zhi 2010: 47; Dangshi.people.net.
6In 1945 Ulanhu’s importance to the CPC grew as he was first able to make himself the chairman
of the Provisional Government of the People’s Republic of Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu renmin
linshi chengfu), set up by Prince De’s former officials from the Mengjiang government, and bring
it under CPC leadership. Then in November he was granted the permission to set up his own
organization, Federation of the Autonomous Movement of Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu zizhi
yundong lianhehui, the Lianhehui) “to function as a semi-governmental organization, and to
prepare for the establishment of an Inner Mongolian autonomous government16.
An event decisive in Ulanhu’s rise to become the leader of Inner Mongolia, and an example of
his “hybridity”, was the April 1946 Chengde conference between representatives of western and
eastern Inner Mongolia and the resulting merge of the East Mongolian (People’s) Autonomous
Government (Dongmeng (renmin) zizhi zhengfu, EMAG), established in January-February 1946
by the IMPRP leadership, into the Lianhehui. With the Soviet troops stationed in East Mongolia
preparing to leave in early 1946, the East Mongolian government needed to find a solution to
live with the warring Chinese parties. At the same time the CPC could not leave the region to be
taken by the GMD. The GMD was not willing to grant the EMAG de jure autonomy, but Ulanhu
was able to convince the East Mongolian leaders to agree to “an Inner Mongolian national
movement aiming at egalitarian autonomy, not independent autonomy,”  striving for national
liberation under CPC leadership.17
Having united the major Inner Mongolian autonomy movements under the leadership of the
CPC, the next step was the establishment of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government
(Neimenggu zizhi zhengfu), which was declared on May 1, 1947 in Wangyemiao (Wang-un Süme,
nowadays Wulanhaote) as a result of the People’s Congress of Inner Mongolia (Neimenggu
renmin daibiao dahui). As the man who delivered the CPC its first victory in resolving nationality
issues, uniting the Mongols under the CPC, Ulanhu was rewarded for his services and took his
place as the chairman of the new government and gained control over Inner Mongolia.18
After the establishment of the PRC Ulanhu achieved a multitude of positions and titles within
the party, the government, and the military, both on national and IMAR level. In September
1959 he became an alternate member of the Politburo, “the only officially recognized minority
16Atwood 1992: 59 – 60. To be fair to Atwood’s description it should be noted that he credits Ulanhu for mostly
being successful in “dissolving improperly nationalist Mongolian organizations” but not for developing the CPC in
these areas. He even adds that unlike the West Manchurian Branch the CPC that was able to get Mongols to fight
against the GMD in Eastern Mongolia, the Lianhehui in Rehe even alienated local Mongols and pushed them in the
direction of the GMD. (Atwood 1992: 62.)
17 Atwood 1992: 63 – 65; Qi Zhi 2010: 47
18 Bulag 2002: 221; Qi Zhi 2010: 54 – 55.
7member in the highest organ of the CCP”19. Ulanhu’s value to the CPC on the national level was
to keep Inner Mongolia a part of China.
In the 1950s and early 1960s Ulanhu can be considered successful in balancing between his
positions between the Mongols and the Center, and the Inner Mongolian society divided into
different camps, some pro-China ;others pro-MPR, “anti-minority Chinese at the lower level; and
pro-minority Chinese at the Center20. On the matter of whether Inner Mongolia should be
independent, Ulanhu was determined to protect China’s territorial integrity, at the same time
creating an “Other”, the IMPRP that stood for pro-MPR; pro-GMD; and pro-Japanese militarism21.
On the other hand, he tried to protect Mongol rights and Inner Mongolian autonomy for
example by denouncing Han chauvinism and quoting Mao Zedong’s view on ethnic equality,
promoting the status of pastoralism in national economy and the Mongols’ position in the IMAR
administration. By balancing the different camps and his position between the Party and the
Mongols, he was able to gain political capital and even create a “kind of personality cult” around
him  as  the  ruler  of  the  minority  region,  something  that,  according  to  Bulagm,  was  even
encouraged by Mao as it could unite the (minority) masses under the socialist cause 22.
His use of personal power to defend Inner Mongolian autonomy, favoring of his native Tumed
banner23, and “insistence on national polity, rather than on the application of universalist class
struggle”, backfired in 1966, as he was denounced in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in
the Qianmen Hotel conference of the North China Bureau (Huabeiju, NCB), presided over by the
first secretary Li Xuefeng (李雪峰, 1907 ̶ 2003). In the conference, discussed in more detail later,
Ulanhu was accused of “creating an independent kingdom, advocating Inner Mongolian
independence, and conspiring with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Republic”24.
Ulanhu was denounced by the Party but not exposed to be physically struggled against by the
revolutionary  organizations.  He survived the CR away from IMAR,  first  in  Beijing  and then in
19 Bulag 2002: 222 – 223.
20 Bulag 2002: 224.
21 Bulag (2002:  223) describes Ulanhu “setting up an Other,  the long defunct” IMPRP in the discourse on Inner
Mongolian  status  in  the  1950s  and  early  1960s,  but  it  should  perhaps  be  noted,  that  the  problem  of  eastern
Mongolian leaders’ ideological purity and background serving the Japanese Manchurian government had been
brought up by Ulanhu already in the negotiations leading to the merge of the EMAG into the Lianhehui in Chengde
in the spring of 1946, thus having used the argument referring to treachery already on an early stage (e.g. Atwood
1992: 65).
22 Bulag 2002: 224. However, raising Ulanhu on level with Chairman Mao in some parts of Inner Mongolia
became one of the severe “errors” of Ulanhu in the denouncement campaign of the CR, which will be discussed
later.
23 E.g. defending Tumed Mongols from being struggled against in the Four Cleanups Movement (launched in 1963),
but also in the early 1951s land reform where he promoted policies protective to the Mongols.
24 Bulag 2002: 226.
8Hunan under military protection. His survival may have been due to protection by Mao Zedong
(毛泽东, 1893 ̶ 1976) and/or Zhou Enlai, but they did not make a final judgement on the case of
Ulanhu, which left his position ambiguous: He became a target of demonization “by all sides, a
symbol conveniently used by different factions, to attack each other for serving Ulanhu at one
point or another”25. Some of his former subordinates and the NCB leaders waged “an all-out
propaganda war against him throughout Inner Mongolia”, in fear of his return and retaliation26.
After the official CR was declared ended in the spring of 1969, Mao declared that there had been
“excesses” (kuodahua) during the Inner Mongolian CR, but approved its general line. Ulanhu’s
name was in the list of old cadres to be rehabilitated approved by Mao in 1971, but the Gang of
Four (sirenbang) insisted on him being guilty of secessionism and revisionism. This time Zhou
Enlai defended him by recalling his contribution to resisting splittist forces and to the founding
of the IMAR.27
Bulag notes, that “Ulanhu was liberated largely because of his ‘Mongolian’ identity and his status
as a ‘nationality leader’”. He was important in “destroying Mongolian independence and
bringing Inner Mongolia into China”, and his policies benefiting the Mongols after the
establishment of the IMAR were declared as mistakes, but apologized for.28
Ulanhu was allowed to resume work in 1973, and in June 1977 he was appointed chief of the
Central Committee United Front Work Department (UFWD). and in August at the Eleventh
Congress he became a full member of the Politburo Standing Committee29. As the chief of the
UFWD Ulanhu became the leading minority affairs specialist in the Party Center. He played a
major role in the restoration of the territorial boundaries of the IMAR in 1979, thus “uniting”
Inner Mongolia for the second time in his career. He was a member of the Politburo and vice-
chairman of the PRC (June 1983April 1988) and the National People’s Congress, latter of which
he held until his death in December 1988.30
After Ulanhu’s death in December 1988, only a small-scale funeral was held in Beijing and no
official mourning ceremony took place in Inner Mongolia, shocking many Mongols. Also a
request by his son and chairman of the IMAR, Buhe (布赫, 1926 ̶ 2017)31, to build a mausoleum
25 Bulag 2002: 228.
26 Ibid: 227.
27 Ibid: 228 – 229.
28 Ibid.
29 Wang 2007: 539.
30 Bulag 2002: 229 – 230, 236; Wang 2007: 619.
31 Since the purge of Ulanhu in the Qianmen Hotel meeting, the highest party leader in IMAR has always been a
Han. After the Cultural Revolution the policy has been, that the first secretary of the IMAR PC is a Han, and the
9to  commemorate  him  was  declined.  The  official  policy  changed  in  1992,  when  the  CPC
Propaganda Department permitted the construction of a mausoleum in Hohhot. 32Ulanhu never
returned, or was not allowed to return, to the Inner Mongolian political stage after the CR. 33.
After his posthumous “comeback” he has taken different roles that reflect his different meaning
to China and to Mongols.
Bulag argues that his posthumous return to Inner Mongolia as “the ultimate embodiment of the
state, as a representative of the state, a Mongol hero, a symbol of Chinese patriotism, a defender
of the Chinese nation”34 following the “low-profile treatment” after his death was both related
to Beijing’s efforts to “assure stability and control” in the IMAR and “the result of pressures from
certain Mongols to restore his honor” and to strengthen the Mongols’ position in politics and
society35.This way, Ulanhu has still been alternating between different roles, trying both to
protect minority rights and strengthen the national unity of the PRC.
chairman (主席) of the IMAR People’ Government a Mongol (starting from December 1977). Ulanhu’s son Buhe
followed Kong Fei (孔飞) as the chairman of the IMAR government in 1983 (Hao 1991: 555 - 556).
32 Bulag: 2002: 208 – 210.
33 Ibid: Yang (2014) elaborates, that while Ulanhu was not allowed to return to Inner Mongolian politics, he did
make two trips back after the CR under guard: first on 30 July 1977 fir the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the
IMAR as a member of a delegation from the Centre; and 28 July20 August, when he visited Hohhot and Chinggis
Khan mausoleum (Yang 2014: 6162).
34 Ibid: 212
35 Bulag 2002: 212.
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3. Sources
While arguably not being the most well-known event of PRC history, the Inner Mongolian CR
and especially the purge of the Neirendang have received attention in academic literature both
in China and abroad, many of the contributors having born in Inner Mongolia and/or having
experienced the CR in Inner Mongolia themselves36. Due to the source languages of this thesis
being limited to Chinese, English, and Finnish, scholarship in for example Mongolian, Russian,
and Japanese have unfortunately been neglected. The major source materials used in this thesis
are introduced below.
3.1 Sources in English
As early as in late 1968, Paul Hyer and William Heaton published an article on the CR in Inner
Mongolia stating that compared to the rest of the country “the Cultural Revolution in the Inner
Mongolian Region takes on added significance in that ‘local nationalism’ the Mongol national
minority played an important role between the established political structure and the efforts of
the Maoists to ‘seize power’”.37The article’s account of the events in the Inner Mongolian CR is
in some respects uninformed compared to later research, e.g. it suggests that Ulanhu was still
active  in  the  Inner  Mongolian  conflict  in  March  1967  directing  “troops  to  surround  the  Red
Guard headquarters” and planning to stage a coup “in order to establish an Inner Mongolian
Revolutionary Committee.”38However, Hyer & Heaton are aware of some aspects of Ulanhu’s
denouncement also discussed in this thesis. The denouncement of Ulanhu presented as a
reaction to local nationalism that had manifested itself in Ulanhu’s and “his Mongol associates”
efforts to resist policies favoring Chinese agriculture, the assimilationist effect of these policies,
and efforts to “become more closely associated with the Mongols of the Mongolian People’s
Republic.”39The switch from “a soft line policy of ‘No Struggle’” (the Three Nos policy) towards
assimilationist policies towards minorities is associated with the Great Leap Forward movement
of 1958 when “local nationalism replaced ‘Han chauvinism’ as the target for condemnation, and
increasing “rate of Chinese incursions into the pastoral areas” aggravated the “already strong
Mongol nationalism.40 However, one is reluctant to agree with the article’s view, that makes
36 E.g. Qi Zhi (Wu Di  experienced the CR in Inner Mongolia as a sent-down youth, also spending a part of his
time in jail, where he came to know about the persecution experienced by Mongols. Yang (2014) includes a
chapter that tells about the experiences of his Mother during the CR. Another important scholar who has written
extensively on Inner Mongolia, and whose works are also used as source material in this thesis, Uradyn E. Bulag,
describes Yang Haiying (Ono Akira) as his ”good old high-school classmate from Ordos” (Bulag 2012: xiv).
37 Hyer & Heaton 1968: 114.
38 Ibid: 122. The article is mostly based on Taiwanese (Republic of China) secondary sources and the information
from e.g. Inner Mongolia Daily was not an accurate source either, like the public denouncement of Ulanhu in IM
Daily in August 1967, a year after the Qianmen Hotel Meeting, suggests.
39 Ibid: 126 – 127.
40 Ibid. 116 – 117.
11
Mongol nationalism a major conflict party in the Inner Mongolian CR, as it could be argued, that
by 19661967 Mongol nationalism was a target and, but not necessarily a player.
The next contributions in English to the research of the Inner Mongolian CR discussed the effects
of the period in Inner Mongolia. An article by William Jankowiak published in 1988, while
analyzing the background of student unrests in the autumn of 1981 in Hohhot, the IMAR capital,
through interviews and observation, does discuss the Mongol experience during the CR and the
Neirendang-case, but the article concentrates on the “consequences of the Neirendang
campaign on present-day (i.e. late 1980s) Han-Mongol relations in Huhhot [sic] and the IMAR”
and does not write the history of the CR in the IMAR.41 David Sneath’s article The Impact of the
Cultural Revolution on the Mongolians of Inner Mongolia published in 1994 draws evidence from
both eyewitness accounts and previously published source material presenting a description of
the course of the CR in Inner Mongolia with emphasis on its effect on the Mongol population,
and as such is probably the earliest paper originally written in English that tries to discussed the
Inner Mongolian CR in a more comprehensive manner, including both government policies and
their effect on the people of Inner Mongolia.42
Likely the earliest work specializing in the history of the CR in Inner Mongolia was published in
1993 by the Stockholm University Center for Pacific Asia Studies. The Cultural Revolution in Inner
Mongolia: Extracts from an Unpublished History includes excerpts from a 600-plus page
handwritten manuscript written by Wu Di (吴迪, who in Chinese writes under the pseudonym
Qi Zhi启之) under the pseudonym W.Woody, translated by Michael Schoenhals and edited into
a  35  page  volume  by  both  of  them. 43  The book was not published in full until 2010 and is
introduced in the next subchapter. In addition to the main text, The Cultural Revolution in Inner
Mongolia, also includes an Editor’s Introduction by the translator (and scholar of the CR)
Schoenhals that gives an outline of the events in the Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia.
To date the only book specifically44 about The CR in the IMAR originally published in English
appears to be Kerry Brown’s The Purge of the Inner Mongolian People’s Party in the Cultural
Revolution, 1967-69, that studies the use of language to gain power and authority during the
first three years of the Cultural Revolution decade by using documents produced in the 1960s
gathered from ”secondhand bookshops and street vendors” during his stay in Inner Mongolia in
41 Jankowiak 1988: 269, 273.
42 Sneath 1994: 410 – 411.
43 Information on The Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia: Extracts from an Unpublished History obtained from
a book review by William Heaton in The China Quarterly (Volume 140, 1994, pp 1194-1195) and from Qi Zhi, 2010
(585) and personal communication with Michael Schoenhals (March 21, 2017), who sent me a pdf-copy of the
volume.
44 The Inner Mongolian CR has been discussed as parts of larger phenomena, e.g. in Bulag (2002).
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the mid-1990s.45 In many respects this is the major English source of this thesis. In addition to
general information considering the Inner Mongolian CR, the context of the source documents
and the various power relations affecting the course of events, one part of Brown (2006) is of
particular interest regarding this thesis. The third chapter, called Nationalism Versus Ethnicity,
studies the campaign against Ulanhu in 19671968, in both “official” materials, i.e. “articles and
items in the IM Daily” (Inner Mongolia Daily), and “unofficial” materials of varied types,
“sponsored by specific factions”.46 The latter band of materials studied in the chapter include at
least two of the source documents produced by rebel organizations also used in this thesis
(documents 3 and 4, see appendix 9.1).47 As Brown (2006) approaches the Inner Mongolian CR
by analyzing the language in documents form the time, it also provides abundant reference
material considering translations and meanings of different terms and concepts that frequent in
the source material of this thesis48.
3.2 Sources in Chinese
The  one  book  perhaps  most  referred  to  in  the  other  source  texts  is  the Kangsheng yu
“neirendang” yuanan by Tumen and Zhu Dongli, published in 1995 in Beijing by the Party School
Press. Being one of the few books on the CR in Inner Mongolia, and an early one, this book has
been an important source to other research discussed below, but has also received heavy
criticism. Qi Zhi49 (2010) mentions it as an example of “shifting responsibility” for the CR events
by making Kang Sheng (康生, 1898 ̶ 1975)50 the chief culprit of the purge of the Neirendang and
criticizes it for ignoring the historical roots of the nationality question of Inner Mongolia and the
lack  of  analysis  of  the course of  events  of  the CR.51 Yang (2014) agrees with the criticism of
moving the burden of responsibility from Mao Zedong’s and the Party Centre’s shoulders to
Kang Sheng, and the inadequate analysis of the nationality question but interprets these
shortcomings as at least partly resulting from constraints of the Party state and not from Tumen
45 Brown 2006: 2005: iix-ix.
46 Brown 2006: 69 – 71.
47 Many of the primary documents used as source material in Kerry Brown’s research were to be placed on a website
of  the  Australian  National  University,  but  were  not  available  at  the  time  of  writing  of  this  thesis,  leaving  the
comparison of the materials on the level of checking the Bibliography in Borwn (2005) (Brown 2005: vii; personal
communication with Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, January 27 – 29 2017).
48 The translations in this thesis do sometimes borrow from Brown (2016), but often not. When a suitable
translation has been found in secondary source materials, they are used, but often the translations, for better or
worse, are my own.
49 Qi Zhi recalls being recommended by Wang Nianyi to Tumen, who was looking for help in writing the book. Qi
Zhi declined the offer as “even the title was unacceptable to me, how could I co-write it?!” (Qi Zhi. 582).
50 Kang Sheng, Mao’s trustee known for his ruthlessness and for having a ”paranormal sixth sense for who was
and who wasn’t an ’anti-party element’”, in charge of the feared Central Case Examination Group set up to
investigate Peng Zhen, Luo Rui, Lu Dingyi, and Yang Shangkun, but became an ”internal gestapo” of the party
leadership. (Macfarquhar & Schoenhals 2008: 33; Paltemaa & Vuori 2012: 172.)
51 Qi Zhi 2010: 121 – 122.
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himself.52 The book itself concentrates on the events of the CR in Inner Mongolia starting from
the  Qianmen  Hotel  in  the  summer  of  1966,  therefore  the  criticism  of  the  lack  of  historical
perspective is understandable. Despite its shortcomings, the book is still useful as a reference to
certain events and dates, especially due to a list of major events in its final pages.
Likely  the  most  comprehensive  history  of  the  CR  in  Inner  Mongolia  is Neimen wenge shilu:
“minzu fenlie” yu “wa su” yundong (2010) by Qi Zhi. The draft of the book was originally finished
in 1991 but not published in full until 2010 A 35 page translation by Michael Shchoenhals based
on handwritten draft of the book was published in 1993 (see “Sources in English”), but the final
book version published in Hong Kong did not come out until 201053. Qi Zhi writes that the part
of Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (edited by Guo Jian, Song Yongyi and
Yuan Zhou, first published in 2006 by The Scarecrow Press) discussing Inner Mongolia also
originates from this book54. Qi Zhi’s work utilizes a wide array of source material including both
“official sources” (publications, archives etc.) and private accounts including interviews and
written accounts of the interviewees.55 As the title that translates as “Veritable records of the
Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution” suggests, the main focus of the book is on the events of
the IMAR CR, meticulously describing the changes in leadership and the effects of central
policies on the Inner Mongolian level. However, as Qi Zhi’s criticism towards Tumen and Zhu’s
work suggests, the Neimeng wenge shilu adopts a more comprehensive historical approach to
the CR events, starting from the Republican period and the Inner Mongolian struggle towards
autonomy, trying to explain both the tensions between the IMAR and the Center, between
different leaders and the ethnic tensions between the Mongols and the Chinese, all affected the
CR events. As an addition, the Neimeng wenge shilu also includes some official documents
important to the discussed events as attachments, like the report on Ulanhu’s mistakes by the
North China Bureau (the Qianmen Hotel Report), of which a rough translation is provided in
appendix of this thesis.
Another  quite  recent  addition  to  literature  on  the  CR  in  Inner  Mongolia  is Meiyou mubeide
caoyuan – mengguren yu wenge datusha by Yang Haiying56. It was first published in Japanese
52 Yang 2014: 436 – 437.
53 The afterword of the book includes an account of the twists and turns of the publication process (Qi Zhi 2010:
581 – 586).
54 Qi Zhi 2010: 585. Qi Zhi possibly refers to Guo et al. (2009) or a different edition of it.
55 Qi Zhi 2010: 585.
56 Yang Haiying (杨海英, Mongolian name Oonos Choghtu, Japanese 大野 旭 (Ohno Akira)), Professor in
Cultural Anthropology, Shizuoka University, Japan.  Yang was born in Ordos, Inner Mongolia. The first volume of
two book that appears to be a translation of Yang’s book was published through the self-publishing company Xlibris
in October, 2017, under the name Genocide on the Mongolian Steppe
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(Bohyo naki sogen – uchimongoru ni okeru bunkadaikakumei, gyakusatsu no kiroku) in 2009 and
the Chinese translation referred to in this thesis in Taiwan in 2014. Meiyou mubeide caoyuan
tells the story of Inner Mongolia and the Inner Mongolian CR through the experiences of several
Mongols, including some of Yang’s own family members, based on interviews, archival
documents and previous research literature. Despite its focus being on the CR, the timeline of
the book extends far back to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, thus linking the Mongols’
grievances during the CR to the history of the autonomous region. As the title suggests (“The
Steppes without tombstones: Mongols and the CR genocide”), Yang Haiying, originally from the
Ordos region, represents the Inner Mongolian CR as “shared memory of ethnic genocide”.57 The
interviewees are “AR cadres, PLA cadres, ordinary nomad herdsmen etc.” who experienced the
CR in Inner Mongolia.58 Unlike for example the abovementioned works, it’s not “CR history” by
nature, but historical anthropology and modern history of the Mongols, therefore its point of
view is very different from the studies that concentrate on major changes in politics and their
effect on the AR level.59 Despite the narrative being formed around personal experiences of
individuals, Meiyou mubeide caoyuan includes a lot of information on events, persons, and the
background of different conflicts affecting the Inner Mongolian CR.
A personal account from a different viewpoint is Neimeng wenge fenglei – yi wei zaofanpai
lingxiu de koushushi (Cultural Revolution in Inner Mongolia – Oral History of a Rebel Leader) by
Gao Shuhua and Cheng Tiejun published in Hong Kong in 2007. Neimeng wenge fenglei is an
autobiographical account of the Cultural Revolution by a rebel leader Gao Shuhua (高树华, 1941 ̶
2003), who was the primary author of one of the first and most famous big-character posters
(dazibao)60 of the Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution, one of the most important rebel leaders
during the CR and imprisoned after it. Having been one of the major rebel leaders in the early
CR in Hohhot, after the replacement of the old IMAR leadership when the Centre sided with the
rebels in the Spring of 1967, Gao became a member of the new leadership organ, the Inner
Mongolia Revolutionary Committee (Neimenggu geming weiyuanhui, (IM)RC, first established
as the Preparatory Small Group (choubei xiaozu) on 18 June 1967 and then the actual RC on 1
(https://www.xlibris.com/Bookstore/BookDetail.aspx?BookId=SKU-001068218). The “primary” source material
of this thesis was also compiled by Yang Haiying.
57 Yang 2014: 43.
58 Ibid: 453
59 Ibid: 453 – 454.
60 Big-character posters(Dazibao) ”were the major for of mass communication during the Cultural Revolution”,
written with pen-brushed on large sheets of paper with black ink and pasted on walls.The dazibao were a way for
the masses to express their thoughts and feelings by circulating the tightly controlled major media channels
(newspapers, radio). (Guo et al. 2009: 54.)
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Novemeber). 61  Therefore, his experiences may shed light on the situation of the rebels in
Hohhhot in Summer 1967, when the primary source materials of this thesis were produced.
3.3 “Primary” Source Material
The latter part of this thesis discussed the denouncement of Ulanhu in documents produced by
rebels organizations (zaofan zuzhi) in Hohhot between 7 June and 5 September (except for one,
document 2, without a date). The documents are from The Collection of Poisonous Weeds:
Selection of Ulanhu’s Antirevolutionary Remarks (Dokusou to sareta minzokujiketsu no riron)
(2012),  which  is  the  fourth  volume  in  a  series  edited  by  Yang  Haiying  collecting  original
documents from the Inner Mongolian CR called Monoglian Genocide During the Cultural
Revolution in Inner Mongolia (Mongorujin jenosaido ni kansuru kiso shiryou). This fourth volume
is divided two parts, and the latter part into two bands of documents. The first part (pp. 1 – 134)
is the Editor’s Commentary on the Materials (Shiryou kaisetsu), which is not used as a source in
this thesis. The second part is the Band of Materials Composing the ‘Poisonous Weeds’ (Dokusou
wo kousei suru shiryougun). The first band of materials is called Poisonous Weeds (Dokusou) (pp.
135 –  590).  Poisonous weeds (ducao) were “any writing deemed antiparty, antisocialist, and
nonproletarian”, used in mass campaigns to criticized their targets.62 The seven documents in
Yang (2012) consist of collections of Ulanhu’s “poisonous weeds”: speeches, reports and other
materials that could be used as a basis for Ulanhu’s denouncement. These compilations are
dated between MayNovember 1967, produced by rebel organizations, and include Ulanhu’s
“black” views starting from 1945 until the Cultural Revolution. In this thesis, these documents
are used as reference to some of Ulanhu’s quotations used in the main source, the second band
of materials.
The second band of materials (pp. 551 – 934), the main primary source materials of this thesis,
Yang has titled as Transplanting the ‘poisonous weeds’ (‘Dokusou’ no ishoku). These materials
include ten documents from JuneSeptember 1967, and one (the last one) from August 1971. As
this thesis studies the documents as a part of the “unofficial attack” (as described by Brown
2006) against Ulanhu in summer 1967, the last document from 1971 is left outside discussion.
One of  the documents  (document  2)  has  no date on it,  but  as  Yang has  placed it  within  the
materials from 1967; and it was produced by the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebels Liaison
Headquarters Criticize and Struggle Ulanhu Liaison Station 63  Inner Mongolia University
“Jinggangshan”, which indicates that the documents are from the time when Ulanhu was the
61 Gao 2007: 267
62 Guo et al. 2009: 225. Posinous weeds were not a speciality of the Cultural Revolution, but were also used to
attack “anti-Party and anti-socialist” elements e.g. during the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 ̶ 1958 (e.g. He :16.)
63 The same Hohhot Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Headquarters is recorded as the head-organization behind
many of the documents on both bands of materials, see Yang (2012: 133).
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main target of the rebels; and the fact that the rebels organizations were dissolved as a result
of the “Cleaning of Class Ranks” campaign (qingdui) starting from March 196864, it is reasonable
to consider the document 2 a part of the primary source material.
The documents of the second band of materials include compilations of quotes from Ulanhu,
some only a few words, some of them longer passages. The quotes are organized under different
themes that show what king of “crimes” of Ulanhu the quotes are evidence of. The quotes are
accompanied by the editors’ notes (an),  either  before  the  compilations  of  quotes  as  an
introduction, or as notes to one or more individual quotes. The documents also include quotes
from authorities (most often Mao Zedong, but also e.g. Lenin, Stalin) that provide foundation
for the denouncement of Ulanhu, who’s views allegedly are in conflict with these authorities.
The main source documents will be commented more in detail later. A list of the main primary
source documents is provided in appendix.
64 Qi Zhi 2010: 266 – 268.
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4. Background
Despite being a part of the countrywide movement that spread to the IMAR from Beijing almost
immediately after its official launch, the CR in the IMAR had a distinctive local character defined
by the issues of minzu tuanjie and nationality policy (minzu zhengce)65. In Qi Zhi’s (2010) view,
the distinguishing feature of the CR in Inner Mongolia was the target of the revolution (geming)
to tackle the issue of national splittism (minzu fenlie zhuyi)66, which became the fundamental
content of the CR in the form of the purge of Ulanhu’s treasonous anti-Party clique (fandang
panguo jituan)  and  the  so  called New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (xin
neimenggu renmin gemingdang, Neirendang).67
The existing threat of splittism is based on the idea of minzu tuanjie68 which became an essential
part of the efforts of folding ”the fluid ethnic diversity of the empire into the homogeneity of a
new national imaginary” since the early twentieth century and the collapse of the Qing dynasty
(1644 ̶ 1911).69 The nationality question (minzu wenti,  Leibold  (2007)  uses  the term national
question), i.e. ”the problem of classifying and assimilating” the minorities or marginalized
citizens of the frontier areas into the geo-body of the nation, became an urgent matter to be
solved in order to relieve the tension between the ethnocentric and political cultural community
(that Leibold calls Sinic) that would form the center of the new Chinese nation-state, and the
protection of the expansive territory inherited from the Qing dynasty 70 . Ulanhu was an
important part of this solution for the CPC, as he desired the liberation of the Mongols form
warlord and Japanese oppression, and at the same time believed that the CPC was the correct
leader for this mission. In the case of the Inner Mongolian CR and Ulanhu, one way of
65 In this thesis, the Chinese word minzu (民族) is translated as nationality/nationalities, e.g. shaoshu minzu is
translated as minority nationalities. As exceptions, some compound expressions that have many meanings or do
not translate easily are mostly referred to in their Pinyin form, these include: minzu tuanjie (national unity or
amity between nationalities) and Zhonghua minzu (“the Chinese nation” that include all the nationalities in
China, also the 55 official minority nationalities). An exception to this exception are the translated citations where
all the expressions are translated in the way (hopefully) most suitable to the context.
66 Splittism (fenlie zhuyi or sometimes only fenlie): Dictionaries define the word ‘splittism’ e.g. as “the pursuance
of factional interests in opposition to official Communist Party policy”
(en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/splittism) or “the advocating of separation from a larger body
(https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/splittism). In this thesis the word ‘splittism’ is
predominantly used despite the possibility of using the Pinyin form fenlie, as the English word bends more
naturally to expressions like “national splittist conspiracy” (minzu fenlie yinmou), and because one could argue
that the word also captures the implied meaning of “fenlie”, i.e. that some-one (Ulanhu) is not advocating the
separation of an ethnic/political/cultural entity from China (separatism or secessionism), but trying to “split” or
destroy a whole (the PRC or possibly the Zhonghua minzu) that cannot be divided into smaller entities.
67 Qi Zhi 2010: 25.
68 Bulag adds that the expression minzu tuanjie can mean both ”national unity” and ”amity between nationalities
(minzu)” (Bulag 2002: 12).
69 Leibold 2007: 2 – 3.
70 Leibold 2007: 19
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approaching the denouncement of Ulanhu is him losing on ”the battleground” that is
the ”keyword minzu tuanjie”. 71 The self-rule or autonomy (zizhi), was initially a positive concept
as Mongols were struggling to free themselves from imperialist or Han chauvinist exploitation,
and then as a building block of a unity of the Chinese nation and nationalities under the CPC. But
as the Sino-Soviet rift escalated in the early 1960s, and absolute loyalty was required from the
Mongols of the frontier, ”Ulanhu’s insistence on local autonomy . . . became the very basis for
charges of his alleged crime of splitting China, and he himself was purged72.
The establishment of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government in 1947 was a result of both
Inner Mongolian movements for independence or autonomy since the fall of the Qing dynasty,
and the successful incorporation of the most successful of the Inner Mongolian movements, the
Easter Mongolia Autonomous Government (EMAG) founded by the Inner Mongolia People’s
Revolutionary Party (IMPRP), into the CPC, a process in which Ulanhu played a major role and
collected enormous political credit. The IMPRP past and Ulanhu’s strong position would then
come back to haunt Inner Mongolia and especially the Mongols during the Cultural Revolution.
Looking back to the pre-CR history of Inner Mongolia and its connection to the alleged national
splittism in the IMAR, Qi Zhi has described the periods of modern IM history (xiandaishi, meaning
before the establishment of the IMAR) and contemporary IM history (dangdaishi, since the
establishment of the IMAR) as follows73:
如果说，内蒙古的现代史为“民族分裂”提供了政治组织方面的丰富联想的的话，那
么，内蒙古的当代史则为“民族分裂”提供了思想路线方面的大量证据。74
If the modern history of Inner Mongolia provided ”national splittism” with abundant mental
associations regarding political organization, then the contemporary Inner Mongolian history
provided ”national splittism” with generous evidence considering ideological line.
71 Bulag 2002: 216.
72 Ibid.
73 Qi Zhi does not define as certain point where the history of IM turns from ”modern” to ”contemporary”, and a
common way of defining the two periods  in the PRC is the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. But as
the land reform in Inner Mongolia, one of the defining manifestations of the ”ideological line”, started in late
1947 and the AR itself was established in 1947, one can argue, that dividing year of periodization in this case
would be 1947.
74 Qi Zhi 2010: 57.
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The ”mental associations” (lianxiang) were powered by the history of Inner Mongolian
autonomy movements, the period of Japanese occupation and ”bogus Manchuria” (weiman),
the EMAG and Ulanhu bringing it under CPC leadership. The characteristics of ideological line
(sixiang luxian) were ”pragmatic economic policies”, summarized by Qi Zhi as ”starting from
reality, handling affairs based on nationality characteristics [minzu tedian]”.75
In this part, the history of the IMAR is discussed bearing in mind the abovementioned
characteristics. First the road towards the establishment of the IMAR is discussed concentrating
on the Inner Mongolian autonomy movements, with an emphasis on the Eastern Mongolian
case and how Ulanhu became the leader of the IMAR: Then the contemporary period is
discussed with a focus on the characteristics based on pragmatism and nationality policy, and
how this created a basis for the denouncement of Ulanhu in the beginning of the CR.
4.1 Outer Mongolian Independence
During the Qing-rule Mongolia enjoyed a privileged position compared to China proper having
become “a junior partner in founding the Qing”76.Mongolian traditions and the pastoral way of
life were protected from Chinese influence by a ban on Chinese migration and intermarriage
during most of the Qing-dynasty (1644 ̶ 1911) 77, but at the same time the Qing banner system
divided Mongols into banners and migration between them was prohibited which prevented the
emergence  of  a  united  political  force  among  the  Mongols.  However,  the  Mongols’  status  in
relationship with the Qing started to decline as a result of the increased importance of the
“political economic collaboration with the Manchu monarch and the Han bureaucrats, gentry,
farmers, and merchants“ as the Qing began to transform into a “national state” through the
modernization of the empire.78 The shift was accelerated by the challenge of Western influence
in China and lastly the New Administration (xinzheng) reforms of the early twentieth century
that in China proper were intended to prevent anti-Manchu forces from growing and to gain the
support of Chinese governors and foreigners, but in Mongolia took the form of Chinese
colonialization.79
The weakening Manchu-rule and the increasing Chinese influence towards the end of the Qing
dynasty, especially strong in Inner Mongolia, alerted the Outer Mongolian nobility and resulted
in the declaration of a Mongolian state independent of the Qing empire on 29 December 1911
75 Ibid: 56.
76 Bulag 2002: 6.
77 Chinese  migration  did  continue  to  grow  and  cultivation  of  land  continued  to  increase  towards  the  end  of  the
Qing-era, but the prohibition remained intact until 1902 (Lan 1999: 39 – 41).
78 Liu 2006: 8.
79 Bulag 2002: 6; Lan 1999: 39 – 41; Liu 2006: 8, 13.
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in Urga (Chinese: Kulun庫倫, today’s Ulaanbaatar) following a secret meeting between ”princes
and nobility of the four Khalkha aimags (leagues)” and a delegation sent to Russia for support.80
The status of the newborn Mongolian state remained ambivalent. The Republic of China (ROC)
did not recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and it was not internationally recognized,
but remained “an autonomous state within Chinese suzerainty but also in the Russian sphere of
influence”.81 The declaration of independence and the period of theocracy82 led by  the Bogd
Khan was followed by a brief interruption in the Russian influence over Outer Mongolia during
the revolution and civil war (1917 ̶ 1922) in Russia which gave the opportunity to the Chinese
government to attempt to “restore the sovereignty” in Outer Mongolia. However, this attempt
failed and gave rise to a second revolution that also introduced a new political power, the
Mongolian People’s Party (MPP, renamed the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party, MPRP,
in 192583), and marked the birth of “the oldest political satellite” of Soviet Russia). 84 Assisted by
the Soviet Red Army, the MPP captured Urga by early July 1921 and established the Mongolian
People’s Revolutionary Government. The Outer Mongolia now declaring independence from
China for the second time was named the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) in 1924.85
The Chinese nationalist had to tolerate Soviet influence and military presence in the MPR due
to the Soviet assistance the GMD needed, but Outer Mongolia remained a part of the pan-
nationalist idea of a five-race republic (wuzugonghe). The GMD-CCP split starting from 1927 and
the purge of the CPC by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi蒋介石, 1887 ̶ 1975) took Outer Mongolia
80  Lan  (1999)  notes  that  the  Mongols  in  Outer  Mongolia  had  already  attempted  to  seek  Russian  support  for
independence in the late 1890s, before the New Administrative reforms. In Lan’s interpretation the main reason for
Outer Mongolian independence was the “alliance [between Manchus and Mongols] that could be broken when it
failed to benefit them [the Mongols]” (Lan 1999: 52).
81 Atwood 2004: 533.
82 After the Qing Empire collapsed, Outer Mongolia experienced a period of theocracy which ended in Mongolia
being fought over by China and White Russian troops. The subsequent revolutionary period (1921 – 40) ended with
the great purge (1937 – 1940) and solidification of Communist dictatorship first under Marshal Khorloogiin
Choibalsan (1885 – 1952). Mongolia was called the People’s Republic of Mongolia from 1924 to 1992 until the 1992
constitution following the democratic revolution renamed the country the State of Mongolia. (Atwood 2004: 101,
369, 473.)
83 The party was formed in June 1920 with the aims of protecting the Mongolian religion, restoring the Mongolian
independence, and improving the commoners’ lives. After the MPP began organizing on Russian territory, the
Buriat Mongols who joined in added to its “sophistication and leftist tendencies”. The manifesto approved by the
party’s First Congress in 1924 “called for restoring Outer Mongolia’s equality as an independent state with other
nations but also advocated eventual pan-Mongolian unification, possibly within a progressive, confederated China”.
The party was renamed the People’s Revolutionary Party in March 1925 after Mongolia had been declared a people’s
republic. (Atwood 2004: 380)
84 Liu 2006: 19-
85 Liu 18 – 19; Atwood 380
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even farther from the ROC government sphere of influence. The years of the Second Sino-
Japanese war (1937 ̶ 1945) were significant in consolidating the Soviet sphere of influence in the
MPR and formalizing the divide between Inner and Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union became
the most important supplier of the united Chinese war effort against Japan, and the Soviet-
Japanese conflicts86 in the Soviet and MPR borders with Manchukuo in 1938 ̶ 1939 strengthened
the Soviet presence in Outer Mongolia. Unfortunately for the GMD government, the Soviet
Union and Japan concluded a treaty of neutrality and agreed to the territorial integrity of MPR
and Manchukuo. The GMD government practically lost contact with the MPR due to tightened
border control on both sides.87
In Yalta, February 1945, the American, British, and Soviet leaderships agreed to a deal where
Soviet territorial demands were supported in return to Soviet agreement to enter the war
against Japan. August the same year, the GMD and Soviet governments concluded a treaty in
Moscow confirming the result  of  the Yalta  agreement.  This  “Friendship  Treaty”  of  August  14
recognized (Outer) Mongolian independence on the “face saving condition” that the Mongolian
people’s desire for independence was confirmed with a plebiscite.88 The unanimous result (no
votes against independence) was recognized by the Chinese government in early 1946. The
reluctant agreement to Mongolian independence by the GMD came with trade-offs for
restraints on Soviet expansion in Northwest and Northeast China and assistance in the GMD-
CCP struggle. The Friendship treaty thus confirmed the separation of Outer Mongolia from
China.89
4.2 Inner Mongolian Struggle for Autonomy
In Inner Mongolia, the early nationalist secessionist movements began among the traditional
ruling elites trying to preserve the status quo instead of pursuing social reform. The much more
sinicized Inner Mongolia was not able to seize the moment of instability following the fall of the
Manchu court in the winter of 1911 ̶ 1912. Some supporters of unified Mongolia among the
aristocracy went to serve in the Urga government and the possibility for secession was discussed
also in Inner Mongolia, but most of the aristocrats were protective of their own interests and
decided to collaborate with the new emerging authorities, seeking continuation for their own
86 Two incidents, July 1938 and May 1939  Zhanggufeng and Nomonhan. Moscow and Ulaanbaatar concluded a
mutual assistance pact in March 1936 creating a basis for increasing Soviet troops in the MPR (Globalsecurity).
87 Liu 2006: 32 – 34.
88 Atwood 2004: 438.
89 Liu 2006: 39 – 41; Atwood 2004: 438.
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interests from the ROC and the Yuan Shikai (1859 ̶ 1916) government that reconfirmed the Qing-
era titles and privileges on Mongol princes and lamas90
Lan (1999) lists four reasons Owen Lattimore thought to have decided the Inner Mongolian
aristocracy’s decision not to join Outer Mongolia: The Inner Mongolian princes believed that
independence under the initiation of Outer Mongolia would lead to them being overshadowed
by the princes of Outer Mongolia; the Inner Mongolian princes had greater economic
dependence on China than the Outer Mongolian princes; the Inner Mongols felt that a
republican China would be a weak state with which they could manage their relations as they
pleased; the Inner Mongols feared the spread of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia, and
believed they would have more real freedom in nominal association with China than under a
nominal independence controlled in reality from Russia. Besides, Inner Mongolia was already
crowded by permanent Chinese settlers, and extensive administrative control in addition to
modern arms and railways provided China the possibility to suppress troubles which made
secession risky. Inner Mongolia suffered more under the New Administration which created
more active armed opposition, but they still lacked leaders who would unify them under the
same political goal. Most of the ruling princes were already partly Sinicized and some of them
approving of the reforms.91
The emergence of notable Inner Mongolian autonomy movements did not begin until the mid-
1920s and developed in interplay between Chinese and foreign forces and influences. If the
Outer Mongolian independence was tied to Russian and Soviet support, the Inner Mongolian
autonomy movements were seeking support from a multitude of players: the Comintern/the
Soviet Union, the GMD, the CPC, and Japan. As Liu puts it ”In twentieth-century China, it was
difficult for an ethnonationalist movement to maintain a purely ethnic political stand. Such a
movement, always a weaker force challenging the dominant Chinese central authority, often
sought to ally itself with a stronger foreign or rebellious Chinese force.”92
The Early IMPRP
The first considerable representative of Inner Mongolian autonomy movements, the Inner
Mongolian Nationalist (People’s) Revolutionary Party (IMPRP) 93 was founded in Zhangjiakou on
90 Liu 2006: 14 – 16.
91 Lan 1999: 52 – 53.
92 Liu 2006: 229.
93 The form Inner Mongolian Nationalist (People’s) Revolutionary Party (Neimenggu guomin (renmin) gemingdang)
is  used by Qi Zhi 2010 (35).  Nakami (2003) has a possible explanation for the parentheses used by Qi Zhi:  Guo
Daofu referred to the party in Chinese as ‘Neimenggu guomin gemingdang’ (Inner Mongolian National
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12 october 1925.The 125 attendees of the founding conference included representatives of
Inner Mongolian leagues and banners, the Comintern, the GMD, the CPC, Feng Yuxiang’s
National Army, and the MPR. The Congress elected a 21-member Central Committee with Bai
Yunti (白云梯, Serengdongrub) 94  as the chairman and Merse (Guo Daofu 郭道甫)95  as the
secretary-general. The spirit of the manifesto, the party programme, and the provincial policy
adopted by the Congress express the goal of building a republic based on the principle of the
five-race-nation and opposing imperialist powers, princes, and warlords; practicing democracy
and ethnic equality; realizing equal land-rights and ethnic autonomy.96
The newly established IMPRP started with organizing its own army and had plans on building a
Mongolian National Army (Menggu guominjun), developing its support base and also recruiting
among the upper stratum of Inner Mongolian society. However, the activities of the newly
established IMPRP did not continue long due to the GMD-CPC split and the resulted end to the
Comintern collaboration. In a special meeting of the of the Party in Ulaanbaatar in August 192797,
the People’s Party split into two groups, one aligning itself with the Comintern and another with
the GMD. In early 1928 Bai Yunti went to request the party to be incorporated into the GMD as
a local branch office. He became the Inner Mongolian representative of the GMD government
and later fled to Taiwan along with the GMD retreat in 1949.98
Revolutionary Party), which reflected his interpretation of the Mongolian word arad (representing ‘the people’) in
the Mongolian name of the Mongolian People’s Party (later Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party) at a time
when  nationalism,  rather  than  socialism,  was  the  driving  force  of  Mongolian  revolution.  Nakami  adds,  that  the
Mongol name of the party makes it appear “as a sister party of the Outer Mongolian MPRP”, whereas the Chinese
name “resonantes with ‘Zhongguo Guomindang’” i.e. the GMD. (Nakami 2003: 97 – 98).
94 Bai  Yunti  (白雲梯,Bayantai, 1894 ̶ 1980), “sophisticated early Mongolian” revolutionary, later presented as
traitor to the Mongolian nationality and revolution. Fled to Taiwan in 1949. (Bulag 2002: 143; Yang 2014: 20).
95 Merse (Guo Daofu, 1894 ̶ ?), Another “sophisticated early Mongolian” revolutionary, later presented as traitor to
the Mongolian nationaity and revolution. Son of a Daur (Dawo’er達斡爾) noble family from Hulunnbier’er. Took
part  in setting up the Hulunbuir Youth Party in 198.  Sacked from his  job as a  Russian translator in the Chinese
foreign ministry due to praise of the (Outer) Mongolian revolution in his book New Mongolia (1923). Met with Sun
Yat-sen in 1924 and was inspired by his Three People’s Principles, publishing two books on the Mongolian question.
Was instrumental in the founding of the IMPRP. One of the major leaders of the IMPRP with “extensive links with
the MPR and the Soviet Union”.Led a failed uprising in Hulunbuir league after the split of the party in 1927. Set up
the Northeastern Banner Normal School in Mukden (Shenyang), “which became the cradle of Inner Mongolian
modern  education  and  nationalism”.  Merse  sought  refuge  in  the  Soviet  consulate  after  the  Japanese  invasion  of
Manchuria and disappeared thereafter. His student Hafeng’a became one of the leaders of the IMPRP by its revival
after the Japanese surrender in 1945. (Bulag 2002: 143 – 145.)
96 Qi Zhi 2010: 35 – 36.
97  Before moving to Ulaanbaatar, the People’s Party had already moved its headquarters west, first from
Zhangjiakou to Baotou, and then to Yinchuan, due to their “military patron” Feng Yuxiang’s Guominjun losing to
Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian Army in northern China (Qi Zhi 2010: 36 – 37).
98 Nakami 2003: 99; Qi Zhi 2010: 36 – 38.
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Following the split of the party, the party politics in Inner Mongolia faded away for years. After
Bai Yunti joined the GMD, the Inner Mongolian party became a part of the Nanjing party
headquarters, but it practically lost contact to the some thousands of members left mostly in
Baotou and Yikezhao (Ordos) regions and existed little more than in name only.99
Prince De
After  the  split  of  the  the  early  IMPRP  and  the  incorporation  of  its  remains  into  the  GMD
government by Bai Yunti in 1928 and the establishment of Chinese provinces in Inner Mongolia
the same year (see appendix: Map 2), Prince Demchungdongrub (De Wang 德王, Prince De,
1902 ̶ 1962) became the “leading Mongol advocate of Inner Mongolian autonomy”.100 De was
prince in the ”most traditional and conservative Inner Mongolian league”, Xilinguole (錫林郭勒,
Shiliin Gol, Silingol)101, and had  the dream of unifying Inner Mongolia under autonomy against
the Chinese provinces. To win over the conservative princes he collected prestige by reaching to
Panchen Lama for support in uniting the princes behind his cause. 102  Building temples to
Panchen to gain political leadership and training his own military the same time, by May 1932
he had enough name to be appointed “ the newly established job of pacification commissioner
to Mongolia (Mengu xuanfu shi)”.  But  Prince De was not  willing  to  become a  Chinese agent
of ”pacification”, and declined the appointment to ”launch transprovincial movement to
establish an autonomous Mongolian government.103
Threatened by Japanese advance in Inner Mongolia and colonization efforts by the Shanxi
warlord Yan Xishan (阎锡山. 1886 ̶ 1960) in the ealry 1930s, Prince De tried to negotiate Inner
Mongolian autonomy with the GMD central government based on Sun Yat-sen’s (Sun Zhongshan
孙中山, 1866 ̶ 1925) ideas of cultivating frontier minorities towards self-determination and self-
rule. As a result of a congress of Inner Mongolian delegates in Bailingmiao (百灵庙, Batukhaalga,
Beile-yin Süme) in October 1933 De Wang established an Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Government that “claimed authority over all Mongols living within the original territory of the
Inner Mongolian leagues, banners, and tribes”.104
99 Qi Zhi 2010: 39.
100 Bulag 2010: 86 – 87.
101 Atwood 2004: 141. The Xilinguole league of today (Xilinguole, 錫林郭勒), along with Alashan and Xing’an,  is
one of the remaining three Inner Mongolian leagues. The geographic domain of Xilinguole was expanded south in
1953 as a result of a merger with Chahar league. (Atwood 2004: 500.)
102 For more on the Prince De and the Panchen, see Bulag 2010: 86 – 98.
103 Bulag 2010: 87.
104 Atwood 2004: 141; Leibold 2007: 60 – 62 (original italics).
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Despite eventually winning the official support of the central government and Jiang Jieshi for
the establishment of a Mongolian Political Council (MPC)105 in 1935, that “was mandated to
manage Mongolian affairs in the three provinces” of Suiyuan, Chahar, and Xilinguole. He was
able to recruit Mongols of different backgrounds, including GMD and CPC supporters, and the
MPC “became a beacon of hope to Mongols of all strata and political ambitions”.106
However, De was frustrated by Chiang’s disinterest to support the Mongols against the threat
of Japanese invasion and to address the problem of the Suiyuan and Shanxi authorities not
accepting and respecting the MPC’s autonomy. This led to De Wang turn to Japan for support
for Inner Mongolian autonomy and to eventually signing an agreement of cooperation between
the MPC and Manchukuo in Xinjing (nowadays Changchun) in December 1935.107
The agreement of Prince De and the Japanese army was “that Japan would first help Prince De
to establish an independence movement among the leagues and banners of western Inner
Mongolia, after which a Mongolian state would be established”.108 However, collaboration with
Japan did not bring independence to Inner Mongolia. Prince De proceeded to organize the
Mongolian Army Headquarters in Wuzhumuqin (乌珠穆沁 Üjümüchin, Ujumchin) right banner
and inaugurated the Mongolian military government in February 1936 in Dehua naming himself
chairman and adopting a new calendar counted from the birthday of Chinggis Khan, its first year
being the 731th of Chinggis Khan.109
De Wang’s Mongolian Army took part in the failed Japanese-organized joint attack to Wuiyuan
in October-November 1946, and a successful one to southern Chaha’er, northern Shanxi and
Suiyuan regions the following year. Refusing De Wang’s proposal of an independent Mongolia,
the Japanese decided to set up a new government with its seat in Guisui that was now renamed
Hohhot. Prince Yun (Yunduanwangchuke, head of the Ulaanchab league) was named chairman,
but died to an illness before assuming his post, and the vice-chairman De Wang assumed
chairmanship of the new ”puppet” United Mongolian Autonomous Government (UMAG).110
After the unsuccessful Zhanggufeng (Battle of Lake Khasan, JulyAugust 1938) and Nuomonhan
(Battles of Khalkhyn Gol, MaySeptember 1939 ) battles Japan changed its orientation towards a
105 Mongolian  Local  Autonomous  Political  Affairs  Council  (Menggu difang zihzi zhengwu weiyuanhui or
Mengzhenghui) (Leibold 2007: 65). In Bulag (2010), Local Mongolian Political Council (LMPC) (137).
106 Bulag 2010: 138.
107 Bulag 2010: 137; Leibold 63 – 68; Lu 2007: 151.
108Lu 2007: 152.
109 Bulag 2010: 43; Lu 2007: 152 – 154.
110 Lu 2007: 155 – 157.
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concentrated attack to occupy China proper, in which the Manmo 111  became  a  region  of
strategic defence and political foundation. The UMAG was merged with Southern Chaha’er and
Northern Shanxi, two collaborationist regimes, into the Mongolian Border Region United
Autonomous Government (Mengjiang蒙疆) on September 1, 1939, of which De Wang was made
chairman, but chief advisor Kanai Shoji having actual control of the government. The capital of
the Mengjiang was in Zhangjiakou, and its striped flag of yellow, blue, white, and red
represented the different peoples of the area (Han, Mongol, Hui) with red stripe in the middle
standing for the ruling Japan.112
The Meingjiang government was renamed Mongolian Autonomous State in August 1941, and
Prince De was able to gain back “more than nominal authority” with the transfer of Kanai Shoji,
but De, “wearied by constant political struggles”, “redirected his attention to educational,
publishing, and economic reforms among the Mongols”.113 He fled to Beijing after the Soviet-
Mongolian invasion in August 1945 where he remained semiretired. He made one last try to
establish Mongol autonomy in Alashan (阿拉善 Alasha, Alxa) in January 1949, after which he
was sentenced to hard labor as a counterrevolutionary by the CPC government until 1963. De
Wang died of illness in Hohhot on 23 May 1966. According to Atwood (2004) the “stubborn by
nature and conscious of his privileges as a prince”, De Wang “is still respecter by most Inner
Mongolians”, for he insistence for Mongols equal treatment. He demanded higher autonomous
from the GMD government and ended up turning to the Japanese for help. For the for both the
GMD and the CPC Prince De was guilty of treason, a collaborationist, either as Hanjian (汉奸) as
the general term for Chinese (regardless of nationality) collaborating with enemies was in GMD
usage, or as Mengjian (蒙奸), a term the CPC came up with in 1936 ̶ 1937.114
IMPRP
The split of the GMD-CPC alliance (1923 ̶ 1927) left one part of the early People’s Party under
Comintern guidance. Secessionism had been forbidden for the Inner Mongols during the united
front, but now as China was ruled by Chiang Kai-shek, it became “the proper revolutionary
policy”115. The underground activities were divided into western (Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningxia
provinces) and eastern (Rehe, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces, and parts of Heilongjiang province)
111 The three northeastern provinces, the Hulunbeir region, Zhelimu, Zhaowuda, Zhuosutu, and Xilinguole
leagues, and left and right wings of Chahar Eight Banners (Lu 2007: 168).
112 Atwood 2004: 141;Lu 2007: 156 – 162.
113 Atwood 2004: 141.
114 Atwood 2004: 142; Bulag 2010: 102 – 104; Yang 16.
115 Atwood 1992: 13.
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branch bureaus that mediated between the local organs and the Central Committee of the
IMPRP located in Ulaanbaatar116.
Between  the  late  1920s  and  early  1930s  the  Comintern  sent  Inner  Mongolian  agents  to
undertake party work in their assigned areas, among them Termurbagen (Temu’erbagen 特木
尔巴根, Temürbagana 1901-1969)117, assigned to Kerqin (Ke’erqin科尔沁 Khorchin) Left Middle
Banner in Rehe (热河) province (in today’s Tongliao), who became one of the most important
IMPRP leaders. Eastern Inner Mongolia was a fertile ground for Mongol autonomy and
independence movements, as the resentment against warlord domination was strong, and was
further intensified by the ruthless suppression of a rebellion led by Kerqin military leader Gaadaa
Meiren against colonization plans implemented by the Northeast warlord Zhang Xueliang (张学
良 1901 ̶ 2001) right before Temurbagen’s arrival.118
The Japanese invasion attack in the Northeast in 1931 gave the Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Army (IMAA), formed by different groups of educated youth and rebel troops, a chance to “strike
for independence”, but their attempt soon fell short as the Japanese were able to draw the
IMAA in their direction. The resistance in the north of eastern Inner Mongolia, where Merse had
gone to resist Japanese imperialism with some of his Daur students, failed too and Merse
disappeared119. The official end of the eastern Mongolian fight for independence came on 18
February 1932, when a resolution approving the Japanese plan for a Khinggan (Xing’an 兴安)
autonomous Mongol province within Manchukuo was passed.120
The Khinggan era under Japanese rule brought many reforms that met the demands of the
young Mongols and created opportunities for the new educated class in the Khinggan
administration. Borders were drawn between Mongolian and Chinese areas and the military,
administrative, and cultural structures were to be Mongolian from top to bottom, in language
and in nationality121 The Mongol nobility lost most of the privileges adhering to their titles and
116 Ibid.
117 The same year another Moscow-educated activist,  Ulanhu,  was sent to western Inner Mongolia (Qi Zhi 2010:
40). Temurbagen was imprisoned briefly in 1936 after his secret activities caught the attention of the Japanese, after
which he remained under Japanese surveillance until the end of the war (Liu 2006: 130).
118 Atwood 1992: 13.
119 According  to  Nakami,  Merse  was  taken  under  guard  to  the  Soviet  Union  through  the  Soviet  consulate  in
Manzhouli (2003: 104).
120 Atwood 1992: 14 – 15.
121 Some consequences of the ”nativisation” included the Chinese officials in Khinggan who chose to stay having to
take Mongolian names and learn the Mongolian language, which was the command language. The East Mongolian
practice of having a Chinese name not related to one’s Mongolian name (Khafungga in Mongolian, Teng Xuwen in
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the replacement of the noble banner rulers (zasag) was no longer hereditary. The selection of
the reorganized banner government personnel was in theory based on merit and also banner
members who had moved from other areas were eligible to work in the banner government.
Most importantly, the reforms brought by the Japanese rule created a large number of offices
offering the educated youth positions of influence. 122
The Khinggan period also expanded the opportunities for modern education, as modern
elementary schools were established in all the Mongolian banners of the Manchurian Empire.
The language of instruction was Mongolian and Japanese was thought as well. The high schools
established in many of the banners with two normal schools (in Kailu and Zalan Ail/Zhalantun)
and the more advanced Khinggan Normal School (in Wangyemiao) offered the Inner Mongolian
youth a full program of modern education for the first time123.
Despite the reforms, increase in prosperity, and the new opportunities for the young Mongols,
the situation was not what the Mongols had longed for. Nakami sees that the Japanese did foster
“some kind of confidence” in Mongol identity by “praising Genghis Khan and the glorious past
of the Mongol empire”, and on the other hand, by containing Mongol nationalism strengthened
the Mongol identity rising from resistance to Japan, but their interests were geopolitical and not
aimed at, and not in the position to allow, the establishment of a Mongol state 124. Mongols were
given more administrative responsibilities, but the actual power was still in the hands of
Japanese officials. Many traditionally Mongolian banner areas were left outside the Khinggan
province and the separation from Prince De’s government in western Inner Mongolia prevented
the emergence of a united Inner Mongolia. Ideologically the abolishment of feudal socio-political
structures were welcome for the Soviet-trained youth yearning for independence with socialism
and communism, but often the nobility and the Buddhist clergy maintained positions of
influence in the government and society. As signs of displeasure many Khinggan officials left for
Prince  De’s  government  in  the  west  or  joined  secret  revolutionary  groups  and  the  era  was
“punctuated by espionage scandals” severely dealt with, again adding to the resentment against
the Japanese.125
Chinese) was often replaced by the practice of transcribing one’s Mongolian name into Chinese characters
(Khafungga to Hafeng’a哈丰阿) (Atwood 1992: 16).
122 Atwood 1992: 15 – 18.
123 Atwood 1992: 18. Atwood, writing in 1992, noted that most common foreign language in Mongolian-medium
high schools in Inner Mongolia was still Japanese.
124 Nakami 2003: 103 – 104.
125Atwood 1992: 20. For some examples of Mongol espionage cases in Khinggan see Atwood 1992: 20 – 21.
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The core members of the IMPRP, like Temurbagen and Hafenga (Hafeng’a 哈丰阿, Khafungga
1908 ̶ 1970), kept their allegiance to the Comintern-led People’s Revolutionary Party secret and
concentrated recruitment work among intellectuals using their contacts from school days and
in the Khinggan army126.  But at the same time, the Soviet Union had decided that the IMPRP
nationalist approach was too divisive to be continued. To avoid a weak Chinese southern front
that would enable the Japanese to attack the Soviet Union, the revocation of the GMDCPC
United Front was initiated in the 7th Congress of the Third Communist International in Moscow
in August 1935. The 1 August anti-Japanese appeal to the Chinese people by Wang Ming (王明
1904 ̶ 1974) and other Moscow-based Chinese Communists 127  had no mention of self-
determination for the Mongols or any other minority, and the Soviet Union restored diplomatic
relations with Nanjing128. At the same time (1935) the IMPRP Central Committee in Ulaanbaatar
was dissolved, but apparently there was no attempt to inform the East Mongols of the change
of policy regarding Inner Mongolian self-determination.129
The Soviet Red Army troops took Khinggan in only a couple of days in August 1945130, and East
Mongolia was open to competing political forces. Presenting itself as an alternative to the
Chinese parties, the IMPRP issued a “Declaration of Liberation of the People of Inner Mongolia”
on August 18, announcing the continued existence of an “East Mongolian Department” of the
IMPRP. The declaration expressed the will to unite Inner Mongolia with the MPR, follow a road
of non-capitalist development, promote equality of all people in Inner Mongolia regardless of
ethnicity, and to cooperate with “allied Chinese revolutionary parties”. But soon the Mongols
received the text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed on 26 August, that “provided the
independence of the MPR, but specifically left Inner Mongolia within China”, which made the
126 By the end of  World War II  the IMPRP had over 100 members within and in the surrounding regions of  the
Khinggan province (Atwood 1992: 22 – 23).
127August 1st Manifesto 八一宣言 or A Letter Calling All Compratriots to Resist Japan 为抗日告全体同胞书. The
Manifesto “entirely the product of the Chinese Comintern delegation” [i.e. not coming from within China] was
first published in the Paris-based newspaper Jiuguo bao on 7 November from where it then was posted to China for
publication (Garver 1988: 36).
128 However, it should be remembered that the December 1935 manifesto/declaration to the Inner Mongolian
people  did  promise  the  Inner  Mongolian  people  the  right  to  self-determination.  Atwood  (1992)  notes  that  “the
Chinese Communists  still  promised the right of  secession to the Mongols up until  1937,” when the CPC finally
accepted the GMD-CPC united front, and  compares the development of the CPC view on minority self-
determination to that  in Yugoslavia:  ”Calls  for the recognition of  the right of self-determination in the twenties,
followed by a switch to demanding immediate minority secession in 1928, and then a reversal to an explicitly anti-
secessionist position on 1935” (Atwood 1992: 74).
129 Atwood 1992: 22 – 23; Garver 1988: 34 – 36.
130 First Soviet planes over Inner Mongolia were observed on August 7, the troops arrived two days later and the war
in Khinggan was practically over by August 12 (Atwood 1992: 26).
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IMPRP leaders to realize that joining the MPR was not an immediate option, and they would first
have to develop their own organization.131
The first Congress of the East Mongolian Department was held on 5 September 1945. Only
twenty-three party members showed up (27 invited) to the congress led by Hafenga, the head
of the secretariat, and the three chairmen, Boyanmandu (博彦满都, Buyanmandukhu 1894-
1980), Temurbagen, and Sgarazhab. The party presented itself as a poor peasant’s party, but
turned to the intelligentsia and old Khinggan officials for political survival. This contradiction was
resolved with the concepts of “New Democracy” and “democratic revolution” that would be the
transitional stage in which the upper-strata elements still play a part. The short-term aim was a
“free union of a new democratic New China” (Maoist vocabulary) in coalition with or led by the
CPC, and the ultimate goals were a union with MPR, socialism, and communism. The party
established contacts with both the GMD and the CPC, with emphasis on avoiding any open
conflict with the Chinese, but with a suspicious attitude towards the GMD and belief in
friendship with the Chinese Communists. They had trouble gaining access to the Mongols of the
MPR because the joint advance of the MPR and Soviet troops in Inner Mongolia against Japan
had left the Wangyemiao area to the Soviet Red Army instead of MPR troops.132
After the party decided to go public in September 1945 their activities developed rapidly. Young
intellectuals were deployed to collect names for petitions for union with the MPR in their home
regions. Also, the recruitment of new party members was accelerated. On 9 October 1945, 31
petitions  “each  with  a  mass  of  signatures  from  21  banners  were  sent  via  the  Red  Army  to
Choibalsang” 133. Also, a delegation of 12 members was organized to seek Ulaanbaatar’s support
for unification134. However, Choibalsang declined the idea of eastern Inner Mongolia joining the
MPR and urged the delegation to dissolve the IMPRP and accept the unified leadership of the
CPC.135
While the hopes of the IMPRP leaders of joining the MPR were crushed, the rapid development
of party activities had the effect of creating a mass movement behind it. The IMPRP organized
militarily establishing a new Central Khinggan Local Garrison Corps with soviet support to patrol
the area of Wang-un Süme and nearby towns. A public hygiene and epidemic prevention unit
131 Atwood 1992: 30.
132 Atwood 1992: 32 – 33.
133 Atwood 1992: 38.
134 The delegation left for Ulaanbaatar on 14 October 1945 and returned late-November.
135 Ibid: 35 – 38, 42.
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was also organized and began the work of controlling the bubonic plague epidemic that had hit
the area.136
The IMPRP began organizing mass assemblies and people’s governments in different parts of
the Khinggan area. The IMPRP did not fully comply with Ulabaatar’s instructions on dissolving
the party and accepting CPC leadership, probably due to the strong support for Mongolian unity
that was observed during the process of collecting mass petitions. They increased cooperation
with the communists but at the same time tried to establish itself as an autonomous political
agent  allied  to  the  Communistd  but  free  to  negotiate  with  the  Nationalists.  This  was  to  be
achieved by taking control of their territory and setting up a government.137
The People’s Congress of East Mongolia was held January 16 ̶ 20, 1946 in Gegenmiao (葛根庙
Gegen Süme , near Bailingmiao). The size of the Congress was remarkable, totaling 2,200
participants of whom almost 300 were voting delegates, several times more than the founding
Congress of the IMPRP in 1925, and the First Mongolian Congress in 1936 that founded Prince
De’s government.138
The Congress adopted an Autonomous Law, essentially a constitution for the new government,
as well as programs of administration and of economic development. A manifesto justifying the
creation of an autonomous government in terms of the principles of self-determination and self-
rule adopted by the First Congress of the GMD in 1924 was produced. The manifesto defined
the government of East Mongolia as an autonomous organ within the territory of the ROC. “The
East Mongolian government was actually running an independent state which was voluntarily
refraining from opening foreign relations or proclaiming its de jure independence.”139
The central administration was headed by Boyanmandu, Hafenga was the chairman of the
secretariat, and Temurbagen headed the Ministry of Economy. The actual administrative tasks
devolved onto the six provinces into which the autonomous government was divided, four of
which the Autonomous Government of East Mongolia had actual control: Khinggan, Zhirim
(Zhelimu哲里木), Zuu Uda (Zhaowuda昭乌达) , Naun Muren (Nawen muren纳文穆仁).140 The
former Khinggan North province, Khölön Buir (Hulunbei’er呼伦贝尔), had its own Autonomous
Provincial Government established in October 1, 1945 headed by popular local leader
136 Atwood 1992: 35 – 39.
137 Atwood 1992: 40 – 42.
138 Atwood 1992: 46.
139 Atwood 1992: 46.
140 Atwood 1992: 46 – 47.
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Erkhimbatu and supported by the Soviet Union. The southernmost Zosotu (Zhuosutu 卓索图)
Province was under the Communist Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning regime, to which Bai Yunhang (Bai
Yunti’s brother) who was sent to the area by the Wangyemiao government, joined perfoce.
Military forces were organized into the People’s Autonmous Army of East Mongolia, under the
overall command of Askhan, and its brigades, essentially garrison forces, were divided by
territory.141
The East Mongolian Autonomous Government (EMAG), officially inaugurated on 15 February
1946, initially kept up an appearance of neutrality, but forged connections with and developed
to the direction of the Communists. The EMAG and the CPC West Manchurian Branch Bureau
organized trade, students’, and women’s unions in cooperation, as well as set up the East
Mongolian Military and Political Cadre School, with Hafenga as the school president and the CPC
newly established Wangyemiao liaison office’s Hu Zhaoheng (胡昭衡, 1915 ̶ 1999) as the political
commissar. The party was taken leftwards in March 1946 with a reorganization, and a new party
programme imitating “the Communist party constitution adopted at Yan’an in 1945. The IMPRP
defined the poor peasants and herdsmen as the ones in need of protection from the rich ones.
Also more importance was paid to unity of the whole of Inner Mongolia, drawing the party closer
to Ulanhu’s Federation of the Autonomous Movement of Inner Mongolia.142
The evacuation of the Soviet Red Army stationed in the Northeast and also Wangyemiao in the
spring of 1946 added to the need of the Eastern Mongolian government to choose sides
between the warring Chinese parties. The reluctance of the Nationalist government to approve
the EMAG in  March confirmed the need to  negotiate  with  the CPC.  IMPRP leaders  met  with
Ulanhu first in Chifeng (赤峰, Ula’ankhada) and then on 30 march 1936 in Chengde (承德),
where Ulanhu was able to convince (or coerce143) the IMPRP leaders to bring the EMAG under
the leadership of Ulanhu’s Lianhehui and the CPC. The East Mongolian military forces were
placed under the Eight Route Army commands of the neighboring regions. The agreement came
with conditions of approval from the East Mongolian People’s Congress, separated jurisdiction
for Mongolian areas in mixed counties, and leadership positions in the Lianhehui for the eastern
Mongols. Hafenga and Temurbagen became members of the CPC, Boyanmandu (who had been
the leader of the Manchukuo Khinggan province) either did not want or was not allowed to join.
141 Atwood 1992: 46 – 48.
142Atwood 1992: 50 – 51.
143For an example of Ulanhu’s ”verbal assault” on the IMPRP leaders, see Atwood 1992: 65 – 66. Atwood describes
Ulanhu as the “bad cop” of the negotiations, accusing the IMPRP “following the line of the feudal upper stratum”,
having officials of the Manchurian government in the party, and by pointing out, that it was the Communists and
not IMPRP that had fought the Japanese in the 1930s and the 1940s.
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General Branch Federation of East Mongolia under Hafenga was set up to mediate between
Ulanhu and the local eastern Mongolian governments. Boyanmandu was made deputy chairman
of the Federation. The Mongolian revolution of 1921 was still held up as the model for Inner
Mongolian revolution and “the slogan ‘Long live Choibalsang’” retained through 1947144. The
EMAG was officially dissolved by the Congress of East Mongolia government on 25 May 1946.
The IMPRP was also dissolved.145
In practice Ulanhu had now successfully brought the EMAG under CPC leadership and the story
of the IMPRP ended but the memory of Inner Mongolian independence and autonomy
movements and the IMPRP would strike back at many of the Mongol leaders during the Cultural
Revolution.
4.3. Ulanhu and the Politics of Difference
There was a short period in late 1946 and early 1947 when the IMPRP leaders contemplated
bringing back the IMPRP146, but the thought was thrown aside by late April and early May 1947,
and despite Ulanhu being faced with opposition at the founding conference of the Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Government (IMAG) in Wangyemiao from Mongols “who stood for
neutrality in the civil war and opposed land reform as unnecessary in Inner Mongolia”, but the
result of the conference turned on Ulanhu’s side and the new Autonomous Region was
established under CPC control and the redundant Lianhehui was abolished.147 The establishment
of  the  IMAG  was  declared  on  May  1  and  a  nineteen-member  Government  Committee  was
elected. Ulanhu became chairman of the new government, with Hafenga as the deputy
chairman148 Ulanhu had successfully brought the EMAG and eastern Inner Mongolia under CPC
leadership and created the first minority autonomy region for the CPC149.
144 Atwood 1992: 64.
145 Atwood 1992: 64 – 68; Qi Zhi 2010: 47 – 48.
146 The Northeast Bureau of the CPC considered the revival of the IMPRP in the shape of “Democratic (People’s)
Party possible, if the people of Eastern Mongolia demanded it, but on the condition of it being led by the CPC and
the  CPC  having  command  of  the  military.  Qi  Zhi  describes  that  the  destiny  a  “united  party  of  all  revolutionary
parties” allowed based on the consideration of a united front policy would have been the same as the “democratic
parties” in Mainland China afterwards [the eight non-communist parties with no actual power]. (Qi Zhi 2010: 48 –
52.)
147 Atwood 1992: 69.
148 From the persons mentioned in this thesis, the new government committee members included Ulanhu, Hagenga,
Temurbagen, Kuibi, Asigen (Askhan), Wang Zaitian (王再天) (Hao 1991: 20),
149 At first the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government covered only the eastern part of Inner Mongolia.
Suiyuan-province making most of the western The IMAR reached its nowadays frontiers only in 3 April 1956
when the autonomous Mongol prefecture (zhou) Bayanhaote (巴彦浩特) and autonomous Mongol banner Ejina
(额济纳) of Gansu prvince were incorporated into the IMAR and Alashan (阿拉善) league was established.
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Following the establishment of the IMAG, the “ideological evidence” of “nationali splittism”
mentioned above started to pile up from the “politics of difference” (as Bulag 2002 describes
Ulanhu’s strategies) that emphasized the difference between Mongols and Chinese and the
Inner Mongolian local characteristics to block policies Ulanhu “deemed unfavorable to the
Mongols”.150 These politics of difference became the major theme of the CR denouncement of
Ulanhu. Below are two examples of how Ulanhu’s “politics of difference” appeared in land
reforms in Inner Mongolia.
Lessons in IMAR Characteristics – Land Reform
One of the earliest minority specific policies that were to become “crimes” during the CR was
the so called “Three Nos and Two Benefits (san bu liang li) policy151, that was brought up by
Ulanhu as a solution to the disaster brought by early land reform in pastoral regions of Inner
Mongolia. After the establishment of the IMAG the CPC-GMD civil war broke out and the IMAG-
controlled territory was designated as a “liberated region” (jiefangqu)  where an all-out  land
reform was to be implemented.152
This land reform was violent and in both agricultural and pastoral regions. In agricultural regions
the land reform was about distributing “land to the tiller” (as the slogan went) seeking to
eradicate feudalism and also ”consolidating the revolutionary regime” by ”eliminating social
bases of Japanese collaborators and GMD supporters” and strengthening CPC support among
the peasants who gained land.153  This  hit  many  of  the  top  Mongol  leaders  who  were  both
landlords and feudal elemts, and had also served the Japanese government during the Xing’an
period. Former Monogl landlords were violently struggled against, to the extent that they that
the top officials had to be protected by Ulanhu (which later became a crime of his).154 in July
1948 Ulanhu analyzed the ”left” deviationst to Inner Mongolian cadres (July 30 1948), bringing
Before this, some major inclusions were parts of the divided Rehe province in July 1955, and Suiyuan province in
March 1954. (Hao 1991: 516 – 517.) For information on minor additions to the IMAR territory see maps in Qi Zhi
(2010: 51, 83).
150 Bulag 2002: 225
151 Bulag 2002: 119 – 120. ”The Three Nos and Two Benefits” (san bu liang li) was a policy, that ”proposed that in
the pastoral regions there should be no property distribution (bu fen), no class labeling (bu hua jieji), and no class
struggle (bu dou). Herdlords and their workers were regarded as symbiotic, with each benefiting the other (liang li)
(Bulag 2002: 120.; Chinese added)” The Tree Nos policy became a CCP policy in minority pastoral regions after the
founding of the PRC. (Bulag 2002: 121)
152 Bulag 2002: 114 – 115.
153 Ibid: 115 – 116.
154 Ibid: 116 – 117.
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up the problem of not ”specifying targets”of struggle ”according to the actual situation of Inner
Mongolia”, but the land reform in agricultural regions was executed through.155
In the pastoral regions, where there were only few Chinese, the violence was of intraethnic
character. Class labeling was based on number of animals possessed, which made rich Mongols
distributed animals to subordinates or “slaughtered animals en masse” to avoid being labeled
herdords (muzhu), and therefore confiscation of property and physical elimination. The poor
Mongols on the other hand were afraid of being labeled herdlords due to the newly acquired
animals, and thus tried to get rid of animals through consumption. “Within a very short time,
not  only  were  some  among  the  Mongol  elite  killed,  but  there  was  a  catastrophic  loss  of
animals”.156The resistance of some Mongols herdlords, an its peak, the Ulanmog rebel in Xing’an
league in February 1948157, was put down by the IMAG Army. IN a self-criticism of the Northeast
Bureau of the CPC in June 1949 the failure to distinguish between Mongols and Chinese and the
mistake of trying to apply practices from Chinese areas to the Mongol areas were admitted. 158
For the future work the self-criticism suggested education of cadres in nationality policy, training
of Mongolian cadres, distinguishing between different policies to different regions and
understanding the need for a gradual implementation of democratic policy.159
Ulanhu’s solution to the problems of land reform in pastoral regions was hat of the reform and
the Three Nos and Two Benefits policy， that protected pastoral regions form property
distribution, class labeling, and class struggle, and recognized the herdordherd worker
relationship as mutually beneficial. This policy was made official in Harbin conference in July-
August 1948. 160 Bulag (2002) has described, that Ulanhu ”introduced a new boundary” between
agrarian China and pastoral areas in Inenr Mongolia. The Mongolian herdlords ”were redefined
as different from Chinese landlords”, and the herd workers ”were to be treated as national
capitalists – that is, as progressive elements”.161 Also in the agricultural regions measures were
adopted ”to prevent Chinese peasants from further struggling against Mongol landlords”, but
Mongol peasants were allowd to take part in struggling against Chinese landlords.162 Bulag finds
155 Bulag 2002: 117.
156 Bulag 2002: 119.
157 In this open rebellion, ”more than twho hundred rebels killed land reform cadres and attempted to
flee to the MPR with many followers and horses” (Bulag 2002: 119). )
158 The ”leftist mistakes” were not only directly related to economy, but also destructions of
monasteries, prrohibitions on Budha worship, and even discrimination against speaking Monoglian in
the army were brought up in the criticism (Bulag 2002: 119 – 120). .
159 Ibid.
160 Bulag 2002: 120.
161 Ibid: 120 – 121.
162 Ibid
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ironic, that ”ideological unity meant ethnic dicision, for unrestrained class struggle eventually
developed into national confrontation once again”, that Mongols were no longer seen as
an ”oppressed small nation”, but internal class relation became defining in ethnically mixed
areas and many Mongols became targets of class struggle.163
Ulanhu’s Three Nos and Two Benefits policy was a success. With other related policies it “arouse
the productive enthusiasm of herdlords and herdsmen” bringing growth to pastoral economy.
It  was  made  a  countrywide  policy  in  pastoral  regions  in  1953. 164  IBulag explains, that the
argument of Mongol distinctiveness was accepted by the Chinese leaders not only because of
the deviations in class struggle and land reform, but also because the Inner Mongols became a
model “for soliciting support from other ethnic minorities in China and/or incorporation in a
future “unified China”.165
Discourse of Difference in Tumed Banner
Another example of nationality-spesific policies and conflicting ideologies comes from the land
reform and in Suiyuan province. Already before it became a part of the IMAR (1954), in 1951
Suiyuan land reform Ulanhu was able to pass instructions that would allow the Mongols in
agricultural banners to possess twice as much land as the Chinese, and their class status “would
be determined exclusively by the volume of exploitation (exploitative income), rather than the
amount of land owned”. 166 The Chinese saw the Mongols as land owners, the Mongols insisted
that they were that “in name only” because of the warlord control and counties set up on banner
territory. “The Mongols’ class status was consequently set one rung lower than that of Chinese
with similar class statuses”, their treatment based on living standards instead of land
ownership.167 The low-level farming skills of landless or poor Mongols were made up by giving
them twice as much land as the Chinese.168 This protected many Mongols from being classified
as landlords. The “earlier yardstick” had been 20% of Monogls classified as landlords, but in the
banners subject to land reform in Suiyuan province, only 5,4% of households and 7,7% of Mongol
individuals were classified as such, the others being “tenants, poor peasants, middle peasants,
and small renters”.169
163 Ibid.
164 Qi Zhi 2010: 64.
165 Bulag 2002: 121.
166 Bulag 2002: 122. It should be noted too, that Suiyuan is where Ulanhu’s native Tumed banner was
located, and Ulanhu was from a wealthy peasant family, bringing ”a personal stake” to the case (ibid.).
167 Bulag 2002: 123.
168 Ibid.
169Ibid.
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Advantages of this approach were, that land was made available to “Chinese tenants, hired
laborers, and the land poor generally”, and the separate criteria of class designation “avoided a
situation of branding huge numbers of Mongols as landlords, so making the reality congruent
with the earlier communist class-nationality principle, whereby ethnic minorities are viewed as
oppressed and exploited by the majority”.170 But, neither Mongols nor Chinese were satisfied.
Mongols lost most of the land that historically belonged to them, and the Chinese deemed unfair
that hey received less and often poorer land than the Mongols and the Mongols’ “class status
was improved in an ideological sense  that is, lowered”.171
Then, as the peasants started to form cooperatives in the Tumed region in the mid-1950s, the
situation complicated further. First, in the cooperatives (Mongols mostly in ethnically mixed
cooperatives), the individuals were paid a divided based on labor and contribution of assets
(gufen: agricultural tools, animals, land), which meant that “most Mongols received greater
dividends than Chinese” due to them having provided more land. This angered the Chinese who
were both the majority and also the more skilled labor force. The Advanced Agricultural
Producers Cooperatives (gaoji she) were introduced in 1956, and income was determined
exclusively based on labor, and the Mongols were impoverished (as they had smaller families,
and many male adults had been lost in the war) resulting many Mongols wanting to quit the
cooperatives.172
“The Mongol-dominated Tumed banner party committee” responded by introducing land
compensation (tudi baochou) in April 1947, that specified that in Mongol-minority joint
cooperatives the Mongols “could be given extra land”, but the program was never fully
implemented.173 Under the anti-rightist campaign in 1959 the Mongols were forced to give up
theirs land compensation and “their grievances were also criticized as manifestations of ‘local
nationalism”. 174  And  after  the  Great  Leap  Forward  catastrophe  in  1962  private  plots  were
introduced as substitute for the land compensation,. In February 1963 “the Inner Mongolia party
committee and government headed by Ulanhu adopted a special measure to double the
standard private plot allowance to the Tumed Mongols, so that they could grow sideline
products to make up for their poverty”.175
170 Bulag 2002: 124.
171 Ibid..
172 Bulag 2002: 124 – 125.
173 Bulag 2002. 125.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
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As the CR dew nearer, the possibility of a discourse of ‘difference’” was further weakened by the
Sino-Soviet hostility from the early 1960s onwards and the geopolitical position of the Mongols
between China and the Soviet sphere of influence.176 After Mao Zedong ”reinitiated the class
struggle” with stating the ”never forget class struggle” in Semptember 1962, and commenting
on the American Blaaks civil rights movement in August 1943 by saying that ”nationality struggle
is, in the final analysis, a question of class struggle”, the nationality question became replaced
with class struggle, or as Bulag puts it, ”we witness the virtual abandonment by the Chinese
communists  of the nationality principle.” 177  In a socialist country ”where everyone was
proclaimed equal” raising the nationality issue was considered backward thinking and class
consciousness, and the nationality problem was to be seen as a problem of class struggle.178
These two examples of Ulanhu’s policies that emphasized the differences between the Mongols
and the Chinese, agriculture and pastoral economy, and “starting from Inner Mongolian reality”
are only a two rather specific cases but show the potential conflict that would emerge, and was
emerging before the CR.
176 Bulag 2002: 125.
177 Bulag 2002: 125 – 126.
178 Bulag 2002: 126.
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5. Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution
Qi Zhi  (2010) has divided the CR in Inner Mongolia into two stages: the fist “principal” stage
(zhuti, May 1966May 1969) and the “derived” stage (paisheng, June 1969  ̶  October 1976). The
first staged began from the Qianmen Hotel meeting and ended three years later in the issue of
the “22 May Notice” (5.22 pishi),  the removal of Teng Haiqing (滕海清, 1909 ̶ 1997), and the
partition of the IMAR territory 179 . The first stage of this periodization corresponds to the
“contemporary understanding” of the CR that lasted until the Ninth Party Congress in the
summer of 1969 and adding the derived stage extends the CR into the “official” length of over
ten  years,  an  interpretation  adopted  in  1981  by  the  6th plenary  session  of  the  11th Central
Committee of the CPC in the Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the
founding of the People’s Republic of China180.
There is no specific date to measure the ending of the CR in Inner Mongolia in a broad sense, as
some of the direct effects lasted long past 1976: In April 1978 a document issued by the CC lead
by Hua Guofeng (华国锋, 1921 ̶ 2008) declared that the New Inner Mongolian People’s Party
“did not exist in the first place and [the case] should be completely denied”, on 20 January 1979
the Inner Mongolia Party Committee announced in a radio broadcast that the “three great
unjust cases”181 (san da yuan’an) had been fabricated and the verdict on them overthrown, and
finally on 1 July 1979 the territory lost in 1969 reverted back to the IMAR182. After 1978 amidst
severe interethnic tension and dissatisfaction with the government, the “bourgeois
liberalization” (zichan jieji ziyouhua) of China took the form of anti-Han chauvinism and demands
for the protection of minzu rights in Inner Mongolia, culminating in large scale student
demonstrations in late 1981183.
The following brief history of the Inner Mongolian CR starts from Beijing and the Qianmen Hotel
meeting which marked the beginning of the Ulanhu era and the beginning of the CR the IMAR.
179 Qi Zhi 2010: 21
180 Paltemaa & Vuori 2012: 167 – 169.
181 The three unjust cases of the Inner Mongolian CR refer to the cases of Ulanhu’s anti-Party Treason Clique
(Wulanfu fandang panguo jituan乌兰夫反党叛国集团), the IM February Countercurrent (Neimenggu eryue
niliu内蒙古二月逆流), and the New Neirendang (Xin neirendang新内人党) (Qi Zhi 2010: 478). In the
Editor’s Introduction of Woody (1993) Schoenhals has translated Ulanhu’s case as the “Ulanhu anti-party
renegade clique”, but to emphasize the panguo (commit treason) content that resonates with the accusations of
splitting the fatherland (fenlie zuguo), the tanlasiton with “treason” is used in this thesis.
182 Qi Zhi 2010: 478; Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction;
183 Qi Zhi 2010: 540 – 557.
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As this thesis studies the criticism against Ulanhu in documents produced in 1967, the CR history
is introduced with an emphasis on the “principal” stage, as defined by Qi Zhi.
5.1 From Qianmen Hotel to Establishment of New Leadership
The Inner Mongolian CR was launched at the Qianmen Hotel meeting in Beijing in MayJuly 1966.
The meeting, held partly concurrently with the Politburo enlarged session (kuoda huiyi)184 that
started the central leadership purges of the CR, was convened and presided over by the CPC
Center’s North China Bureau’s (NCB) first secretary Li Xuefeng (李雪峰, 1907 ̶ 2003) by the
appointment of the Centre185. During the Qianmen Hotel meeting Ulanhu – who had already
been criticized the previous year for “being soft on Mongol ‘class enemies’” and “disregarding
central policies in general” – was criticized and his “errors” (cuowu) were exposed by the
attendees. As a result of the meeting, Ulanhu was dismissed from his Party posts, he was
accused of being sanfan (“three-anti”, opposing the Party, socialism, and Mao Zedong thought)
and the “biggest party person in authority taking the capitalist road” in the IMAR.186 Ulanhu was
not allowed to return to Inner Mongolia and he was eventually stripped of all his posts in the
PLA and IMAR government187. He was “deprived his power and freedom” for the next six years,
which he spent under house arrest in Beijing and Hunan, and did not return to the political stage
of China until the Tenth National Congress in 1973.188
The CR spread to the IMAAR seat of government, Hohhot, following developments in Beijing, as
teachers and students answered the call to “sweep all ox demons and snake spirits”189 by putting
up their own big-character posters (dazibao) criticizing their leaders considered
counterrevolutionary, revisionist, and not engaged in the CP like Chairman Mao wanted. The
IMAR Party Committee sent work teams to take control of the situation in campuses and manage
184 The Politburo Enlarged Session started the leadership purges with the denunciation of Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing,
Lu Qingyi, and Yang Shangkun.
185 The Qianmen Hotel meeting took place between 22.5. – 25.7. Among the 146 participants were Party Committee
members of the IMAR, party secretaries from the local levels and leaders from the various IMAR PC organs. (Qi
Zhi 2010: 105.)
186 Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction.
187 The termination of some of Ulanhu’s leadership posts: 16 August, 1966: IMAR first secretary, NCB second
secretary; 2 November 1966: commander and political commissar of the IM MR, the president of Inner Mongolia
University (Tumen & Zhu 1995: 319 – 320). Ulanhu was “allowed to retain position as chairman of Inner
Mongolia, in name only, until mid-1967” (the establishment of the IMAR RC in June 1967) (Bulag 2002: 226; Hao
1991: 562 - 563).
188 Qi Zhi 2010. 105; Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction; Bulag 2002: 220 – 222.
189 The call to “sweep all ox demons and snake spirits” (hengsao yiqie niugui-sheshen) was published on People’s
Daily on 1 June 1966, and “China’s first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster”, originally put up by Nie Yuanzi
(聂元梓) et al. at Peking University on 25 May, was published on People’s Daily on 2 June (Macfarquhar &
Schoenhals 2006: 56; Qi Zhi 2010: 123).
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the CR leading to confrontations with the power holders and their defenders and the “rebels”
(zaofanpai).190.  Initially  it  was  the  “conservatives”  (baoshoupai)  who  were  able  to  curb  the
rebellious movement, but the situation was about to change following support from Beijing for
the rebellious mass movement.
The Decision Concerning the Great Cultural Revolution (Guanyu wuchan jieji wenhua
dagemingde jueding, also “the Sixteen points”) approved by the eleventh plenum of the Eight
CPC Central Committee on 8 August and published on People’s Daily (PD) the following day gave
instructions on the execution of the CR. The Sixteen points sided with the mass organizations by
exposing the problem of “persons in charge” (dangquanpai) organizing counter-attacks “against
the masses who put up big-character posters against them”, and stated that, cases of severe
crimes excluded, “no measures should be taken against” students engaged in the mass
movement191. Starting from Hohhot and spreading to other regions, Inner Mongolia witnessed
the emergence violence and the establishment of large-scale mass organizations to “seize power”
(duoquan) and criticize the work teams, capitalists, and counterrevolutionaries. Mass
organizations opposing each other emerged within educational institutions, enterprises,
government organs, and the army. The divide between the mass organizations was affected by
their attitude towards the authorities. For example, the first so called Red Guard (hongweibing)
organization, Mao Zedong Thought Red guards (Mao Zedong sixiang hongweibing) was
established in late August and soon evolved into the Hohhot First Headquarters (Hu yi si, First
HQ), a collective conservative side head organization for organizations siding with the work
groups in institutes of higher learning. In October the organization called Dongzong192 left the
First HQ due to disagreement over its support of the authorities. The Dongzong then became
one of the founding and leading members of one of the most powerful rebel organizations of
the IMAR, the Hohhot Third Headquarters (Hu san si, Third HQ). The rebel-conservative
opposition was not about questioning the Qianmen Hotel meeting and Ulanhu’s denouncement,
as both parties considered themselves following the correct line, but their attitude towards
whether to oppose or support the radical mass movement and to go against or maintain the
prevailing order.193
190 Qi Zhi 2010: 123 – 124.
191 Schoenhals 1992: 38.
192InnerMongolia Teacher’s Institute East Is Red Combat Column (Neimenggu shifan xueyuan dongfanghong
zhandou zongdui内蒙古师院东方红战斗纵队), abbreviated Dongzong (东纵).
193Qi Zhi 2010. 125 – 133.
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In January 1967 inspired by the power seizure in Shanghai194 and Mao’s calls to the rebels for
seizure of power from the hands of “a handful of persons in the Party taking the capitalist road”
published in PD and Red Flag magazine encouraged the rebels to direct action against the
authorities. Following the example of shanghai, rebels in Inner Mongolia tried to start power-
seizures in newspapers. A failed power-seizure in the Inner Mongolia Daily press in early January
1967 that escalated into a violent conflict between rebels and conservatives and that ended with
the Inner Mongolia MR taking control of the situation started a conflict between the military
and the rebels.195
Between late January and early February tension between the conservatives and rebels
continued to increase and the rebels accused the MR for siding with the conservatives and
demanded the military to change the direction of their support. Violent conflicts continued to
erupt within work units around Hohhot and the MR itself cleared its ranks from rebel-
sympathizers, as it viewed the rebels as counter-revolutionaries trying to seize power from the
MR. Starting on 1 February the rebel Red Guards gathered outside the MR south gate in Hohhot
to demand the military’s support. The demonstrations ended on the fifth day after a student
demonstrator, Han Tong (韩桐), was shot by the deputy director of the MR Military Training
Department, Liu Qing (柳青). Han Tong died soon after. The MR was prepared to eliminate the
rebels who were expected to charge the MR, but thanks to some of the older demonstrators
with military experience who saw through the plan, further bloodshed was avoided. Alerted by
the “first shot by the PLA towards the students in the CR” the Center summoned the four conflict
parties in Inner Mongolia, the IMAR PC, the IM Military Region, the Third HQ, and the Hohhot
Red Quard Army196 to Beijing in order to mediate and investigate the conflict. 197
194 In shanghai, January 1967, rebel forces led by Wang Hongwen ”seized power” from the ”counterrevolutionary
revisionist” major Cao Diqiu and the PC., establishing the Shanghai People’s Commune (5 February 1967) that
was later the same month renamed Shanghai revolutionary Committee. The power seizure started from rebel Red
Guards first occupying the newspaper Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao) in late November 1966. In early January the
rebels (now led by Wang Hongwen and the Worker’s Revolutionary Rebels General Headquarters) seized power
in another newspaper, Wenhui Daily (Wenhui bao. (Macfarquhar & Schoenhals 2006: 162 – 169; Zhao 1996: 179,
185.)
195 Qi Zhi 2010: 165 – 167.
196 The Red Guard Army (as referred to in English by Brown (2006: 41)), Chinese红卫军, should not be
confused with the rebellious red Guards, but, according to Qi Zhi (2010), was a conservative organization
supported by the political elite of the IMAR and was in opposition to the rebel organization Thire HW and the
IMAR PC members supportive of the rebels (130 – 131).
197 Qi Zhi 2010: 169 – 179, 181; Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction.
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The four-party meetings (si fang huiyi)198 directed by Premier Zhou Enlai with other leaders of
the Center199 was not a dialogue between the local representatives and the Party Center. The
Center was the authority and the local representative were left with the role of “competing to
claim the symbolic capital released when Ulanhu was felled” in negotiations where the Center
“acted like a judge” 200 . During the meeting in Beijing, the conflict in Hohhot continued to
intensify as the military and the conservatives started arresting members of rebel organizations
and “seized back power” in companies and work units, the MR even deciding to establish a new
leading group, the Hohhot Revolutionary Committee on 18 March. Strengthening the Center’s
control and setting up a new leadership in Hohhot became the priority of the four-party
meetings. As a result of the meetings, on 13 April 1967 the Centre issued the Central Committee
Decision on Handling Problems in Inner Mongolia (Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu chuli Neimeng
wentde jueding, the 13 April Decision)201.The 13 April Decision marked a new turn in the Inner
Mongolian CR. It criticized the MR for attacking the rebels and supporting the conservatives
and ”Ulanhu’s representatives” within the IMAR Party leadership. Representatives of the now
vindicated mass organizations previously declared counterrevolutionary by the MR were to be
taken into the new leadership organ, Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee Preparatory
Small Group (Neimenggu geweihui choubei xiaozu) that was to be established under the new
leader sent by Beijing, the Beijing MR deputy commander Teng Haiqing202 The 13 April Decision
also sanctioned the public attack on Ulanhu, the “the power holder within the Party taking the
capitalist road” that resulted in the first official direct attack on Ulanhu, the publication of the
editorial “Strike Down Ulanhu” in IM Daliy on 29 August 1967. Teng became the leader of the
most disastrous part of the CR in Inner Mongolia that culminated in the campaign to “dig out
and purge the New Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party”203.204
Teng’s  arrival  at  Hohhot  in  April  was  not  smooth.  The military  and conservative  organization
were revolting against the 13 April decision and propagating against the leaders. Both
conservatives and rebels went to Beijing either to demand a new investigation on the IM
198 The meetings lasted a total of 70 days, from 2 February to 13 April, (Qi Zhi 2010: 195).
199 After Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng was the most active speaker from the Center’s leaders (Brown 2006: 37)
200 Brown 2006: 41.
201 Also referred to as Hong ba tiao (the red eight points) by Qi Zhi as the orders expressed in the document being
organized under eight points(2010: 195, 211 – 212).
202 Actually, the 13 April Decision named the Qinghai MR commander Liu Xianyuan (刘贤权) the new leader of
the MR and the Preparatory Small Group, but he was not able to take up the assignment and the post was assigned
to Teng Haiqing. (Qi Zhi 2010: 195, 211).
203 As Liu Xiaoyuan has translated the campaign abbreviated wa-su (Liu 2006: xvii).
204 Brown 2006: 43, 47; Qi Zhi 2010. 191 – 196; Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction;
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problem and correction on the Centre’s stand on the matter, or asking for the Centre’s support.
The violence and disorder between the factions ended in late May when the Centre punished
the MR for revolting and not implementing the 13 April Decision “by downgrading it to a military
district (MD) subordinate to the Beijing MR”205 With the military under the Beijing MR control
new leading organs were finally set up under the leadership of Teng Haiqing, Wu Tao (吴涛,
1912 ̶ 1983)206, and Gao Jinming (高锦明, 1917 ̶ 2012) 207 starting from the establishment of the
Preparatory Small Group on 18 June 1967. Their positions were strengthened by leading
positions in both the Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee (Neimenggu geming weiyuanhui,
set up on 1 November 1967) and the IMAR revolutionary Committee Nucleus (Neimenggu zizhiqu
geming weiyuanhui hexin xiaozu, established on 13 February 1968).208
5.2 Discovering an Enemy
The latter half of 1967 was characterized by devoted study of Mao Zedong thought and criticism
of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Ulanhu, and their followers. The message of the official
propaganda was unified and simplified, as local papers mainly published editorials from the “two
newspapers and one magazine” (liang bao yi kan)209, Mao’s directives, and content criticizing
the aforementioned former leaders. At the same time study groups emerged around the country
on all levels of society devoted to the study of Mao Zedong thought.210
While the early CR in Inner Mongolia is characterized by factional conflict between rebels and
conservatives, attacks against Mongols emerged early on as Mongol cadres on lower levels of
government around the IMAR became suspects of being members of Ulanhu’s black gang
(Wulanhu heibang)211. The ethnic-orientated violence increased after February 1967 and the
weakening  of  government  control  until  the  late  1967  and  early  1968  “discovery”  of  the
“’counter-revolutionary’ underground organization of ethnic separatists” led by Ulanhu, when
205 Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction.
206 Wu Tao, a Mongol from Shenyang (Fengtian/Mukden), Liaoning province. Excelled in criticizing Wulanhu at
the Qianmen Hotel meeting. (Qi Zhi 2010: 134 – 135, 216 – 217.)
207 Gao Jinming a Manchu from Liaoning province from a landowner family. University education. Political
positions in Inner Mongolia since 1949, leading party positions in Baotou starting from 1955 and a secretary of
the IM Party Committee Secretariat 1964 – 1966. Gao was active in promoting the idea of the IMPRP still existing
underground before the beginning of the “excavationt” of the splittist Mongol party. (Qi Zhi 2010: 217.)
208 Qi Zhi 2010: 206 – 210; 215.
209两报一刊, i.e. People’s Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag. (Renmin ribao, Jiefangjun bao, Hongqi人民日报，解放军
报，红旗).
210 Qi Zhi 2010: 217 – 220.
211 Qi Zhi 2010: 205 – 206.
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“unearthing” of the members of Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party became the main
content of the Inner Mongolian CR212.
The development of the of the CR towards “unearthing and elimination” (wa-su)213 becoming
the main direction of the campaigns was a joint effort where the Center gave the general
guidelines of the movement, the local activists, rebels, produced evidence and exposed traitors
driven by the competition to gain legitimacy as the true radicals and executors of Mao Zedong’s
strategies, and between them, the IMAR leadership had the responsibility to provide official
legitimation and define targets of the campaigns.
In the autumn the denouncement campaigns targeted against Ulanhu et al. needed new content
and the next enemy was to be found from the hints given by the Qianmen Hotel meeting and
the Center. Inspired by warnings by Gao Jinming against the deep-rooted revisionism and
splittism in Inner Mongolia and by Kang Sheng about the complex effects and devoted following
Ulanhu had left behind, Teng Haiqing presented the new objective to “uproot and eliminate
Ulanhu’s sinister line and pernicious influence”214in the founding meeting of the IMRC in early
November. To define the target of the “uprooting and elimination”, Teng introduced the “three
forces” (san gu shili) of Ulanhu. First there were the old core members of Ulanhu’s political
establishment215; second were the reactionaries, consisting mainly of alleged spies of the Soviet
Union and the MPR, Japan, GMD, and also the old elites (princes and other feudal upper
classes)216., and the third force consisting of opportunists, dissident, and conspirators who had
infiltrated the Party. 217
Capturing traitors and spies (jiu pantu、 tewu) encouraged by Mao already in early 1967 took
off in Inner Mongolia during the latter half of 1967, as rebel organizations began to set up liaison
stations (lianluozhan) for capturing different targets. This search for traitors and spies led to the
discovery, or at least identification, of the peril within the Party ranks, as investigation
committee of the case of Hafenga, vice chairman of the IMAR People’s Government and director
212 Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction.
213 The wa-su started from the unearthing (wa) and eliminating (su) of Ulanhu’s sinister line and pernicious
influence (wa Wulanfu heixian, su Wulanfu liudu ), and after the “discovery” of the still active IMPRP, targeted
the alleged members of this counter-revolutionary splittist party. A clear distinction of which campaigns can be
considered part of the wa-su is diccicult to define, as other nationwide campaigns, like “cleansing the class ranks”
(qingli jieji duiwu) became extensions of the wa-su in Inner Mongolia (see e.g. Hao et al. 2006: 610 – 612).
214 Wa Wulanfu heixian, su Wulanfu liudu挖乌兰夫黑线，肃乌兰夫流毒， translation in Woody 1993:
Editor’s Introduction.
215 For example: Kuibi, Jiyatai, Buhe (Ulanhu’s son), i.e. cadres with close personal ties to Ulanhu.
216 The most prominent figure of this group was Hafenga who had been a leading figure of the eastern
Inner Mongolian autonomy movement before the establishment of the IMAR.
217 Qi Zhi 2010: 224 – 228; Woody 1993. Editor’s Inrtoduction.
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of the language committee (yuwei), found disturbing evidence on the IMPRP. They found out
that it had been led by Hafenga and its members included Tegusi (特古斯, 1924), deputy director
of the IMPC propaganda department. The investigators found out that the IMPRP had had
connections with Oute Mongolia, GMD, and even American intelligence after 15 August 1945
(the announcement of Japan’s surrender)218. This discovery made the members of the IMPRP, a
reactionary organization with members from Manchukuo bureaucracy, feudal elite, Mongol
traitors etc. the focus of the rebels’ efforts to expose the perils within the leading organs.219
The first ones to draw a connection between the IMPRP past and the contemporary enemy
within the leadership were two Mongols, Wulanbagan220 and Erdunaola221 who presented the
Concise Report on Ulanhu’s Black Gang Covering up the Crimes of a Major Treasonous Clique
(Wulanfu heibang baobi yi ge da panguo jituande jianyao baogao) to the IMRC preparatory small
group on 3 October 1967.The report exposed, without evidence, Hafenga’s treasonous crimes,
further members of the clique , and how the organization worked under the cover of legitimate
government organs.222
218 Qi Zhi 2010: 230 – 231. As discussed in the part on IMAR pre-PRC history, the Eastern Mongolian governmetn
tried to unite Inner Mongolia with the MPR, and to gain official recognition of their autonomy from the GMD
before joining the CPC:
219 Ibid: 230 – 231.
220 Wulanbagan (乌兰巴干, 1929 ̶  ), born to a middle-peasant family in Jerim league that was soon made a part of
Manchukuo, The verbally skillful Wulanbagan engaged in propaganda work for the CPC and was appointed
editor in the Inner Mongolia newspaper press (Neimenggu baoshe) by its establishment in 1948. Took up writing
while working at the IMPC Propaganda Department in 1956. At the height of his career Wulanbagan held many
important positions in literary and arts circles in Inner Mongolia and his representative work “Uprising of the
sinners” (Caoyuan fenghuo, 1959, English translation (excerpt) in Chinese Literature (No. 2, 1965, Foreign
Language Press, Peking) had been translated to several languages. A part of Wulanbagan’s success had been the
skillful navigation of the different political campaigns, changing his views according to the current tide. In August
1966 he was captured as a member of the “black gang” (heibang fenzi) and later accused for glorifying Ulanhu and
being of land lord back ground, which made him seek Teng Haiqing’s protection against “capitalist roaders” in
August 1967. (Qi Zhi 2010: 243 – 245; Tsai 1979: 319-320.)
221 Erdunaola (E’erdun’ao’la额尔敦敖拉, 1933), born in Hulunbei’er league. Entering the Inner Mongolia
newspaper press without finished education at the age of 14, E’erdunao’la became a self-trained skilled writer and
a party member, rising within the press hierarchy (Qi Zhi 2010: 246).
222 Qi Zhi 2010: 230 – 231. One example of the legitimate covers was the ”Terminological committee of Inner and
Outer Mongolia” (Nei-Wai Menggu mingci shuyu weiyuanhui) led by Hafeng’a during the 1956 reform of the
Mongolian language. On the report the committee was said to have been IMPRP revisionist Mongol spy
organization, a facade for treasonous activities led by Ulanhu and a side-branch of Ulaanbaatar.
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The “myth” of the IMPRP still active underground was confirmed by the denouncement of
Tegusi223  and Wang Zaitian (王再天，1907 ̶ 2005) 224 , and started to spread around Inner
Mongolia. Several already concluded cases and incidents not considered crimes before were
now raked up and investigation groups were established to find out their connection to the
Neirendang. Presented with ever increasing “evidence” of an underground IMPRP actually
existing, Teng Haiqing needed encouragement to begin his all-out campaign to unearth and
eliminate the members of the Neirendang. The encouragement from within the AR came from
the Capture Ulanhu’s Treason Clique Liaison Station (Wulanbagan’s organization). From the
Center, the IMAR leadership’s suspicions were confirmed by Kang Sheng, who instructed Teng
et al. to start cleansing Ulanhu’s influence from the army and then proceed to agricultural and
pastoral regions, and told Teng that the IMPRP was still active underground and one should not
be afraid of capturing its members with “too wide a net” in the beginning225.
5.3 Purge of the Neirendang
The build-up towards the five-month “climax” period of the wa-su between December 1968 and
April 1969226 , described by Qi Zhi as the period of highest death and injury rate in Inner
Mongolian history, was characterized by the mobilization of the revolutionary masses (geming
qunzhong) to execute the wa-su campaign by the means of dictatorship of the masses (qunzhong
zhuanzheng)227  and the removal of critics and obstacles from the campaign through other
campaigns launched from the center that became part of the wa-su in Inner Mongolia.
Hohhot Dictatorship of the Masses Command Headquarters (Huhhehaote shi qunzhong
zhuanzheng zhihuibu) was established on 15 January 1968. During the next three months the
masses executed several nighttime attacks in cooperation with the military to search property
and class enemies, counter-revolutionaries, rightists, adn members of Ulanhu’s and Hafenga’s
223 The denuncement of Tegusi and the IMPC propaganda department was inspired by Jiang Qing’s call for
a ”thourough sweep of the literary circles from cunning enemies” distributed by the Center 13 November 1967
(Qi Zhi 2010: 232 – 233).
224 Wang Zaitian, an Eastern Mongol, was the secretary in charge of the IMPC public security authorities (gong
jian fa) , a fact that made him an easy target due to holding a post in which he could be held responsible for
enemies infiltrating the leading organs (Qi Zhi 2010: 233 - 235).
225 Qi Zhi 2010: 241 – 242. Kang Sheng’s answer to Teng and Li Shude’s (李树德) report for the Center on the
situation in Inner Mongolia on 4 February 1968.
226 Qi Zhi’s periodization of the wa-su campaign: 1) November 1967 – April 1968, “arousal” (兴起) 2) May –
November 1968, deepening development and struggle with resisting forces 3) December 1968 – May 1969,
“Climax” (高潮) (Qi Zhi 2010: 339).
227 Dictatorship of the masses of Mass dictatorship (qunzhong zhuanzheng) was ”the name for the leagal authority
that mass organizations assumed to arrest, imprison, and torture ordinary citizens, to search their homes, and to
confiscate their personal belongings”, an under which ”widespread persecution” during the CR mostly took place
(Guo 2009; 178).
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black gangs. Other regions followed suit and the campaign spread to all levels of organization.
The dictatorship of the masses organizations were under the leadership of the local
revolutionary committees and preparatory groups and the lead figures often came from Mao
Zedong thought propaganda teams (Mao Zedong sixiang xuanchuandui). The organizations took
over tasks of public security, prosecution, and court, taking people into custody, interrogating,
and torturing them in order to make the Neirendang captives expose themselves and others228.
As for the ”removal of obstacles” from the wa-su campaign, the campaigns launched at the
Center to ”cleanse the class ranks” and ”anti-rightism” (fanyou) paved the way in Inner Mongolia
towards its most disastrous phase. Cleansing the ranks, i.e. getting rid of the ”bad persons”
within the revolutionary ranks, lead to the dissolution of rebel organizations, as rebels ”not
revolutionary and holding back others” were discarded, and some of the conservatives who had
been sidelined in early 1967 were accepted back to make revolution. The anti-rightist campaign
on the other hand targeted organizations and individuals who tried to reverse the verdict on
Ulanhu and the February Countercurrent (mostly Mongols), and rebels critical of the current
IMAR leadership and the wa-su campaign (mostly Han). These campaigns cleared away the only
force potentially able to resist the wa-su and let the ”conservatives, opportunists, and radicals”
unite behind the main campaign229.
The breakthrough that led to explosive expansion of the wa-su campaign came in late April 1968,
when the  investigation – more precisely, forced confessions – of the vice-president of the Inner
Mongolia University, Batu (巴圖 ), and deputy director of the IMMR Political Department,
Baoyinzhabu (鮑音扎佈 ,  Boyin-jabu)  led  to  confessions  on  the  existence  of  a  new  IMPRP
(Neirendang) and details and names on the rumored March 1963 IMPRP Congress in Jinan (in
Wulanchabu league). The Center was informed about the findings of the special case group on
the IMPRP and its connection to Ulanhu as his ”secret troupe” (an banzi).The IMRC Nucleus set
a special case group to handle the Neirendang case and the evidence pouring from local levels
on members of the Neirendang collected through interrogations and torture. The Third enlarged
session of the IMRC passed the Report on Opinions on Handling the IMPRP that was distributed
to the whole of IMAR. According to the report, the ”counter revolutionary organization” that
was supposed to be dissolved by the establishment of the IMAG (1 May 1967) had continued its
228 Qi Zhi 2010: 290 – 296, 304. It should be mentioned, that people taken in custody were not only alleged IMPRP
members, but also ”normal” and political offenders, members of ”five black categories” (landlords, rich peasants,
counter-revolutionaries, bad elements , rightists) offenders etc. For a  description on the conditions in ”dictatorship
of the masses” jails, see Qi Zhi 2010: 297 – 304. Qi Zhi himself spent 100 days ”behind bars” in Salaqi (薩拉齊),
Tumed Right banner between October 1968 and January 1969.
229 Qi Zhi 2010: 266 – 270, 281.
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counter-revolutionary activities underground under Ulanhu’s protection in cooperation with the
MPR 230 .  The  report  was  a  message  to  all  Inner  Mongolia  to  start  an  all-out  purge  of  the
Neirendang.231
5.4 “Climax”
In late September 1968 in the middle of the rapid growth of the wa-su campaign, partly due to
the Centre’s instructions and partly due to internal conflicts within the IMRC, Gao Jinming
declared the wa-su victorious and called for an alleviation of the campaign in order not to
exagerrate enmity and erroneously attack the masses. The question on the validity of the wa-su
campaign and rumors about Teng Haiqing being replaced raised and ”anti-wa-su” (fan wa-su)
tide in Inner Mongolia as victims and families of victims of anti-rightist and anti-Neirendang
activities took to the streets to demonstrate against Teng and to demand justice232. For Teng the
wa-su was not over and he attacked Gao as the man behind the anti-Teng and anti-wa-
su ”undercurrent” (anliu). At the Fourth expanded session of the IMRC (3-19 November 1968)
Teng denounced Gao for having an ”anti-mao Zedong thought revisionist” stance since long and
for protecting Ulanhu’s followers and resisting the wa-su. Teng declared the wa-su far from over,
and that ”rightist inclination” (youqing) was widespread. The most dangerous enemies were still
hidden despite all the ones already unearthed. Along with Gao, Teng took down many other
leaders and framed the IMRC a plan to execute a coup. Teng became the single highest authority
in Inner Mongolia pacing himself as the leader of a new Leadership Group for Thorough
Unearthing of the IMPRP (Shenwa “Neirendang” lingdao xiaozu). Gao’s denouncement as
rightist instigated local factional strives where ”small Gaos” were purged along with IMPRP
members, taking Inner Mongolia deeper into chaos.233
The climax period took the wa-su campaign deeper and further as the RC issued a document
ordering the ”celansing of ranks” to be extended to the countryside and pastoral regions. In the
unearthing of hidden and disguised enemies, especially the ”two-faced counter-revolutionaries”
(fangeming liangmianpai) who had infiltrated the Party organization, the IMPRP was the main
230 The report deivided the IMPRP operations into three periods of different qualities: 1925 – 1936 ”bourgeois
nationalist pary”; 1945 – 1947 ”local nationalist party”; May 1945 onwards ”counter-revolutionary organization”.
In theory the members of the first two periods were not to be regarded as reactionaries, but in reality
any ”member” could be could be considered a member o the ”new” party and handled accordingly.  (Qi Zhi 2010:
312 – 314.)
231 Qi Zhi 2010: 312 – 314.
232 At the time Teng and Wu Tao were in Beijing for the 12th plenum of teh 8th Central Committee (13 ̶ 31 Oct.
1968), where Liu Shaoqi was expelled from the Party and anti-rightism was declared the main direction of the CR
(Qi Zhi 2010: 327 – 328).
233 Qi Zhi 2010: 323 – 338; 340 – 341.
50
target, but not the only one, as alleged agents of the MPR, the GMD, and Japan, capitalists and
class enemies were ”cleansed”. By late December the IMPRP had already become
an ”omnipresent” (wu suo bu zai) anti-Party army of several million members. As the purge of
cadres had created an urgent need of Party personnel, Teng had to ask for reinforcement cadres
from Beijing. According to Teng’s own statistics234, the daily ”excavation rate” of enemies had
grown tenfold during the period between November 1968–January 1969 compared to the nine
month period since the beginning of wa-su (November 1967 – October 1968).235
In March 1969 the people of Inner Mongolia started overt resistance against the wa-su campaign.
At the Teacher’s Institute the rebel leader and RC vice director Qin Weixian (秦維憲) launched
criticism towards Teng Haiqing and organized the escape of military who had been framed
Neirendang  members.  At  the  same  time  victims  and  families  of  victims  of  the  IMPRP  purge
started to flood to Beijing to report injustices.236
The Ninth National Congress (124 April 1969) became an opportunity for Mao and the
Proletarian Headquarters to address the problem of Inner Mongolian people flooding to Beijing.
During the congress Lin Biao was announced Mao’s successor and Mao came up
with ”implementing all policies” (luoshi gexiang zhengce) and the need to ”expand the scale of
education and reduce the scale of attack” (kuoda jiaoyumian, suoxiao dajimian). Mao stated
that there had been ”excesses” (kuodahua) in the Inner Mongolian cleansing of class ranks. Teng
Haiqing et al. realized the need to change their approach in Inner Mongolia. Implementing
policies, education, and recognition of mistakes became the key concepts for proceeding with
the CR. The primary mission after May was to ”strengthen unity, correct mistakes, summarize
experiences, implement policies, stabilize the situation, and face the enemy together” expressed
in the Center’s 22 MayDdirective (5.22 pishi). The directive marked the end of the “principal
stage” of the Inner Mongolian CR.237
5.5 After the Wa-su Campaign
The 22 May Directive meant a return to a state of factional conflict in Inner Mongolia. On the
other hand it approved the main direction of the wa-su and defined its problem as merely
“excess”  on  one  hand,  but  at  the  same  time  allowed  criticism  of  Teng  and  emphasized  the
234 According to Teng, the total number of enemies unearthed between Noovember 1967 – October
1968 was 80 000, and between November 1968 – January 1969over 60 000 (Qi Zhi 2010: 348).
235 Ibid: 341 – 342; 348.
236 Qi Zhi 2010: 361.
237 Qi Zhi 2010: 384 – 388; 390, 394.
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“implementation of policies” 238 , giving both critics and defenders of Teng and the wa-su
something to draw support from.239 The message of the directive and orders to implement
policies were often ignored and in many places the search for Neirendang members continued.
The IMRC had lost its ability to work properly as the leaders were occupied by people lodging
complaints and appeals (shagnfang shanggao) and sometimes cadres were even afraid of going
to work due to angry people waiting for them to express their dissatisfaction. 240
The factional struggles were accompanied by attacks against people and property, robbing
banks and stealing arms. Local armed forces emerged. At the same time, the masses of people
heading for Beijing to lodge complaints and appeals could not be stopped despite a prohibition
for going to Beijing set on 8 August 1969. The Center’s response to the chaos in Inner Mongolia
was “dismembering” (zhijie) of its territory in July 1969. About two thirds of the IMAR territory
was placed under the surrounding provinces and one autonomous region (Ningxia) (see
Map ?)241. The decision was based on the need to stabilize the Inner Mongolian situation and
increase war preparations. On one hand it was meant to secure the “anti-revisionist
frontline”(fanxiu qianxian) against the Soviet Union and the MPR, and on the other hand slicing
the expansive territory into smaller units administered by different provinces had the effect of
cutting the regions off each other to avoid a united resistance to emerge against the Center242.
To further control the chaotic situation in (what was left of) Inner Mongolia, on 19 December
1969 the Center ordered the IMAR under military control under the Beijing MR and the new
administrative unit, the Frontline Command (qianxian zhihuisuo) consisting of Beijing MR senior
officers led by commander of the Beijing MR , Zheng Weishan (郑维山, 1915 ̶ 2000). This was
the end of Teng Haiqing’s mission in Inner Mongolia. The military control of the IMAR lasted
238 In practice, the ”implementation of policies” (luoshi zhengce) meant rehabilitation of falsely accused
offenders and compensatons to vitims and their families.
239 Qi Zhi 2010: 407.
240 Ibid: 408 – 409.
241 The decision placed the Hulunbei’er league under Heilongjian province (Except for the Tuquan banner and
Ke(erqin) Right banner that were merged into Baicheng “special region” of Jilin province), Zhelimu league under
Jilin province, Zhaowuda league under Liaoning province, the Ejina banner and Alashan Right banner of
Bayannao’er league under Gansu province, and the Alashan Left banner of Bayannao’er league under Ningxia Hui
Autonomous Region. The changes included the placement of the local military sub-districts under the surrounding
MDs. (Qi Zhi 2010: 418)
242This divide-and-rule pattern seems to repeat itself in the Inner Mongolian history: the Qing banner system
prevented inter-banner migration and the emergence of united political force in Inner Monglia; Inner Mongolia;
Chinese provinces were established in Inner Mongolia in 1928 , during ROC-period; also the Japanese Khinggan
policy altered between a united and divided administration of the Khinggan provinces (see Atwood 1992). The
PRC period of Inner of Inner Mongolia started from a period of uniting the differend parts, as the IMAR reached
its present-day (and pre-CR) frontiers by 1956, but the years 19691979 represent another period of divided Inner
Mongolia.
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from late-December 1969 to mid-May 1971, although it took until the latter half of 1972 until
the forces were completely withdrawn.243
The wa-su disaster and the subsequent oppression during the military control period led to
counter-reactions. Ulanhu returned to the CC in the Tenth National Congress in 1973 with the
help of Zhou Enlai. This marked the denial of the Qianmen Hotel meeting results and the wa-su
campaign, at this poin as a part of the rhetoric of Lin Biao’s political coup (zhengbian). It also
implied the denial of the existence of the Neirendang. In Inner Mongolia criticism of Han
chauvinism emerged as a form of the campaign to Criticize Lin and Criticize Confucius (pi Lin pi
Kong)244.
The Neirendang case was finally officially declined on 20 April 1978  in the report Opinions on
Further Solution of the Problem of Unearthing the ‘New IMPRP’ approved by the CPC chairman
Hua Guofeng. The report stated the “so called New IMPRP simply did not exist and should be
completely denied”245. Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were defined as the roots of the disaster
(huogen) and the main responsibility was on the shoulders of the IMRC Nucleus. The report was
handed to the representatives of IMAR and the surrounding provinces as the 20 April Directive
(4.20 pishi) and based on the directive, the implementation of policy and rectification of
the ”three great unjust cases” (san da yuanan), i.e. the cases of Ulanhu’s anti-Party treasonous
group, the February counter-current246, and the Neirendang, were to be started. However, the
Centre’s guidelines to the IAMR PC on handling offenders followed Deng Xiaoping’s principle of
“rather rough than detailed”247 and the Centre was to handle the Centre’s leaders, meaning that
the cases of highest leaders like Teng Haiqing were outside the IMAR reach. The last scene of
the IM CR investigations was the trial of Wulanbagan in October 1987 (after 9 years in custody),
were he was sentenced for 15 years for the “crime of framing” (wuxianzui), i.e. fabricating the
243 Qi Zhi 2010: 408 – 419; 430 – 432, 440.
244 Criticized Lin and Criticize Confucius  “was a political and ideological campaign that Mao Zedong
launched in 1974 supposedly for a dual purpose: first, to link Lin Biao ’s ideology to what Mao saw as
China’s moralistic, backward-looking, and reactionary legacy, namely Confucianism; second, to defend
the Cultural Revolution against the kind of criticism that in Mao’s view paralleled the Confucian
resistance to essentially Legalist social transformations in the early “feudal” period of Chinese history.”
(Guo et al. 2009: 8889.
245 Qi Zhi 2010: 478.
246 The First case refers to the denouncement of Ulanhu and other IMAR cadres as a “anti-Pasrty treasonous group”
at the Qianmen Hotel  meeting.  The February Countercurrent in the case of  Inner Mongolia refers  to February -
May,  1967,  the  suppression  of  rebels  by  the  IMAR  MR  leaders,  the  shooting  of  Han  Tong,  resisting  the  Center,
persecution  of  people  with  differing  views,  that  was  considered  by  the  Center  a  anti-Party  group  case.  Other
connected cases were also rectified. (Qi Zhi 2010: 478.)
247 Qi Zhi 2010:479. ”Rather rough than detailed, rather lenient than petty” (宜粗不宜細，宜寬不宜窄).
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Neirendang case, leaving many people demanding the punishment of the actual leaders of the
wa-su. 248
The official figures from 1980 regarding the victims of the purge of the Neirendang are: a total
of 346,220 people persecuted, of which 16,222 dead in interrogations by torture (xingxun) and
armed struggles (xingxun wudou), and 87,188 severely disabled (yanzhong shangcan). The
Neirendang case amounts to approximately 60% of the deaths in the Inner Monglian CR, again,
according to official statistics.249
A prominent example of the public demonstrations “of the lingering wounds of the Cultural
Revolution”  were  the  Mongolian  students  strikes  of  late  1981  and  early  1982 250 The
demonstrations started in the autumn of 1981 came as a reaction to Center’s prohibition251 on
obstructing  Han  migration  to  Inner  Mongolia,  which  was  seen  as  a  threat  to  the  Mongols’
political power and IMAR authority. in September Mongol students demanding punishment of
“the murdered Teng Haiqing” and protection of nationality rights took to the streets of Hohhot.
After boycott of classes(bake) by Mongol students and a delegation sent to Beijing that even
resorted to hungers strike as a negotiation tactic, the movement ended in the Centre giving a
notice on continuing classes thus stopping the class boycott and avoiding the student movement
to be considered an offence of resisting the Center and being violently suppressed252. Students
were not punished for the demonstrations but school presidents were transferred to other
duties and the government began a purge of the officials supportive of the students of
sympathetic to their goals.253
According to Sneath (1994), and one would could claim that many researchers agree
with this view, one of the most important results of ” the attack on Mongolian
248 Ibid: 478 – 479, 497 – 498, 522.
249 Qi Zhi 2010: 23. The total figures of dead and disabled in the Inner Mongolian CR are 27,900 and
120,000 respectively. These figures are sometimes quoted (erroneously, according to Qi Zhi) as the
figure for Neirendang case victims (e.g. Yang 2014, see also Qi Zhi 2010: 23). The Mongol population of
Inner Mongolia in 1965 was about 1.5 million, which means, that even by taking into account the fact
that there were some Han Chinese persecuted as part of the Neirendang case, still perhaps about 1% of
Mongols were killed during the purge of the Neirendang only. For a more detailed discussion on the
figures and their reliability, see Qi Zhi (2010: 23). A Map in Yang (2014) presents a regional distribution
of “Mongols who suffered maltreatment” (bei nüedaide Mengguren) based on “very incomplete
materials” (feichang bu wanchengde ziliao) (4041).
250 Jankowiak 1988: 284.
251 The ”Article 28”, ”a long range plan for the development of Inner Mongolia (Jankowiak 1988: 279),
For the content of the article, see Qi Zhi 2010: 533 – 534..
252 There’s no mention of a hunger strike as a means of negotiating a way out for the student delegation
in Jankowiak (1988), but is based on an interview with one of the members of the delegation by Qi Zhi
(2010: 556)
253 Jankowiak 1988: 286; Qi Zhi 2010: 540 -. 557.
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nationalism, customs and religion, and any remnant of pre-revolutionary thinking”
during the CR was “the sharpening of ethnic conflict”. Mongols becoming victims or
predominantly Han-organized suffering created distrust and even hatred “of the
Chinese on the part of many Mongols”.254
254 Sneath 1994: 429.
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6. Ulanhu’s Crimes Against National Unity
This chapter will discuss the primary source material of the thesis, content of eleven
compilations of quotations from Ulanhu’s speeches and writings that were used to
denounce Ulanhu and expose his “poisonous” effect to Inner Mongolia. The documents
were produced by rebel organizations, eight of them being dated between September
– November 1967. The first document is dated June 1967, the last one August 1941, and
there is one without a date on it. The quotations from Ulanhu are accompanied by
comments by the editors that point out the alleged crimes and errors Ulanhu is being
criticized of – often supported by famous citations from Mao and sometimes by other
authoritative figures like Lenin. The crime and errors of Ulanhu will be discussed divided
in subchapters roughly based on the different types of criticism targeted at Ulanhu.
First, it is necessary to discuss the early authoritative document that lists and explains
why Ulanhu was to be remove from the IAMR leadership, the Report Considering the
Problem of Ulanhu’s Errors255 (Guanyu Wulanfu cuowu wenti de baogao, the Qianmen
Hotel Report), produced by the North China Bureau as a result of the Qianmen Hotel
meetings in late July 1966 and was approved for distribution by the Party Center on 27
January the next year.256 The aim is to understand to what extent the content in the
rebels’ documents was already expressed after the Qianmen Hotel meeting and,
conversely, what kind of new crimes and errors come up in the rebel’s document. A
rough translation of the report is provided in appendix (9.6).
6.1 The Report Considering the Problem of Ulanhu’s Errors
The report – based on the Qianmen Hotel meetings and information gathered from the
government organs and institutes of higher education in the IMAR while the meetings
took place – defines Ulanhu as an element of the three-anti  (san fan fenzi), as often
seen important figures denounced during the CR: “opposing the Party, socialism, and
Mao Zedong thought”257. He is accused of “destroying state unity”, “national splittism
aiming for the establishment of an independent kingdom”, and revisionism. Ulanhu is
255 Used as a source here is the report approved for distribution that had been through ”appropriate condensing”
and can be read in Qi Zhi 2010 (153 – 164).
256 Qi Zhi 2010: 119.
257 Fan dang, fan shehui zhuyi, fan Mao Zedong sixiang反党、反社会主义、反毛泽东思想.
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characterized as the “biggest power-holding capitalist roader within the IMAR Party
organization” and “a time bomb hiding within the Party”.258
After the general introduction, the report continues by specifying Ulanhu’s five major
errors and the evidence against him. The five errors are discussed in order of appearance
in the report.
1. Opposing Mao Zedong thought, raising another flag, setting up a system of his
own
Of major importance in the attack against Ulanhu was his alleged opposition to Mao Zedong in
ideology and practice – especially in distorting the notion of the true nature of the nationality
problem. The report traces the evidence of this problem back to August 1963 when in “a
statement of support to the American blacks’ righteous struggle against racial discrimination by
American imperialists”259 Mao Zedong stated that racial struggle, in the final analysis, is an issue
of class struggle. This notion, reflected on Chinese national minority discourse, formed a basis
for the accusations of Ulanhu’s ideological deviance from the correct Mao Zedong line. During
the CR, the absolute true nature of the nationality problem was class struggle and Ulanhu was
accused of turning this basic setting upside down by downplaying class struggle and using the
nationality problem to oppose Mao Zedong thought.260
Continuing on the topic, the report turns to criticize Ulanhu for ignoring Mao Zedong’s
instructions on minority work during the March 1958 Chengdu work conference where
Mao stressed the importance of ideology in government instead of where one comes
from and which nationality one belongs to. Ulanhu was accused for not only ignoring
these instructions but opposing the Chairman by emphasizing the importance of
minoritizing (minzuhua) the leadership organs.261
After criticism for distorting and ignoring the correct instructions to the handling of the
nationality problem Ulanhu is accused of establishing his own ideology, an “Ulanhu
thought” (Wulanfu sixiang). By promoting his own ideas concerning the nationality
problem and by introducing his Three Foundations (san ge jichu)262 to promote the unity
258 Qi Zhi 2010: 154.
259Zhichi Meiguo heiren fandui diguo zhuyi zhongzu qishide zhengyi douzhengde shengming
260 Qi Zhi 2010: 154 – 155.
261 Ibid.
262 According to the report, during the enlarged session of the third plenum of the  IMAR second party committee
(Neimenggu zizhiqu dangwei er jie san ci quanwei kuoda huiyi) Ulanhu introduced the idea of strengthening and
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of the nation and between the nationalities. Ulanhu is criticized of ignoring the universal
class struggle, socialism, and communism, placing him on the side of bourgeois
nationalism (zichan jieji minzu zhuyi).263
2. Opposing class struggle and socialist revolution
Ulanhu’s opposition to class struggle and the Socialist revolution are here presented as
the essential problem in his opposition to Mao Zedong thought. By promoting peaceful
transition (as opposed to class struggle) in pastoral regions, peaceful coexistence with
minority and religious upper class, and peaceful competition with revisionist (Outer)
Mongolia, e had been replacing class struggle with the nationality problem. By opposing
Han chauvinism (da hanzu zhuyi) and placing it as a top priority among the issues to be
tackled in the IMAR Ulanhu had understated and even replaced the most important
struggles – the ones between socialism and capitalism, the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie.264)
One concrete example of Ulanhu’s misguided ideas and policies is his “opposition to the
socialist revolution in pastoral regions and promotion of peaceful transition” in order to
avoid causing harm to production. The report criticizes Ulanhu’s notions of a need for
lenient treatment for minority upper class and accuses him of embellishing the success
in incorporating minority elite to the new system. The lenient treatment included for
example the policy of Three Nos (san bu) in pastoral regions during the land reform that
saved many Mongols from losing cattle and property and from being labelled as
herdlords.265
 Adding an international flavor to the accusations, the report also criticizes Ulanhu’s
view of the relationship with revisionist Mongolia (mengxiu, meaning the MPR) being
one of economical rivalry and not of political struggle, thus being unable to instill
patriotism (towards China) and hatred towards the MPR especially in border regions.266
developing the three foundations of minzu tuanjie and the unity of the motherland: politics, economy, and culture
(Qi Zhi 2010: 155 – 156).
263 Qi Zhi 2010. 155 – 156.
264 Qi Zhi 2010: 156 – 157.
265 Qi Zhi 2010: 157; Bulag 2002: 120.
266 Qi Zhi 2010: 158.
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3. Bowing and kneeling towards revisionism267
While being accused of serving the Mongol elite within the country’s borders,
internationally Ulanhu had allegedly yielded under revisionist pressure, courting the
MPR and opposing Han-chauvinism when standing firm against the revisionists would
have  been  most  crucial.  In  addition  to  promotion  of  the  Cyrillic  script  to  be  used  in
writing Mongolian in Inner Mongolia in the mid 1950’s to unify the writing system with
that of the MPR, other examples of Ulanhu serving the MPR and the revisionist camp
include trivial anecdotes that supposedly show his submissive attitude towards the
revisionists in international interactions, one example being celebration of the 40th
anniversary of the MPR and the 14th congress of the Mongolian People’s Party in July,
1961, where as head of the Chinese delegation he was the first to stand up two times
during the speech of the representative of the delegation of Tito’s Yugoslavia (not an
ally of the PRC during the Sino-Soviet split), thus “isolating the Albanian representative”
(Albania being an ally of the PRC).268
4. Advocating national splittism and setting up an independent kingdom based on the
1935 Declaration269
While being accused of serving the Mongol elite within the country’s borders,
internationally Ulanhu had allegedly yielded under revisionist pressure, courting the
MPR and opposing Han-chauvinism when standing firm against the revisionists would
have  been  most  crucial.  In  addition  to  prom ̶otion  of  the  Cyrillic  script  to  be  used  in
writing Mongolian in Inner Mongolia in the mid 1950’s to unify the writing system with
that of the MPR, other examples of Ulanhu serving the MPR and the revisionist camp
include trivial anecdotes that supposedly show his submissive attitude towards the
revisionists in international interactions, one example being celebration of the 40th
anniversary of the MPR and the 14th congress of the Mongolian People’s Party in July,
267 Bowing and kneeling, (beigong-quxi), meaning ‘to curry favour with’, ‘to be servile’.
268 Qi Zhi 2010: 158.
269 Declaration of the Chinese Soviet Central Government to the people of Inner Mongolia (Zhonghua suweiya
zhongyang zhengfu dui Neimenggu renmin de xuanyan, abbr. san-wu xuanyan) can be read in whole in Qi Zhi
2010 (100 – 102). The Declaration signed by Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Central Government of the
Chinese Soviet Republic, is here said to have been written by “dogmatists [jiaotiao zhuyizhe] within the party”
wrongly acting in Chairman Mao’s name (ibid. 159).
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1961, where as head of the Chinese delegation he was the first to stand up two times
during the speech of the representative of the delegation of Tito’s Yugoslavia (not an
ally of the PRC during the Sino-Soviet split), thus “isolating the Albanian representative”
(Albania being an ally of the PRC).270
4. Advocating national splittism and setting up an independent kingdom based on the
1935 Declaration271
Perhaps one of the most concrete cases of national splittism was the utilization of the
1935 Declaration of the Chinese Soviet Central Government to the People of Inner
Mongolia (the 1935 Declaration) to serve the alleged purpose of splitting the nation. The
1935 Declaration promised the Inner Mongolian people right to govern and to “solve all
internal issues” themselves, and forbade anyone to violently interfere heir living habits,
religious  practices  etc.  It  also  promised  the  people  of  Inner  Mongolia  the  right  to
organize themselves and decide whether to form a federation with other nations of to
become independent. The report accuses Ulanhu of using this outdated and invalid
declaration to fight Han-chauvinism and to establish his own kingdom when he should
have been fighting local nationalism instead.272
Continuing to the domain of psychology, the report finds the fundamental cause for
Inner Mongolian splittism in Ulanhu’s strong desire for leadership. He is characterized
as a self-proclaimed leader and nationality expert who is unable to take criticism and is
desperately trying to build up his authority, even placing himself on the same level with
Mao Zedong in Inner Mongolia. He is also criticized for unwillingness to implement
policies that he does not agree with and for ignoring directives from the Center, thus
disregarding the principle of democratic centralism.273
5. Placing trusted follower to key positions and seizing leadership
270 Qi Zhi 2010: 158.
271 Declaration of the Chinese Soviet Central Government to the people of Inner Mongolia (Zhonghua suweiya
zhongyang zhengfu dui Neimenggu reninde xduanyan abbr.San wu xuanyan) can be read in whole in Qi Zhi 2010
(100 – 102). The Declaration signed by Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Central Government of the Chinese
Soviet Republic,  is here said to have been written by “dogmatists within the party” wrongly acting in Chairman
Mao’s name (ibid. 159).
272 Qi Zhi 2010: 159.
273 Qi Zhi 2010: 159 – 160.
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Lastly, the report brings out Ulanhu’s political moves in the course of a year before the
Qianmen-hotel meetings. He is criticized for deliberately steering cadres to a road of
factionalism (zongpai zhuyi) by favoring trusted followers (qinxin) who execute his
revisionist, anti-Han-chauvinist, and splittist ideas. He is also accused of favoring the
rightists within the Mongol cadres and the ones supporting his ideas within the different
factions of Mongol cadres. On the other hand, he is criticized for discriminating against
and attacking the ones “adhering to Party principles”. The process of seizing Party and
government leadership is said to have started in the latter half of 1965, one of the major
moves being the establishment of a 13-member Surrogate Standing Committee (daili
changwei) to replace the CPC IMAR Standing Committee in order to implement Ulanhu’s
splittist policies in January 1966274. The report lists additional cases of Ulanhu replacing
leaders in the IMAR and local government levels with his own followers.275
With respect to the question of nationality politics, the last of the points of criticism of
power seizure in the IMAR brings out the “nationalized” conflict within the leadership
of the IMAR. Ulanhu is accused of attacking the leading Chinese cadres trying to clear
away obstacles to advocating national splittism. The report highlights Ulanhu’s attack
against the Chinese Party Committee Secretaries Wang Duo (王铎 1917 ̶ 1997), Quan
Xingyuan (权星垣 1916 ̶ 2015), and Gao Jinmin (高锦明 1917 ̶ 2012 ) during a Surrogate
Committee meeting in April 1966, accusing them of not being up to their tasks. Ulanhu’s
followers were allegedly spreading rumors of these secretaries and some other leading
cadres being “anti-Ulanhu”. Preparations for a “palace coup” (gongting zhengbian) are
said to have continued until the NCB meeting in late April where Ulanhu’s intentions
were finally discovered and criticized accordingly. Right after that Ulanhu was
summoned by the Central Committee to take part in the Politburo enlarged session in
May 1966 in Beijing, thus preventing Ulanhu from carrying out his plans.276
274 Ulanhu’s explanation for setting up the Surrogate Standing Committee recorded in a biography published in
2007 was the need to promote vigorous and able cadre to lead the IMAR by circumventing the established practice
of promotion that prevented the removal of once-promoted cadres and replacing them with new blood (Wang et
al. 2007: 509).
275 Qi Zhi 2010: 161 - 162.
276 Qi Zhi 2010: 162 – 162.
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The report concludes by once more describing Ulanhu’s personality that explains his
political behavior. Despite having been a member of the Communist Party for over 40
years he has not been able to change his capitalist stand point inherited from his
landowning home and capitalist education. With his bourgeois nationalism and selfish
ambitiousness he has betrayed the trust of the Party Center and Chairman Mao as the
leader of a strategically vital border region. Lastly, the report states that despite
everything, the NCB is still confident that “more than 95% of the cadres and masses of
Inner Mongolia are revolutionary and believe in the Centre and Chairman Mao”, and
expression of trust – regardless of its sincerity – that would soon be lost.277
6.2. Rebels Exposing Ulanhu's Crimes – Compilations of and Notes on
Ulanhu’s Poisonous Speeches
Moving from the Qianmen Hotel a year forward to the summer of 1967 when the primary source
material was produced, Inner Mongolia had been through a lot. The conflict between “rebels”
and “conservatives” had occupied the CR enthusiasts during late 1966 and early 1967, but
Centre’s intervention in the conflict and the 13 April Decision turned the focus on a concentrated
attack on Ulanhu and his representatives among the cadres, and brought in a new leader, Teng
Haiqing, from Beijing.
In  general,  the  tone  of  the  period  starting  from  mid-1967  was great study (da xue), great
criticism (da pipan), and great alliance (da lianhe).  Great  study  meant  the  tireless  study  of
Chairman Mao’s works everywhere in study classes (xuexiban) set up for this purpose. Great
criticism was criticism towards Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Ulanhu and his “sworn followers”
(sidang). Great alliance meant unifying the mass organizations and to form unity between the
rebels and the cadres, which then led to the three-in-one (sanjiehe) combination in the
Revolutionary Committee278.The great alliance was promoted through propaganda in the IM
Daily and local papers in a unified voice, that reprinted materials form the two newspapers and
one magazine, and editorials and reports denouncing targets like Ulanhu’s anti-party clique
(Wulanfu fandan jituan). 279  attack This was the general atmosphere where the studied
documents by the rebels denouncing Ulanhu were produced. The secondary source materials
give also some details about the period when the studied materials were produced.
277 Qi Zhi 2010: 163.
278 The Revolutionary Committees were to be established based on the principle of three-in-one, having members
from abong the leadership cadres, the military, and the masses.
279 Qi Zhi 2010: 217 – 219; Guo 2009: 321.
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The primary source material by the rebels fall  under the category of ”unofficial” materials or
attack on Ulanhu as defined by Brown (2006). The attack on Ulanhu in 1967 ̶68 was “conducted
through two types of material”, the “official” attack being a “series of articles and items in the
IM Daily” representing “the public attack on Ulanhu and his power base”; and the unofficial
attack consisting of varied material produced by “various groups competing with each other”280.
According to Brown, the official material prioritized the “ideological factor” in criticism of Ulanhu,
his opposition to the Centre’s instructions on class and class struggle. The Unofficial material
were “fiercer, and conveyed by more aggressive language”, and included sub-genres: collections
of Ulanhu’s “black sayings” “with editorial comment and notation”; prose narratives of
chronologies of” Ulanhu’s “black counter-revolutionary deeds”; and ideological attack
“presented through analytical discussion of the ideological heresies attributed to” Ulanhu281.
The “rebellious group publications with limited audience” attacked Ulanhu before the official
attack, starting in June 1967, whereas the official attack was launched with the naming of Ulanhu
on 29 August 1967 in an IM Daily editorial branding him “the key representative in the IMAR
taking the capitalist, revisionist road”282. Despite the official attack against Ulanhu by name did
not start until the editorial in IM Daily on 29 August 1967, the target was already well-known.
Qi Zhi (2010) cites an article in IM Daily form 24 August 1967 that praised the “revolutionary
great criticism big-character posters lately appearing like bamboo shoots after spring rain [ru
yuhou chunsun] by the streets of Hohhot” denouncing China’s Khrushchev (Liu Shaoqi) and the
reigning prince (dangdai wangye, i.e. Ulanhu) of Inner Mongolia.283
The rebels’ documents studied here could probably be seen as having the task of “preparing the
audience” for the open attack on Ulanhu. The “need to prepare the audience” was something
that according to Brown (2006) was considered in the “min-campaign against the Wang’s”
(Wang Duo and Wang Yilun) from May to July, i.e. ending where the materials studied here start
form.284 The campaign resembled the central campaign against Liu Shaoqi in that “the explicit
mention of the real target – Ulanfu [sic] was still taboo despite the sanction from the Centre in
the ’13 April Decision’ to do so”.285 One reason why preparation was needed may have been the
initial ineffectiveness of the 13 April Decision to end the conflict between the parties. Yang (2014)
notes an interesting detail from a meeting between Zhou Enlai and Inner Mongolian MR and
280 Brown 2006: 69 – 70.
281 Ibid: 69.
282 Ibid. 64.
283 Qi Zhi 2010: 220.
284 Brown 2006: 56.
285 Ibid.
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rebel representatives on 26 May 1967. In the meeting Zhou blamed the problems in Inner
Mongolia, including the factional strives and deaths, on Ulanhu’s crime of treason and urged the
rebel organizations to put more effort on exposing and denouncing Ulanhu, Wang Yiluo, Wang
Duo etc. “enemies”.286
In the following chapters the result (or rather a sample of the results) of the efforts of the rebels
in exposing and denouncing Ulanhu’s crimes are discussed. The chapters are organized in
themes that begin with quoted passages from the original documents The quoted passages are
meant to serve as introductions to the respective discussion. The (slightly) resembles the
organization of the rebels’ documents, where the compilations of quotes from Ulanhu are
usually organized under themes (the different crimes) preceded with an introduction by the
editors that explain the problems the quotes are evidence for.
The rebels’ documents are reffered to according to the page numbers in Yang (2012), but also
according to the number of the document in the “list of documents” (appendix 1). In the
footnotes the number of the document is given in parentheses, e.g. Yang 2012 (1): 591 refers to
page 591 in Yang (2012), which is the document 1 in the list of documents. This system is used
to both avoid constant referring to documents according to their names (which are very long),
and to enable an easier referral to source documents.287
6.2.1 Opposing Chairman Mao and Class Struggle
长期以来，乌兰夫窃据了内蒙古自治区党、政、军、财、文大权，推行一条修正主义，
民族分裂主义的反革命政治路线。他极力宣扬资产阶级民族观，借口民族特点、地区特
点，抹煞阶级矛盾，以民族问题代替阶级斗争; … …
For a long time Ulanhu has unjustly claimed the major power over the party, government,
military, finance, and culture in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, implementing revisionist
and national splittist counter-revolutionary political line. He propagates a bourgeois nationality
view with all his strength, using nationality and local characteristics as pretense to obliterate
class conflict, replacing class struggle with the nationality problem; … 288
Like  the  report  from  the  Qianmen  Hotel  meetings  already  suggested,  class  struggle  –  or  in
Ulanhu’s case the alleged denial of class struggle was a major theme on the rebels’ documents.
286 Yang 2014: 222 – 223. In Yang’s view, this is how the Centre blamed the IMAR problems on Ulanhu and
turned the ”spearhead” (against) Mongols, proving that the becoming killings of Mongols were initiated from the
Centre.
287 The system was inspired by the one, despite different, used by Brown (2006).
288 Yang 2012 (2.2): 617. The quotation from the introduction to the Compilation of Ulanhu’s Reactionary Views
that is the second part of the Extracts From Ulanhu’s Black Speeches by the Inner Mongolia University
“Jinggangshan” Denounce Ulanhu Liaison Station, that is the second document among the rebels’ documents
compiled in Yang (2012) (no date indicated).
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Being of central importance for Mao since the beginning of the Socialist education movement,
class struggle and the resistance of capitalist revival and revisionism within the Party were the
main themes linking the Center’s ideas of the CR to the local issues in Inner Mongolia. The
pragmatic policies that emphasized nationality characteristics and starting from Inner
Mongolian reality since the establishment of the IMAR had earned Inner Mongolia the title of
the “exemplary model of minority nationalities”289. But starting from the autumn of 1962 and
the Tenth Plenum of the Eight Central Committee, where Mao defined the central political line
as opposing revisionism internationally and guarding against it domestically (fanxiu fangxiu), and
“re-emphsized the class struggle” (chongxin qiangdiao jieji douzheng), the pragmatic policies in
Inner Mongolia started to become more and more incompatible with the central tone.290
In Ulanhu’s case, the essential problem of the ideological conflict with Mao and the Centre was
the conflict between class struggle and nationality politics. The Qianmen Hotel Report accused
Ulanhu of prioritizing the nationality problem over class struggle, when the correct Mao Zedong
thought viewed the nationality conflict as essentially a class conflict, as expressed by Mao in
1963 (see chapter 6.1).
On the issue of class struggle, the rebels’ mostly repeat what was already pronounced in the
Qianmen Hotel Report. Backed by the “brilliant and mighty thesis” by Mao that “nationality
struggle, in the final analysis, is a problem of class struggle”291, Ulanhu is criticized of rejecting
and twisting this view and promoting anti-Maoist policies. He had replaced class struggle with
the nationality problem and made it his “first and foremost cause” (gang shang zhi gang).292
Earliest quotations of Ulanhu opposing class struggle by emphasizing the particularity of
nationalities are from 1946 – 1949 and consider land reforms. The quotations allegedly testify
that  Ulanhu,  “in  order  to  protect  the  reactionary  regime,  actually  dared  to  distort  the  most
fundamental and important conflict, the class conflict, into a nationality conflict”293.The main
“error” of Ulanhu was to promote differentiating policies on land reform based on ethnicity,
region, and economy. A prime example is the “class capitulationist” (jieji touxiang) “Three Nos”
policy in pastoral regions already mentioned in the Qianmen Hotel Report and a policy of “not
struggling and not striking down” (bu douzheng budado)  landlords  (dizhu) and rich peasants
289 Shaoshu minzude bangyang. A title conferred by People’s Daily in an editorial on 1 May 1957 (Quoted in QI
Zhi 2010: 56.)
290 Paltemaa & Vuori 2012: 146; QI Zhi 2010: 56.
291 One of the most used quotes from Mao in the materials, e.g. (2.1): 601; (2.2): 621; (3): 644
292 Yang 2012 (2.1): 601 – 602; 3: 644.
293 Yang 2012 (2.2): 621. More on early land reforms in eastern Inner Mongolia and the IMAR in Bulag 2002 (114
– 121).
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(funong) in agricultural regions that, according to the rebels, was maintaining the feudal class
rule294.
The problem of denying the basic principles of the nationality problem surfaced again in 1962.
The rebels’ document 1 criticizes Ulanhu’s speech at the Central Nationality Work Conference
(zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyi)  in  April,  1962  for  refusing  to  mention  the  proletarian
dictatorship and its function in the IMAR socialist revolution and construction, but replacing it
with ideas of ”minorities being masters in their own territory” (shaoshuminzu dangjia zuozhu)
and “right to self-determination “ (zizheng quanli) trying to gain support for his “capitalist
dictatorship” (zichanjieji zhuanzheng)295.
Ulanhu’s views on economic development of Inner Mongolia were heavily criticized for
suffocating the class struggle. In a speech to the persons in charge of league-committees
(mengwei)  in  1953  Ulanhu  describes  the  Party’s  previous  work  in  Inner  Mongolia  as  that  of
achieving equality of nationalities, and that going forward the goal should be economic
construction and elimination of the inequalities in economy and culture, remnants of history296.
In the rebels’ papers this kind of talk in support of economic development as a means of
achieving equality of nationalities was interpreted as abandoning the most important “historical
mission”, the class struggle and “…leading the minority nationality’s workers on the capitalist
road…”297 . Four years later in August, 1957 “when the Anti-Rightist Campaign had already
began”, Ulanhu is again quoted “crushing” it [the Anti-Rightist campaign] with his talks about
the socialist construction being “the overriding task” in the IMAR298.
The twofold conflict of both nationality policy and economic development being at odds with
the principal mission of class struggle is prominent in regard to the economic development of
pastoral regions (muqu). In quotations from 1965 considering pastoral-region specific policies,
like the Three Nos and Two Benefits, Ulanhu commends how the pastoral economy has been
able to flourish and been beneficial to all parties, and how the herdlords (muzhu) have
successfully been incorporated to the government. Later, during the Four Cleanups Ulanhu is
quoted defending the importance of pastoral economy before the class struggle, as the full-
blown class struggle would be the end of pastoral economy. For the editors, these examples
show Ulanhu’s hostility towards class struggle and consider it “viciously attacking” the
294 Yang 2012 (2.2): 621.
295 Yang 2012 (1): 592.
296 Yang (3): 657.
297 Yang (3): 658.
298 Yang (3): 658.
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democratic revolution, the socialist transformation and the Four Cleanups. Despite success in
the increase of production, this success is considered similar to the “bourgeois revolution of
Britain”,  making  the  capitalist  class  richer  and  leaving  the  society  with  the  problems  of
unemployment and poverty. Thus, the specific policies for pastoral regions, despite their
superficial success, are a form of capitalism, taking the wrong road.299
The problem of Ulanhu placing the nationality question above the class struggle is only one of
the ways he is  seen as “opposing the Party, Mao Zedong thinking, and socialism”, but it can be
seen as the most fundamental or general one. Qi Zhi describes the contradictions within the
Party, appearing in the form of line and power struggles, as being “on the surface, central, and
primary”300 that surfaced in the beginning of the CR as a result of the 1958 Central Committee
definition that “in a class society the true nature of the nationality problem is class problem”
and the reasserted emphasis on class struggle since in the 60’s.301 Not surprising from a report
approved by the Party Center, the conflict between Ulanhu’s pragmatic policies adapted to local
conditions and Mao’s radical leftist line was already well established in the Qianmen Hotel
report. Ulanhu’s errors concerning nationality policies, like the Three Nos, peaceful transition
instead of class struggle, and opposing the Four Cleanups were recorded in the Qianmen Hotel
Report and the rebels had little to add apart from fierce and vulgar language. However, the
centrality of the conflict between minority policy and class struggle is evident in the way that it
brought about and affected further conflicts.
6.2.2 Ideological Conflict
最后他集其反革命修正主义和民族分裂主义之大成，抛出臭名远扬的“三个基础”，公
然对抗毛主席提出的三大革命运动，为资本主义复辟全面制造舆论。
Finally, he put together all his great achievements of counter-revolutionary revisionism and
national splittisim, and released the stinkingly notorious ”three fundamentals”, openly resisting
299 Yang 2012 (3): 650 – 651.
300 Qi Zhi 2010: 18. As for the third quality of the intraparty contradictions, Qi Zhi (2010) and Woody (1993) are
themselves contradictory. In Woody (1993) the ”contradictions were on the surface, central, and subsequential
[houfaxingde]”, whereas in Qi Zhi (2010) the last of three qualities is yuanfaxingde (原發性的), which is
translated as  ”primary” in this thesis. A probable explanation for the contradiction is that Qi Zhi edited the text
between the publicatoin based on the handwritten draft (Woody 1993) and the final book (Qi Zhi 2010).
The ”primary” quality does seem more logical considering the Inner Mongolian CR starting from the
denouncement of Ulanhu and his opposition to the Centre before the CR spreading to the AR and among the
people. (Qi Zhi 2010: 18; Woody 1993: first page of the main text, after the Editor’s Introduction.)
301 Qi Zhi 2010. 20.
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the three revolutions campaign put forward by Chairman Mao and preparing public opinion of
all aspects in favor of the restoration of capitalism.302
The culmination of Ulanhu’s ideological defiance of Mao Zedong thought criticized in the
Qianmen Hotel Report was the three foundations (san ge jichu) of minzu tuanjie presented by
Ulanhu in January 1865, the “revisionist from head to tail” distortion of Mao Zedong thought
promoting bourgeois nationalism.303 In a passage from November 1965 Ulanhu explained the
theory about the three foundations: political foundation (zhengzhi jichu), economic foundation
(jingji jichu), and cultural foundation (wenhua jichu). The political foundation was to be created
by recruiting cadres of all nationalities, in both agricultural and pastoral regions, to establish
“class ranks” (jieji duiwu) and strengthen minzu tuanjie. In this passage, Ulanhu also refers to Liu
Shaoqi’s report on constitution that, according to Ulanhu, also stated that the crucial point of
the nationality question is the question of the unity of the fatherland, for which a reliable
political foundation is needed.304 The major problem to solve by building economic foundation
is the conflict between agriculture and pastoralism that “is inherited form history”. This problem
should be solved by uniting agriculture and pastoralism, “Mongols can herd, the Han can also
herd, the Han can cultivate land, so can the Mongols”, turning the conflict into a relationship of
both helping each other. About the cultural foundation, Ulanhu reminds that it is ruled about
the autonomous region that in IMAR two languages are used side by side (tongxing liangzhong
yuyan), but this had not been realized, as many Mongol cadres could not speak Chinese, and
many Han cadres could not speak Mongolian, even the ones working in the most basic level in
pastoral regions. Having a common language, political and economic foundation, would bring a
common heart/mind (gongtongde xinli).305
The rebels criticize the three foundations on similar lines with the Qianmen Hotel Report, but
ad some more content to the criticism with more aggressive language. The three foundations of
the “reigning prince” (dangdai wangye)  and  “autocrat  traitor  to  the  people”  (dufu minzei)
Ulanhu are counter-revolutionary revisionist, national splittist “mish-mash” (dazahui), opposing
302 Yang (4): 2012: 665. The quotation is from the inroduction for document 4, Opposing Mao Zedong Thougth,
Promoting National Splittism, Betraying the Proletarian Dictatorship by The Hohhot Revolutioinary Rebels
Liaison Headquarters Denounce Ulanhu Anti -Party Clique Liaison Station, dated July 1967.
303 QI Zhi 2010: 156; see translation in appendix..
304 Ulanhu possibly refers to the Report on the Draft of Constitution (xianfa baogao) by Liu from September 1954,
which does not use the same words with Ulanhu, but in content is very similar. In the report Liu also refers to the
“experience in creating a free and equal big family of nationalities [minzu dajiating]”, and the rules the
constitution gives on “construction of politics, economy, and culture of all minority nationalities”
(Chinacourt.org).
305 Yang 2012 (4): 681 – 683.
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Mao Zedong’s three revolutions (san da geming)306 But the rebels add further attributes to the
content and goals of the foundations. The political foundation is said to resist the proletarian
dictatorship by turning the proletarian party into a counter-revolutionary splittist party, even a
facist party (faxisidang). It suppresses the revolutionary masses and “enlists” (wangluo) all kind
of  “ox  monsters  and  snake  demons”  (niugui sheshen), like landlords (di), rich peasants and
herders (fu, supposedly meaning both peasants and herders), counter-revoutionaries (fan), and
bad elements (huai). The establishment of this “reactionary ‘class ranks’” (fandongde
“jiejiduiwu”) is said to have played a major role in the “capitalist counter-revolutionary
restorationist couter-current” in the IMAR since February (1967). This reference to the so called
February counter-current (eryue niliu) in Inner Mongolia, where the “conservatives” and their
supporters in the leadership of the AR and the MR suppressed the revolutionaries of course
something  that  did  not  make  to  the  Qianmen  Hotel  Report.  It  can  also  be  observed  as  an
association of the conservative faction and much of the IMAR leadership (that mostly was also
“anti-Ulanhu” after the Qianmen Hotel meeting) with Ulanhu and his “black gang” (heibang).307
In the same document (4) the rebels present the economic foundation of the three foundations
as Ulanhu’s “sinister talk” (guihua, lies/nonsense) that aims to protect the exploiting system and
opposes socialist relations of productions, trying to restore capitalism. The cultural foundation
is directly in opposition with Mao’s idea of all culture, literature and art belonging to a certain
class and political line. Ulanhu is accused of “resisting the mass movement of the great study
[daxue] of Chaiman Mao’s works” by promoting the “great study” (daxue) of the Mongolian
language and script.308 (The problem of cultural foundation is discussed under N.N.)
The three foundations was only a refined version of Ulanhu’s defiance of Mao Zedong and the
CPC. Its origins could be traced far in IMAR history. Finding evidence of denying the leadership
Mao and the CPC was perhaps one of the easiest tasks for the rebels, as standards were low.
An important way in which Ulanhu is considered to have been opposing and denying the
leadership of the Party is the way Ulanhu represented the revolutionary history of Inner
Mongolia. Whereas the “errors” discussed above (denying class struggle, protecting old elites,
setting up a kingdom of his own) were major errors of Ulanhu already criticized in the Qianmen
306 The revolutions in class struggle, production (shengchan geming), and scientific experiment (kexue shiyande
geming). Interestingly, in the passages quoted in the same document, Ulanhu himself emphasizes the importance
of the two first of the three revolutions, and that the scientific revolution will be fulfilled within the revolution of
production. (Ibid.)
307Ibid.
308 Ibid.
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Hotel report, here the rebels have but more effort in reinterpreting Ulanhu’s speeches
considering Inner Mongolian history as “poisonous” and obliterating the alleged leading role of
the CPC in the Inner Mongolian revolution and after that in the development of the IMAR.
As an example of Ulanhu distorting history, the rebels give an early quote from the Report of the
February 1947 Lindong Cadre meeting, where Ulanhu states, that “the beginning of the Inner
Mongolian revolution was in Beiping MongolianTibetan School”309. Disregarding the spirit of the
report where Ulanhu praises the CPC role as the leader of the Inner Mongolian revolution (and
the irony of  fact that the CPC recruited Mongols and other minority students from the school,
including Ulanhu), the rebels criticize Ulanhu for distorting (cuangai) the correct history,
according to which “the Inner Mongolian revolution has been executed under CPC leadership
from start to beginning”, “under the leadership of the great Mao Zedong thought”, and “began
from JInaggangshan, Ruijin, and Yan’an” 310  and definitely not from “the Mongolian-Tibetan
School where traitor-Ulanhu, Kuibi, JIyatai and other scums of the Zhonghua minzu were”311.
Another example of Ulanhu distorting history and denying the CPC and Mao Zedong’s leadership
is found from his speeches between 19451947, i.e. even before the establishment of the IMAG.
The rebels collected quotations from Ulanhu that emphasize the role of the Lianhehui
(Federation of Inner Mongolian Autonomy movements, an organization led by Ulanhu and
working under the CPC) in liberating Inner Mongolia. Despite Ulanhu repeatedly bringing up the
CPC’s “assistance” (yuanzhu) and ”help” (bangzhu) in the Inner Mongolian strive for autonomy,
his error in CR standards was the modest evaluation of the CPC’s role: “The counter-
revolutionary revisionist Ulanhu” distorts the leadership role of the CPC by calling it help and
assistance, and represents the IM revolution as parallel with the Chinese revolution instead of
being  a  part  of  it312. Worst of all, Ulanhu even dares to state that the right to self-decision
(zijuequan)  of  all  nationalities  was  advocated  by  the  CPC  leader Mister Mao Zedong (Mao
Zedong xiansheng, italics added), the address ‘mister’ being an insult of worst kind to the great
leader313. As is the case throughout the rebels’ documents, the context of Ulanhu’s speeches, in
this case meetings and official document of the Lianhehui and the IMAG, need not be taken into
309 3: 645. The quoted sentence was not to be found in Lindong cadre meeting report included in the Ducaoji
(Yang 2012: 155 – 157), but the Ducaoji report includes merely extracts (jiexuan) from the full report. It is
possible that the quoted sentence has been left out from the Duocaoji.
310 Jinggangshan (井冈山, Jiangxi-Hunan, ) is considered the birthplace of the Chinese Red Army/the PLA, Ruijin
(瑞金, jiangix), is where the Chinese Soviet Republic was established in 1931, and Yan’an (延安, Shaanxi) is
where the Long March ended in late 1935.
311 3: 645.
312 2.2: 618 – 620.
313 2.2: 620.
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consideration. Before the establishment of the IMAG Ulanhu’s mission was to unite the Inner
Mongolian autonomy movements, especially the already established EMAG, under the
leadership of the Lianhehui and the CPC, a context where emphasizing the role of the Chinese
Communists would not have brought the desired results314.
6.2.3 Proxy of Aristocrats and the Bourgeoisie
“当代王爷”长期以来自封“领袖”的同时，也把他们的党羽，鱼肉人民的王公贵族捧
为少数民族“领袖人物”，这还不算，他又提出什么“自治机关民族化，党的领导机关
民族化，自治机关干部民族化”等反革命修正主义口号，为其反动党羽争权夺利，要使
他们骑在人民头上作威作福，作为他的“当家作主”的领导核心。315
While proclaiming himself as ”minzu leader”, since long has the “reigning prince” praised their
party wing, the princely aristocrats preying on the people, as the “leading figures” of the
minority nationality. What’s more, he put forward his “minoritization of the organs of the self-
government, leadership organs of the party, cadres of the organs of self-government” and
whatever counter-revolutionary revisionist slogans to scramble for this reactionary wing’s
power and profit, trying to let them ride roughshod over the people, to create his leadership
core of “being masters in one’s own territory”.
Ulanhu serving the “nationality upper strata” (minzu shangceng) of the Mongols and creating
his own leadership group by favoring “trusted followers” (qinxin) in appointments were both
mentioned in the Qianmen Hotel Report, but in different contexts. First there was the part of
opposing class struggle and socialist revolution with his pragmatic policies protective of the
interests of the upper strata, and  the “beautifying” (meihua) of them by praising (in 1962) the
successful rally of people of all strata who were “patriotic and supportive of the nationality
autonomy” to serve the IMAR government since the establishment of the IMAR. Another was
the recent development during about one year before the Qianmen Hotel meeting, when
314The Eastern Mongol leadership made conditions for them entering the Lianhehui, e.g. the role of the CPC was
to “be kept secret as long as possible” and only the Lianhehui “would be publicly acknowleged as the leading
organ of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement”, and the role of the CPC military regions as having “the
operational command of the People’s Autonomus Army” was downplayed to keep an appearance of an
“independent Inner Mongolian army” (Atwood 1993: 67).
315 Yang 2012 (5): 698 – 699. This quotation is from the second part of Ulanhu’s Counter-revolutionary Revisionist
Speeches by the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Headquarters Denounce and Struggle Ulanhu Anti-Party
Clique Liaison Station, July 1967.
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Ulanhu assigned cadres allegedly based on allegiance to his revisionist line, anti-Han-chauvinism,
and national splittist goals.316
The problems of Ulanhu protecting old elites, praising the achievements of using their abilities
for the benefit of the IMAR, and promoting the minoritization of cadres to strengthen unity
(tuanjie) are in the rebels’ documents all a part of the same major crime of “conspiring to set up
his own kingdom” and “restoring capitalism”.317  One more crime already mentioned in the
Qianmen Hotel Report, using the 1935 Declaration for his kingdom ambitions and to fight “so
called Han chauvinism” is also added to this category, fulfilling the evidence for Ulanhu’s 20
years of splittist conspiracy.318
What was considered beautifying the upper strata in his speeches in 1962 by the Qianmen Hotel
Report, had its roots in the early history of the IMAR. As the summarized in document 5: “From
the Inner Mongolia autonomy movement to the democratic revolution, to land reform and all
the way to the socialist transformation and socialist education movement,” Ulanhu had
protected the interests of the feudal upper strata and the herdlords with his counter-
revolutionary and anti-class-struggle pretext of the “theory of the speciality of the [Mongol]
nationality” (minzu teshu lun).319
316 See parts 2 and 5 of the translation in appendix N, and Qi Zhi (2010: 156 – 158, 162 – 162).
317 E.g. 2012 (5): 687.
318 E.g. Yang 2012 (5): 687 – 704; (3) 642 – 661.
319 Yang 2012 (5): 642.
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323 The depth of the problem of “traitor-Ulanhu’s” (Wu zei326 ) tuanjie-talks considering the
protection of old elites can be observed in document 3. First of all, “protecting” the old elites by
taking them into the new government, letting them transform themselves by ”excavating each
other’s thinking” (huxiang wa sixiang) and letting old princes be elected as banner leaders is
“class capitulationism” at its worst327. Not only is he protecting and serving the old elites but is
trying to replace the proletarian dictatorship with “nationality dictatorship” (minzu zhuanzheng).
The promotion of peaceful transformation instead of “fierce class struggle” in minority regions,
according to Ulanhu himself, may have seemed to have been making concessions to elites on
the surface, but its aim was to pave a more stable and easily acceptable road towards socialism,
for the benefit of the minority nationality. This, however, was not only incompatible with Mao’s
idea of revolution being “an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows
another”328, but it also shows that the aim of traitor-Ulanhu’s revolution “is not overthrowing
the feudal upper class oppressing and exploiting the great masses of the minority workers, crush
320 “Authoritative media” (quanwei meiti) calling Ulanhu “contemporary prince” (dangdai wangye) also inspired
the “masses” come up with related names for his close allies. Kuibi and Jiyatai, whose common history with
Ulanhu led back to the Mongol-Tibetan School  were named Ulanhu’s “right and left prime minister” (zuo-you
chengxiagn, chengxiang being the highest official in imperial China ). Buhe (Ulanhu’s son) and Yun Liwen
(Ulanhu’s wife) were called the contemporary prince’s “son of a bitch” (gou erzi, literally dog’s son) and
“stingking wife” (chou poniang) etc. (Qi Zhi 2010: 220).
321 Yang 2012 (
322 Yang 2012 (
323 Collectivisation in agricultural regions had begun from voluntary ”mutual aid teams” (互助组) in eastern IM
already before the establishment of the PRC and in western Inner Mongolia after the land reform, too. The focus
of the movement turned to collectives (hezuoshe, first into “elementary clectives” chuji hezuoshe and then
“advanced collectives” gaoji hezuoshe) after the Center’s Decision on the development of agricultural production
collectives in October, 1952. The collectivization of agriculture in IM was “fundamentally completed” by late
1956. (Hao 1991: 117 – 119.)
324 Yang 2012 (
325 Yang 2012 (
326 Wu zei (烏賊) is the derogatory nickname given to Ulanhu in document 3. The first character烏 (wu) stands
for Ulanhu (Wulanfu).賊 zei (thief, traitor) was a part of the CR vocabulary used to denigrate enemies, e.g. in
October 1968 when Liu Shaoqi was expelled from the Party, he was characterized a ”traitor, hidden agent, and
strikebreaker (gongzei工賊”(pantu, neijian, gongzei)(Zhao 1995: 248 – 249.),A common term of abuse used for
Ulanhu was ”reigning prince” (dangdai wangye,當代王爺), which also inspired more names given to his allies,
e.g. ”left and right (chief) ministers” (zuoyou chengxiang，左右丞相) of Ulanhu used for Kuibi（奎璧）and
Jiyatai (吉雅泰)（Qi Zhi 2010:220).
327 Boyanmandu esimerkkinä. ”a feudal figure, utilized by Japan, utilized by the GMD, always a reactionary,
during the land reform, people like this, we protected them” (3: 648).
328 Full English translation of the famous quotation: A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or
painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind,
courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class
overthrows another. "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (March 1927), Selected
Works, Vol. I  p.28. https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/red-book/ch02.htm (29 Sept. 2017)
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the  cruel  serf  system,  the  feudal  system,  but  to  achieve  the  goal  of  ‘stable  and  unified
development of production”, thus clearly protecting the reactionary forces and opposing class
struggle329.330
6.2.4 Crimes in the Cultural Domain
乌兰夫妄想分裂我们的社会主义祖国、建立资产阶级专政的大蒙古国，长时期以来，就
把他的反革命修正主义民族分裂主义的黑手伸进了文化领域的各个部门 …
In his vain attempt to split our socialist fatherland and found a Great Mongolian Kingdom of
bourgeois dictatorship, Ulanhu has since long reached his counter-revolutionary revisionist
national splittist black hand into all branches of the cultural sphere … 331
Ulanhu’s crimes in the cultural sphere is a topic that was touched only as a part of him “bowing
to revisionism” in the Qianmen Hotel Report in the form of the promotion of the use of the
Cyrillic script in writing Mongolian to unify the writing system with the one used in the
“revisionist” MPR332. In the rebels’ materials from the Summer of 1967 Ulanhu’s actions in the
cultural sphere receive more attention their evaluation is developed to fit the ideological
problem of denying class struggle.
The problem of reforming the Mongolian language touched upon in the Qianmen Hotel Report
developed from a bow to revisionism into a part of “creating conditions for founding a counter-
revolutionary independent kingdom” in the rebels’ documents333. In the early- and mid-1950s
Ulanhu promoted the Cyrillic script as a part of developing the Mongol culture, which also
included unifying dialects, creating “new Mongolian” (xin mengwen) education and science, in
order  to  unify  Inner  Mongolia  and catch up and learn from the “more than twenty  years  of
experience” of revolution in the MPR that was considered more developed334. In Ulanhu’s view,
the reform of the Mongolian language and script was both a question of “how to unite Inner
Mongolia, and at the same time engage in cultural exchange with the ‘Khalkha” (ka’erka, the
largest ethnic group in Outer Mongolia, here meaning the MPR)”335. Thus the reform had both
domestic and international aspect. Domestically there was the goal of unifying the people
through unifying the Mongolian dialects and script, and internationally the cultural exchange
329 3: 650.
330 3: 648 – 650.
331 Yang 2012 (7): 730. This quotation is from the introduction to the third part of the Extracts from Ulanhu’s
Counter-revolutionary Revisionist Speeches by the Hohhot Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Headquarters Denounce
and Struggle Ulanhu Anti-Party Clique Liaison Station, dated September 1967.
332 See chapter X.X in this thesis and appendix X.
333 Yang 2012 (7): 740.
334 Ibid: 741.
335 Ibid: 740.
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with the Mongols in the MPR, as they formed “one minzu in two countries” (yige minzu, liang ge
guojia)336. These views served evidence for both founding an independent kingdom in Inner
Mongolia, as well as bowing to revisionism and trying to unify Inner and Outer Mongolia. Already
criticized in the Qianmen Hotel Report, the problem of the reform of the Mongolian script
became a part of the early findings paving way towards the excavation and elimination of the
Neirendang.
In September 1955 the IMAR People’s Government had passed a decision on promoting new
Mongolian script in a reform that should be completed in six years. During the following two
years the reform was prepared in cooperation with the MPR to unify the script and promote the
development of Inner Mongolian culture. However, the Centre did not agree with the reform,
in Qi Zhi’s view due to the threat of secessionism the unification of the Inner Mongolian script
with the Cyrillic script used in the MPR and Soviet Union337. In January 1957 Zhou Enlai reported
the Centre’s opinion on the matter by stating, that the future reforms of minority language
scripts shall be based on the Latin alphabet, as is consistent with the Chinese language that had
adopted the Latin alphabet as a medium of phonetic transcription (the Hanyu pinyin). Ulanhu’s
plan was thus frustrated by the Cente’s intervention338. However, the attempt provided lots of
material for the denouncement of Ulanhu during the Cultural Revolution. When the “wind of
catching traitors and spies” (jiu pantu, tewu zhi feng) reach Inner Mongolia in the latter half of
1967, the first “old IMPRP” member to be caught was Hafeng’a, the IMAR vice-chairman, head
of the Language Committee (yuwei) in charge of culture and education, who had also been the
person in charge of the Committee for Unifying Nouns and Terms of Inner and Outer Mongolia
(Nei-Waimeng mingci shuyu tongyi weiyuanhui, established in July 1956 in Ulaanbaatar as a joint
effort of Inner and Outer Mongolia), was taken from Beijing by the Catch Hafeng’a Liaison
Station (jiu Ha lianluozhan) to Hohhot to be denounced and criticized. During the investigation
of Hafeng’a’s case, the Special Case Group (zhuan’anzu) found out about the history of the
IMPRP that had advocated the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia, and that Hafeng’a had
been its leader. At the same time, they discovred a connection between Hafeng’a and the the
deputy chief of the IMAR PC Propaganda Department, Tegusi (特古斯 ), who had been
introduced to the IMPRP by Hafeng’a. The discovery of the two IMPRP members were the first
signs leading to the discovery of the new Neirendang.339
336 Ibid: 740 – 741.
337 Qi Zhi 2010: 76.
338 Ibid: 76 – 77.
339 Ibid: 76, 228 – 230.
75
Another problem in Ulanhu’s views considering the cultural sphere was the promotion of a
common language (gongtong yuyan), more specifically the view that Inner Mongolian cadres,
whether Mongols or Chinese, should know both Mongolian and Chinese languages. The problem
is examined in Ulanhu’s speech at the third expanded meeting of the second IMAR Party
Committee in 13 January 1965, where he expressed displeasure with how Inner Mongolia had
not been able to realize the common usage of two languages, Chinese and Mongolian. He saw
a problem in the fact that “many Mongols can’t speak Chinese and even the Chinese working at
the very lowest levels in pastoral regions can’t speak Mongolian”340. Ulanhu was promoting
bilingualism among cadres as a basis for a “common mental state” (gongtong xinli zhuangtai)
and to avoid barriers between nationalities, i.e. to promote “tuanjie”.However, by changing the
point of view Ulanhu’s promotion of unity becomes ideological defiance and is, in fact, breaking
the unity. For the rebels, a common language has nothing to do with a common state of mind,
as testified by the way “princes, herdlords, landlords” don’t share a state of mind with “poor
herders, poor and lower middle peasants” 341. Seen in this way, the promotion of common
language and common mental state instead of proletarian culture and cultural revolution proves
Ulanhu is a “representative of the feudal upper classes wrapped in a communist party coat”342.
The problem of promoting bilingualism and common language as a foundation for a common
mental state criticized in the rebels documents as “opposing the leadership of proletarian
thought, and the use of the endlessly radiant Mao Zedong thought to unify the thinking of all
nationalities” became a central theme of the official attack on Ulanhu, too343. Kerry Brown (2006)
quotes a 15 January article on the IM Daily, which saw Ulanhu’s logic of achieving a “common
attitude” trough a common language as “clearly the old tune of class compromise theory (jieji
tiaohelun de laodiao)”344. Brown argues, that while superficially the criticism towards Ulanhu’s
views on common language as a basis for common mental state and towards the reform of the
Mongolian script declared “that the fundamentals of ideology transcend language”, there also
was “a sense in which this was suppression of greater use of Mongolian, and a reaction against
the symbolic unity coming from the spoken language between the Mongolian people’s republic,
and Mongolians in IMAR”345. As already became clear in the rebels’ criticism, Marxism-Leninism
340 Yang 2012: 297.
341 Yang 2012 (3): 647.
342 Ibid.
343 Yang 2012 (7): 734.
344 Brown 2006: 72. What Kerry Brown has translated as ”common attitude” is probably the same phrase
of gongtong xinli zhuangtai translated as “common mental state” in this thesis.
345 Ibid. On a side note, ”the few words in Mongolian that had appeared on the front page of the IM
Daily” were banished from early 1968 onwards (Brown 2006: 72 - 73).
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and Mao Zedong Thought formed “a fundamental ideological body of truth beyond language”,
that could only be adequately conveyed by the language of the Centre346.347
The further criticism on Ulanhu’s erroneous views considering the cultural sphere also reflect
the  primacy  of  class  struggle  over  minority  policy.  In  the  first  document  that  collects
Ulanhu’s ”black speeches” from the April 1962 Central Nationality Work Conference, the rebels
base their criticism on Mao’s statement: ”In today’s world, all culture or literature and art belong
to a certain class, belong to a certain political line. In reality, art for the sake of art [wei yishude
yishu], supra-class art [chao jiejide yishu], and art coexisting side by side or independent of
politics, does not exist.”348 This is the manifestation of the conflicts between Ulanhu’s view on
IMAR local characteristics and the Centre’s universalism, class struggle and minzu policy,
observed in the cultural sphere. The rebels quote Ulanhu’s words that emphasize the
importance of ”minzu characteristics” and ”minzu form” in the development of literature and
art: ”We are taught by experience, that in order to develop flourishing minzu culture with
socialist content, we must start from the objective reality in the Autonomous Region, to give
consideration to minzu characteristics, apply minzu form”349. To the rebels, this ”empty talk of
minzu characteristics and minzu form”, ignore the class struggle within the cultural sphere and
the the ”fundamental question of serving proletarian politics”350.
One individual example of Ulanhu’s problem of not serving the class struggle is his criticism
towards the manuscript of the play Baogangren (包钢人)351 at the Forum to Celebrate the 20th
Anniversary of the Preparatory Committee (Qingzhu ershi zhounian chouweihui kaide zuotanhui)
on  22  December  1965.  Ulanhu  uses  the  example  of  the  play  Baoganren  to  the  IM  cadres,
346 Brown 2006: 73.
347 In his discussion on the official attack in early 1968 against Ulanhu’s “new empire” and its “ideological basis”
of “three theories” (political, economic, and cultural), Brown describes the cultural aspect as follows: “‘Study of
two languages. With a common language, there is a common heart’ (reference to the use of different scripts in
Mongolian People’s republic and IMAR…” (Brown 2006: 71). While the international aspect of the problem of
Ulanhu’s attempted reform of the (Inner) Mongolian script definitely was an important part of the criticism
towards language policies, in his speech on 30 December 1965 quoted often by the rebels, Ulanhu promotes the
bilingualism among cadres as a means of strengthening unity within Inner Mongolia and between Mongols and
Chinese. The quotes from mid 1950s regarding the reform of Mongolian script do not seem to be connected to the
“common heart” or “mental state” in the “cultural foundation” of Ulanhu’s three theories, but it is of course
possible, that creative interpretation was used to increase the effect of the materials denouncing Ulanhu. The
“three foudations” (sange jichu) that seem identical to the “three theories” discussed by Brown are criticized in
the rebels’ materials as a part of Ulanhu’s speeches in December 1965 (see Yang 2012: 292 – 293; 683).
348 Yang 20112 (1): 595.
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid.
351 Baogang, abbreviation of Baotou gangtie (包头钢铁, ”Baotou seel and iron”), is ”one of the first iron and steel
industry bases in China”. Its construction started in 1954 and went into operation in 1959. (Baidu1)
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especially the Chinese ones, that while bringing industry to Inner Mongolia, organizing working
class ranks (gongren jieji duiwu) from peasants and herders and transform their old thinking to
strengthen unity, one should not forget the reality of Inner Mongolia. In his view, the Baoganren
did not “dare to exposed conflicts”352. In Ulanhu’s view the play avoided bringing up conflicts
like the problems the herders experience when they are forced to leave their native pastures
and wives to go work in a factory and adapt to life in a city, and depicted the recruitment of
Mongol  workers  as  troublesome,  when  the  Chinese  peasants  would  in  reality  be  similarly
reluctant to leave their homes to work in factories.353 In document three, the rebels counter the
Criticism  by  Ulanhu  by  arguing  that  he  himself  is  “breaking  the  unity  of  workers  of  all
nationalities” by his criticism “preaching ‘conflicts and difference [between Mongols and
Chinese]” that denies that fact that “the class interests among Mongol and Han workers are
identical”354. The same criticism by Ulanhu is observed also in document two, that considers
Ulanhu’s claim that in reality a herder’s wife would be sad of her husband leaving her to work in
a factory as “wilful defamation of the working people”355.
To summarize the rebels’ criticism on Ulanhu’s views considering the cultural sphere, the
common theme is his insistence on taking the local characteristics of Inner Mongolia into
consideration, when he “should” have been promoting and universalist line based on the
“common benefit” of the working class. While the Qianmen Hotel Report did not have much
content considering these problems, the rebels’ criticism is based on the same ideological
conflicts of minzu policy and class struggle, and Ulanhu’s alleged opposition to Mao Zedong and
the Centre already established in the Qianmen Hotel Report.
6.2.5 Kingdom of Ulanhu
他一贯用反革命修正主义和民族分裂主义反对毛主席关于少数民族自治的理论和政策，
拼命篡改民族区域自治政权的无产阶级专政性质，阴谋复辟资本主义的封建主义，把内
蒙古变成王公贵族、地主资产阶级专政的“乌兰夫王朝”，变成帝国主义和现代修正主
义的殖民地和附属国。356
He [Ulanhu] has always been opposing Chairman Mao’s theory and policies considering
minority nationality autonomy with counter-revolutionary revisionism and national splittism,
exerting himself on tampering with the proletarian dictatorship nature of nationality regional
autonomy, conspiring to restore capitalist feudalism, turning Inner Mongolia into an “Ulanhu
352 Yang 2012: 324.
353 Yang 2012: 323 – 324.
354 Yang 2012 (3): 662.
355 Yang 2012 (2): 609 – 610.
356 Yang 2012 (5): 689. This passage is from the document Distorting the Nature of the Proletarian Dictatorship of
Regional Autonomy, Conspiring to Establish a Kingdom of his own, to Restore Capitalism by the Hohhot
Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Headquarters, dated July 1967.
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dynasty” of bourgeois dictatorship of princely aristocrats and landlords, into a colony and
dependency of imperialism and modern revisionism.
早在抗戰勝利后，“當代王爺”領著他的一小撮狐群狗黨跑到内蒙古的大後方，公開抗
拒中國共產黨對内蒙古的統一領導，同王工貴族，蒙奸賣國賊大搞反革命串聯，到處大
叫大嚷什麽“為祖先的榮譽，要民族對立、民族自決”，妾[sic]圖繼承成吉思汗、林丹
汗、德王、李守信等封建貴族和蒙奸賣國賊的反動統治。357
As early as after the victory in the War of Resistance [against Japan], the “reigning prince” led
his small pack of foxes and dogs and run to the great [GMD controlled] rear of Inner Mongolia,
openly resisted the leadership of the CPC in Inner Mongolia, established vast
counterrevolutionary connections with princely aristocrats, Mongol traitors, and
collaborationists, went around crying out for “minzu independence and minzu self-
determination for honour of the ancestors”, trying to carry on the reactionary regime of
Chinggis Khan, Ligdan Khan, Prince De, Li Shouxin and other feudal aristocrats and Mongol
traitor-collaborationists.
Duli wangguo, “kingdom of one’s own” or “independent kingdom” (duli, independent +
wangguo, kingdom), something Ulanhu was accused of aiming at in the Qianmen Hotel Report
by using the 1935 Declaration, refers to “an administrative region [xingzhengqu] or unit [danwei]
resisting or not following the superior’s leadership” 358 , i.e. not actually establishing an
independent country in a literal sense. In the Qianmen Hotel Report Ulanhu’s kingdom
ambitions were denounced as a combination of splittism, local nationalism, resistance to the
Centre, and personal hunger for power. Although referring to splittist intentions and local
(Mongol) nationalism in the Qianmen Hotel Report already blurs the line between a figurative
interpretations of the “kingdom of his own” and an actual crime of splittism or secessionism, the
criticism is based mostly on Ulanhu’s actions of fighting Han chauvinism and resisting superiors
“since the latter half of last year”, meaning the year 1965, thus not yet openly framing Ulanhu’s
history as a leader of the IMAR as a history of splittist conspiracy. The rebels’ documents, on the
other hand, provide more historical “proof” of Ulanhu’s kingdom ambitions.
The document 5 can be considered a representative collection of Ulanhu’s splittist crimes. It
combines most of Ulanhu’s “crimes” discussed in the documents into a great plan of founding
an independent kingdom and restoring capitalism. The earliest evidence of these plans is
Ulanhu’s “resistance to CPC leadership, advocation of minzu independence and minzu self-
determination”.359The rebels “expose” Ulanhu’s history of leading his “pack of foxes and dogs”
357Yang 2012 (5): 691. This passage is from the document Distorting the Nature of the Proletarian Dictatorship of
Regional Autonomy, Conspiring to Establish a Kingdom of his own, to Restore Capitalism by the Hohhot
revolutionary rebels liaison headquarters, dated July 1967.
358 Baidu baike:独立王国
(https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%8B%AC%E7%AB%8B%E7%8E%8B%E5%9B%BD)
359 Tang 2012 (5): 691.
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(huqun goudang) to the GMD controlled “great rear” (dahoufang) after the victory of the War
of Resistance against Japan, to establish connections with “princely aristocrats and Mongol
traitor-collaborationists” (Mengjian maiguozei), “crying out for ‘minzu independence and minzu
self-determination for the honour of the ancestors’, trying to carry on the reactionary regime of
Chinggis Khan, Ligdan Khan360, Prince De, Li Shouxin361 and other feudal aristocrats and Mongol
traitor-collaborationists.362 These allegations are backed up with quotes from 19451947, from
the funding conference of the Lianhehui (November 1945) to the Lindong cadre meeting
(November 1947). Some of the quotes are already known examples from the part considering
Ulanhu’s defiance of CPC leadership, like talking about the Lianhehui “with the help of the CPC”
being  the  leader  of  the  Inner  Mongolian  autonomy  movements”  or  a  similar  “error”  from  a
different point of view, comparing the Inner Mongolian movement with the development in the
MPD that’s independence was recognized only after “more than twenty years of revolution”.  363
This time the implied meaning of the quotes seems be hidden in the context of the speeches,
i.a. the “audience” of Ulanhu in the iand around establishment of the IMAR (as the IMAG). The
effort of Ulanhu bringing the various Inner Mongolian autonomy movements under the
leadership of the Lianhehui is interpreted as evidence of trying to “establish his independent
kingdom” of “dictatorship of feudal aristocrat capitalist old masters (laoyemen)”.364
Document 5 then proceeds to expose how the reigning prince’s “democratic government”
(minzhu zhengfu) protected the interests of the elites, by stating in his government programme
(shizheng gangling) that “all the personal rights and property of all the people of Inner Mongolia
(peasants, herdsmen, workers, intellectuals, the military, public officials, skilled workers, the
self-employed, landlords, herdlords, industrialists and merchants, lamas and former princes) are
guaranteed by the autonomous government”.365This statement, along with others presenting
the IMAR as a project of ”tuanjie”, brining all strata and all nationalities under the leadership
and to the service of the AR government allegedly support the rebels’ accusation of Ulanhu
building a counterrevolutionary regime (fangeming zhengquan). Interestingly, the rebels seem
to have given preference to quotes where Ulanhu mentions Chinggis Khan. Ulanhu is for
example quoted talking about the new government as a “great unity of Chinggis Khan’s
360 Ligdan Khan (Chinese: Lindan Han林丹汗, 15881634), ”the last emperor of the Northern Yuan dynasty”
(Atwood 2004: 334 – 335.)
361 Li Shouxin (李守信 18921970), ”the number two figure in Japan’s puppet Mongolian regime at Zhangjiakou”,
and an ”adapted Mongol” of Han migrant ancestry (Liu 2006: 117).
362 Yang 2012 (5): 691.
363 Ibid: 691 – 692.
364 Ibid: 691.
365 Ibid: 693 – 695.
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decendants” (Chengjisihan zisunde datuanjie, quote from 1947); referring to Chinggis Khan as a
part of the Mongols’ “glorious revolutionary history”366; and praising Chinggis Khan for uniting
the whole of Mongolia and founding a feudal country based on nomadic pastoralist
economy.367Adding to the list of Mongol historical figures with notorious reputations, in the
introduction to the quotes, the rebels describe the programme of Ulanhu’s government as being
“no different from the reactionary rubbish” (tongchu yichede fandong huose) of the Mengjiang
government of the “Mongol traitor-collaborationists Prince De and Li Shouxin”, both of whom
were not mentioned in Ulanhu’s quotes.368
Moving forward to the time after the establishment of the IMAR, the rebels expose Ulanhu’s
tactics of appealing to “minorities being masters in their own territories, and governing their
domestic matters” in order to “deceive the working people into forgetting the class struggle and
the proletarian dictatorship”.369The rebels quote Ulanhu’s speeches from 1957 ̶ 1962 regarding
the  principle  of  “masters  in  one’s  own  territory”,  e.g.  that  the  policy  of  minority  regional
autonomy in short means that “under the leadership of the party, in all regions with
comparatively congregated minority nationality population, they have the right govern their
domestic matters as masters in their own territory”.370For the rebels this shows how Ulanhu,
despite sometimes “saying a couple of words about class struggle”, persistently holds on to the
“false theory” (miulun) of minorities being masters in their own territory regarding the authority
in autonomous regions. According to the rebels, this connects Ulanhu to the aspirations of
“Bernstein371, Khrushchev372, and Liu Shaoqi”, preaching “all-people’s state”373, conspiring to
turn proletarian dictatorship into bourgeois dictatorship. 374
366 This history also included ”Lingdan Khan of the Chahar bu, in late Ming-early Qing, Ga’erdan [噶尔丹] of
Yimeng [Yikezhao league, Ordos] and other such minzu heroes” (Ibid: 693).
367 Ibid.
368 Yang 2012 (5): 693.
369 Ibid: 695.
370 Ibid: 695 – 696.
371 Eduard Bernstein (Chinese: Aidehua Boenshitan爱德华·伯恩施坦,or (in the documents)
Boensitan伯恩斯坦 1850 ̶ 1932), German Marxist theorist and politician.
372 Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (usually only refered in Chinese as Heluxiaofu赫鲁晓夫, 1894 ̶ 1971 )
373 All-people’s state, quamin guojia. A concept ”proclaimed as ’one of the most important developments of
contemporary Marxist –Leninist scientific thought’ at the 22nd Party Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union in 1961. The new Party Programme stated, that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” had fulfilled its
mission and “ceased to be indispensable”, and that the state has become “a state of the of the entire people”.
(Kanet 1968: 81).
374 Yang 2012 (5): 695.
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The “leadership core of ‘being masters in one’s own territory’” was appointed through favoring
Ulanhu’s own trusted followers.375 as discussed earlier, in the rebels’ document the criticism of
the Qianmen Hotel Report towards Ulanhu favoring his “trusted followers” in major leadership
appointments shortly before the CR, and advocating the “minoritization” of leadership organs
in the IMAR, were connected to the history of “more than twenty years” placing princely
aristocrats etc. persons of the upper strata to leadership positions, executing the “evil
conspiracy of usurping the party, government, and the military”.376
The second to last point of criticism in document 5 is Ulanhu’s hostility (choushi) towards minzu
tuanjie, sowing discord between nationalities with his opposition to the “so called Han
chauvinism”.377 The rebels elaborate further the Qianmen Hotel Report criticism towards the
ignorance of the threat of local nationalism in Inner Mongolia, and that Ulanhu himself is the
“root” of Inner Mongolian local national splittism.378 Ulanhu’s “extreme hostility towards the
great unity of people of all nationalities” (gezu renminde datuanjie) is presented in quotes from
1947 ̶ 1966, where he provokes nationality relations and creates splittism by for example stating
that in Inner Mongolia “the nationality conflict is most important, class conflict secondary”
(February 1947), and that the despite the existence of nationalism in some places, but the
“major direction of the nationality question” in Inner Mongolia is fighting Han chauvinism
(December 1965). 379 The Tumed banned Four Cleanups is presented as “reaching the peak”
(dengfeng zaoji) of Ulanhu’s splittist agitation. Here Ulanhu is quoted attacking the “Tumed is
special”  criticism  of  the  time,  that  in  Ulanhu’s  view  was  a  denial  of  the  Inner  Mongolian
leadership, the old revolutionaries from Tumed banner (including Ulanhu himself) and
opposition to the party’s minority policy.380An interesting inclusion in one quote from 1957,
where Ulanhu answers to criticism by “some Mongols” that claim Ulanhu being in  (suspiciously)
good terms with the Han (wo he hanzude guanxi gaode hao)  by  saying that  if  Chinggis  khan
would not have been in good terms with the Han, “how could the Yuan dynasty have reigned
for ninety years”.381One is inclined to interpret the inclusion of this quote not as an example of
Ulanhu sowing discord between the Mongols and the Han (as it was about good relations with
the Han), but as suggesting that Ulanhu considers himself the heir of Chinggis Khan and that his
375 Yang 2012 (5): 698 – 699. See also the introductory quote to 7.N in this thesis.
376 Yang 2012 (5): 699.
377 Yang 2012 (5): 701.
378 See part 4 of the report, appendix N.N
379 Yang 2012 (5). 701 – 702.
380 Ibid: 702.
381 Ibid.
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promotion of national unity and other policies should be suspected as parts of his splittist
conspiracies.
The theme of the seventh and last part of document 5 is Ulanhu’s minzu fenlie activity by
promoting the 1935 Declaration, i.e. same as the fourth “crime” in the Qianmen Hotel Report.
The content of this part is similar with the Qianmen Hotel Report, only adding quotes as
examples of the points of criticism. In 1965 ̶ 1966 Ulanhu is quoted defending the Inner
Mongolian Autonomy – or agitating splittism, depending on the point of view – by referring to
the 1935 Declaration, instructing cadres to study it, and using Mao Zedong’s to defend his views
(in vain, as during the CR the 1935 Declaration was claimed to be written by “dogmatists within
the party” falsely using Mao’s name). What could be considered an addition is the problem of
Ulanhu claiming territory based on the 1935 Declaration, that was only briefly referred to in the
Qianmen Hotel report, but is elaborated by the rebels with quotes from 1947 and 1952. The
quotes form 1947 show Ulanhu arguing for that the basis for territorial autonomy should be that
“all regions in intimate political and economic relation” to Inner Mongolia should be defined to
be a part of the AR, but also warning, that if “the Han are drawn within [ba hanren hualai] the
Mongols’ autonomy, it becomes Han autonomy!”382
6.2.6 Excavating Roots
内蒙党委到底是根子，这是革命的根子，这个根子可以挖掉马？这个根子谁来挖呢？是
国民党要挖，美帝国主义要挖，日本帝国主义要挖，其他人也想挖，是要挖什么根
子…383
Inner Mongolia Party Committee really is a root, the root of revolution, can this root be dug
out? Who is going to dig this root? Guomindang tried to dig it out, American imperialists tried
382 Yang 2012 (5): 704.
383 Yang 2012 (10): 832. The quote is from Ulanhu’s speech in Decemeber 1965 at the Hohhot Nationality Work
Meeting, quoted in Compilation of Ulanhu’s Reactionary Views by the Hohhot Third Headquarters Inner
Mongolia University Jinggangshan Struggle and Denounce Ulanhu Liaison Station, reprinted (or reproduced,
fanyin) by the Hohhot Third Headquarters Inner Mongolia Hydraulic Engineering School (shuidianxiao) East is
Red. This document s handwritten and includes some obsolete simplifications (in addition to some traditional
from characters) of characters, that are here written with the present official simplifications. Another interesting
detail is the subtitle of this part of the document “Ulanhu on Ulanhu” (Wulanfu lun Wulanfu,乌兰夫论乌兰夫,
page 830), where the fourth character (乌) is turned 90 degrees and the sixth one (夫) turned upside down, and
the characters in Ulanhu’s name (but not the character for lun) are crossed over . A similar “visual effects” trick
can be observed on the cover page of a collection of Ulanhu’s speeches titled Strike Down Ulanhu (Yang 2012:
490), where the “tumbling” (or struck down) characters in Ulanhu’s name are accompanied by a drawing of a
giant fist stricking Ulanhu’s back.
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to dig it out, Japanese imperialists tried to dig it out. If others want to dig it out, what root are
they digging …
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The passage above is a slightly modified quote from Ulanhu’s speech at the Hohhot Party
Committee Nationality Work Meeting in December 1956. In the original speech Ulanhu criticizes
the Hohhot Party Committee (Hohhot PC) for not following the IMPC line, for not acknowledging
that there are differences between nationalities. According to Ulanhu, the Hohhot PC resisted
the IMPC orders, and therefore the Centre’s orders by claiming the Tumed banner is “special”
(teshu), the “root” (genzi) of the IMPC, the native place of Ulanhu, Kuibi, Jiyatai384. This reflected
two problems of Ulanhu right before the CR. One was his alleged favoring of his native Tumed
banner, and other the general problem of minority characteristics. For the rebels, Ulanhu was
the “revisionist, old national splittist root” they were going to dig out385.
However, the most interesting part of this document, and a light ending to this list of Ulanhu’s
crimes is its use of “visual effects”. The document is hand-written, the single one among the ten
documents. The editors have made interesting visual enhancements to the otherwise not very
beautiful appearance of the document. The subtitle leading to the passage quoted above is
“Ulanhu on Wulanhu” (Wulanfu lun Wulanfu), consisting of a total of seven characters. The
Fourth character, i.e. wu in Wulanfu is turned 90 degrees left, and the sixth character fu is
upside-down (see appendix: Picture 2). In addition, the characters in Ulanhu’s name(s) are
crossed over, but the verb lun is not. This must be one wayu of defaming Ulanhu and adding to
the force of the text. Similar trick can be observed elsewhere in the documents. The cover page
to a compilation of Ulanhu’s “poisonous weeds” by the Inner Mongolia United Front System
Criticize and Struggle Ulanhu Liaison Station (Neimenggu tongzhan xitong pidou Wulanfu
lianluozhan) that is included in the first band of documents in Yang (2012) has the character lan
in Ulanhu’s name turned 90 degrees right386 and the character fu upside-down (see appendix:
Picture 1). Accompanying the text is a drawing of a giant fist stricking Ulanhu’s back. Qi Zhi (2010)
also notes that in the propaganda materials of that period in IM Daily denouncing different
targets, like Ulanhu, the targets’ names in the slogans were sometimes written upside-down or
“reclined” (hengwo).387
384 Yang 2012: 338.
385 Yang 2012 (10): 832.
386 One coud argue that turining the character right makes more sense, as Ulanhu was accused of rightism and
promoting bourgeois dictatorship etc. crimes.
387 Qi Zhi 2010: 218 – 219.
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7. Conclusions
Describing the Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution, Qi Zhi (2010) has distinguished four
conflicts, two within the party, line struggle (luxian douzheng) and strive for power (quanlizhi
zheng), and two outside the party, the conflict between the intelligentsia and the one-party
dictatorship and the conflict between bureaucracy and the masses. In minority regions, in this
case  Inner  Mongolia,  there  was  also  the  conflict  of  “primacy”  (xianzaixing 现在性),  i.e.  the
conflict between the majority Han and the minority Mongols.388 The line struggle was the central
conflict that ignited the other conflicts. The conflict between majority and minority was what
provided the Inner Mongolian CR with the breeding ground of ethnic violence in the form of the
purge of the Neirendang.
However, despite the emergence of ethnic violence targeting Mongols already early on as the
CR  spread  to  Inner  Mongolia  and  Mongols  were  in  danger  to  be  attacked  as  members  of
Ulanhu’s “black group”, the discovery and persecution of the members of the Neirendang was
still ahead when the discussed documents denouncing Ulanhu were produced, in summer 1967.
Therefore it is perhaps no surprise that the “primary” conflict within the party was the central
theme of the documents around which the other cases against Ulanhu were built. The main
conflicts between minority policy and class struggle, “Ulanhu thought” and Mao Zedong thought
were well established already in the Qianmen Hotel report and the rebels documents often
merely provided historical quotes as evidence of the same cases that were already mentioned
in the Qianmen Hotel report.
The most important crime of Ulanhu, maybe one could use the word ”primary” to describe its
character here too, was the insistence on nationality policy. Since around 1962 and the
rediscovered importance of class struggle, Ulanhu had been criticized for ignoring the class
struggle on the pretext of nationality conflict being the main issue in Inner Mongolia. However,
as the documents show, the earliest evidence of using differentiating policies to benefit the
minority were from late 1940s, the establishment of the IMAR and the land reform, and the
Three Nos etc. policies, that were considered violating the principle of class struggle. This
temporal  aspect  repeats  itself  in  many  of  the  documents  and  crimes.   It  seems  that  the
predominant majority of the quotes are either from the very early years of the IMAR or even
some years before its establishment, or from the 1960s, increasing towards 19651966. For the
large amount of quotes from the last years before the CR a reasonable explanation is the change
of political climate. Since 1962 Mao Zedong had been working on consolidating his power after
388 Qi Zhi 2010: 18.
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disastrous policies like the Great Leap Forward and faced with increasing challenge within the
party leadership. Class struggle was again emphasized as the fundamental political guiding
principle. The rebels did not change this, or even bring much new content to the denouncement
but digging the history of Ulanhu may have still been the most important contribution of the
rebels to the denouncement of Ulanhu, perhaps even paving way for the discovery of
Neirendang.
The historical contribution of Ulanhu to minzu tuanije and unity of China was turned upside
down by claiming that instead of bringing Inner Mongolia under CPC leadership, Ulanhu had
been benefitting the old Mongol elite and conspired to set up his own kingdom. While in the
Qianmen Hotel Report Ulanhu’s protection of Inner Mongolian elite by bringing them into the
new government was based on Ulanhu himself lauding the “tuanjie” policies of the early years
of IMAG/IMAR in the 1960s, assumedly as a part of his defense of the importance of nationality
policy against class struggle. But the Rebels interpreted Ulanhu’s old speeches from the late
1940s promoting the “tuanjie” of all strata as a part of his conspiracy to create a kingdom of
bourgeois dictatorship. Now Ulanhu’s success in winning the Inner Mongolian autonomy
movements over to the Lianheuhi and under CPC leadership were denied as crimes of treason,
or at least “class capitulationism”. Some of the quite extreme examples of the freedom to ignore
the context of the speeches were the meeting where Ulanuh spoke to a Mongol audience,
promoting the Lianhehui, but made the error of not praising the CPC leadership.
One of the major differences between the Qianmen Hotel Report and the rebels’ documents
was the appearance of names of enemy figures, to whom Ulanhu was compared or with whom
Ulanhu had connections. The appearance of “China’s Khrushchev” Liu Shaoqi in the rebels’
materials is no surprise. During the Qianmen Hotel Meeting, Liu was still a part of the Centre’s
leaders  criticizing  Ulanhu,  but  by  summer  1947  Liu  was  one  of  the  main  targets  of  “great
criticism”. Regarding the future developments in the Inner Mongolia CR, of more interest as
additions might be the historical Mongol figures that Ulanhu was set side-by-side with. The most
important of them was of course Chinggis Khan, the symbol of Mongol nationalism. Chinggis
Khan became a forbidden image during the CR, the “descendants of Chinggis Khan”, once used
by Mao Zedong to call for Inner Mongolian cooperation against the Japanese and the GMD (the
1935 Declaration) “became a term of abuse”, and Ulanhu himself was “labelled a ‘modern day’”
Chinggis Khan.389 Another case were the “Mongol treaitos-collaborationists” like Prince De and
Liu Shouxin (see 6.2.5), who were not mentioned in Ulanhu’s quotes, but who made it to
389 Brown 2006: 184.
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document 5. This was not without importance, as the history of Inner Mongolia under Japanese
rule and the collaboration with or serving within the Japanese government organs and the
Military brought the Mongols and their allegiance to China under suspicion.
As could be expected, the Neirendang was not mentioned in the documents. Still some of the
content can be considered, if not directly affecting the “discovery”, but at least giving inspiration
to those “mental associations” mentioned by Qi Zhi.390  In addition to the abovementioned,
already quite provoking associations with traitors and collaborationists, an important part of the
development towards inventing or discovering the Neirendang was the discovery of old IMPRP
figures within the party, and their connections to Ulanhu. A major step towards naming the
Neirendang enemy was the discovery of a “peril within the party ranks”, Hafenga had been the
leader of IMPRP and who at the time was the director of the language committee in the IMAR
people’s Government.391 Hafenga’s IMPRP background had been found in an investigation that
was inspired by his position as the person in charge of the Committee for Unifying Nouns and
Terms of Inner and Outer Mongolia in 1956. This can be seen as connected to the case of Ulanhus
“Crimes in the Cultural Domain”.392
As the discussion of the rebels’ documents and the Qianmen Hotel Report has shown, the main
direction of the denouncement of Ulanhu had been set already a year before the rebels’
documents were produced. As noted in the introduction to the chapter discussing the rebels’
documents, the rebels were further guided to the right direction of denouncing Ulanhu in spring
1967. However, the rebels did make own contributions. Driven by the need to prove their
devotion to Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution, they managed to dig deep into the past of
Ulanhu to expose crimes against the unity of China and the dictatorship of the proletariat,
without constraints to interpretation of Ulanhu’s history. As Brown (2006) described the
difference between the “official” and “unofficial” attacks (the rebels’ documents belonging to
the latter”), the official attack was more restrained in language and emphasized “the ideological
factor”, whereas the unofficial attack was “fiercer, and conveyed by more aggressive
language”.393 Without considering the difference in language (which indeed was fierce at times),
moving outside the “ideological” domain seems to have been a quality of the rebels’
denouncement of Ulanhu. The materials showed no clear clues about the upcoming campaign
to purge the Neirendang, but perhaps some hints about the various ways in which the past could
390 See chapter 4: Background in this thesis.
391 See chapter 5.2.
392 6.2.4.
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become as crime to be denounced. The rebels documents here are only a small sample, but as
such could be considered an early example of how the need to compete for legitimacy as “true
representatives of Mao Zedong’s strategies” and leadership of the rebellious movement
eventually enabled the “discovery” of the Neirendang in late 1967.394
394 Qi Zhi 2010: 250.
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9. Appendix
9.1 List of documents
1. 《把乌兰夫反毛泽东思想的“黑讲话”拿出来示众》 ，呼和浩特革命造反联
络总部批斗乌兰夫反党集团联络站师院《东纵》 (1967年6月7日) (Ba Ulanfu
fan Mao Zedong sixiang de ”hei jianghua” na chulai shizhong, Huhehaote geming zaofan
lianluo zongbu pidou Ulanfu fandang jituan lianluozhan – Shiyuan ”Dongzong”) An
eight-ptheage compilation of extracts from Ulanhu’s speeches at the Central
Nationalities Work Conference (Zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyi) in April 1962 with
quotes from Mao Zedong and comments from the editors.  7 June, 1967.
2. 《乌兰夫黑话摘录》，呼三司内大井冈山兵团翻印，印刷年月不详
This document consists of two parts, both of them produced by the Hohhot
Revolutionary Rebellion Alliance Headquarters, Criticize and Struggle Against Ulanfu
Liaison Station，Inner Mongolia University ”Jinggangshan”. The document does not
show the printing date.
The first one (2.1), A secret report on Ulanhu’s counter-revolutionary revisionism and
splittism (Wulanfude yi pian fangeming xiuzhengzhuyi minzufenliezhuyide mimi
baogao), compiles and comments on extracts from Ulanhu’s speeches at the Forum to
celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Organizing Committee (Qingzhu ershi zhounian
chouweihui zhaokai de zuotanhui) that took place 22 – 24 December, 1965.
The second one (2.2), Compilation of Ulanhu’s reactionary views (Wulanfu fandong
yanlun huibian), compiles and comments on short (many of them only a simple
sentence) quotes from Ulanhu from various origins between 1945 – 1948.
3. 《一、毛主席论民族问题；二、马克思、恩格斯、列宁、斯大林论民族问
题；乌兰夫在民族问题方面的罪恶言论一百例批判》，呼和浩特市革命造
反联络总部印发，一九六七年七月一日
The third document was printed on 1 July, 1947 by the Hohhot revolutionary rebels
liaison headquarters and it was compiled by the Inner Mongolia Medical Institute
Dongfanghong Commune Liaisong Station for Struggling and Critisizing Ulanhu
(Neimenggu yixueyuan “dongfanghong” gongshe doupi Ulanfu lianluozhan). This
document first presents a compilation of views on minzu-policy by Marx and Engels,
Mao, Lenin, and Stalin. Then it proceeds with “hundred samples” (yibai li) of Ulanhu’s
evil views on the nationality problem.
4. 《反对毛泽东思想，推行民族分裂主义，背叛无产阶级专政 ——乌兰夫反
革命修正主义言论摘编（一）》，一九六七年七月
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The fourth document, Opposing Mao Zedong thinking, pursuing national splittism,
betraying the proletarian dictatorship, was compiled by the Hohhot revolutionary rebels
liaison headquarters denounce Ulanhu anti-Party clique liaison station in July, 1967. It
is  the  first  of  the  four-part Extracts from Ulanhu’s Counter-revolutionary Revisionist
Speeches. The document is divided in five themed chapters each criticizing different
“crimes” of Ulanhu., The chapters start with comments by the editors and then continue
with quotations organized under subtitles introducing the “spirit” of the following
quotations. The time frame of the quotations is 1945 – 1966.
5. 《篡改区域自治的无产阶级专政性质，阴谋搞对立王国，复辟资本主义—
—乌兰夫反革命修正主义言论摘编（二）》，一九六七年七月
The fift document, Distorting the Nature of the Propletarian Dictarorship of Regional
Autnomoy, Conspiring to Establish a Kingdom of his own, to Restore Capitalism, is the
second part of Extracts from Ulanhu’s Counter-revolutionary Revisionist Speeches by the
Hohhot revolutionary rebels liaison headquarters, dated July 1967.
6. 《保护剥削制度，鼓吹“和平过渡”，反对社会主义革命——乌兰夫反革命
修正主义言论摘编（三）》，一九六七年九月
Protecting the System of Exploitation, Preaching ”Peaceful Transition”, Opposing
Socialist Revolution is  The  third  part  of  the Extracts from Ulanhu’s Counter-
revolutionary Revisionist Speeches by the Hohhot revolutionary rebels liaison
headquarters denounce Ulanhu anti-Party clique liaison station, dated September 1967 .
7. 《斩断乌兰夫伸进文化领域中的黑手——乌兰夫反革命修正主义言论摘编
（四）》，一九六七年八月
Cut off the Black Hands of Ulanhu Stretching inside The Cultural Domain – the fourth
part of the Extracts from Ulanhu’s Counter-revolutionary Revisionist Speeches by the
Hohhot revolutionary rebels liaison headquarters denounce Ulanhu anti-Party clique
liaison station, dated August 1967 .
8. 《当代王爷乌兰夫十年反革命黑话集》，一九六七年七月二十四日
Compilation of the Ten Years of Counter-revolutionary Black Speeches by the Reigning
Prince Ulanhu was printed on 24 July by Hohhot Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Station
Headquarters.
9. 《反革命的自白书——〈乌兰夫言论集〉（五卷）摘编》，一九六七年八
月
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Confessions of a Counter-revolutionary – “Compilation of Ulanhu’s Views” by Hohhot
Revolutionary Rebels Liaison Headquarters Dnounce and Struggle Ulanhu Anti-Party
Clique Liaison Station. Dated August 1967
10. 《乌兰夫反动言论汇编》，一九六七年九月五日
Compilation of Ulanhu’s Reactionary Views by Hohhot Third Headquarters Inner
Mongolia Univesrsity Jinaggangshan Struggle and Denounce Ulanhu liaison Station,
reprinted (fanyin) by Hohhot Thrid Headquarters Inner Mongolia School of Hydraulic
Power (shuidianxiao) East is Red, dated 5 September 1867. This is the only handwritten
document among the primary materials.
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9.2 Major Events
1945
August, The Sino-Soviet treaty negotiated in Moscow between the GMD and Soviet
governments. The Chinese government agrees to Outer Mongolian independence in exchange
for restraints of Soviet expansion in NE and NW China, and Soviet support to the Nationalist
government. “China’s territorial integrity minus Outer Mongolia” is sealed, closing the door for
Inner Mongolian accession to the MPR. (Liu 2006: 39, 41, 137.)
August 18, “Declaration of Inner Mongolian People’s Liberation” issued by the Eastern
Mongolian Branch of the IMPRP, which announces “the continued existence of an East
Mongolian Department” of the IMPRP (Atwood 1992: 29; Liu 2006: 133).
Late August – early September, IMPRP conference in Wangyemiao elects a party executive
committee with Hafenga as the secretary general. The conference adopts a “Provisional
Constitution” for the IMPRP. (Liu 2006: 133.)
October, The eleven-member “Eastern Mongolia delegation” expresses the will to unite with
the Outer Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar but is declined (Qi Zhi 2010: 43).
November 25-27, The founding Conference of the Federation of the Autonomous Movement
of Inner Mongolia held in Zhangjiakou (Atwood 1992: 60).
1946
January 1 – 10, Political Consultative Conference convenes in Chongqing. The CCP presents
“Draft of the Guidelines towards Peaceful National Construction” in which it states that the
equality and autonomy of all nationalities should be recognized in minority regions signifying
the replacement of the idea of minority regions establishing independent states with regional
autonomy. The draft is approved by the conference. (Qi Zhi 2010: 43 – 44.)
January 16-20, People’s Congress of East Mongolia held in Gegenmiao (due to an outbreak of
plague in Wangyemiao) which elects the Autonomous Government of East Mongolia. The East
Mongolian Autonomous Government is officially inaugurated by an announcement from
Buyanmandukhu on February 15. [1946] (Atwood 1992: 45, 49).”
March, Ulanhu meets with the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government heads Boyanmandu,
Hafenga, and Temurbagen in Chifeng395, convinces them to cease the operations of
Neirendang and join the Lianhehui (Qi Zhi 2010: 47).
April 3, Representatives of Western and Eastern Inner Mongolia convene in Chengde, passing
the “Main resolutions of the united conference of the Inner Mongolia autonomy movement”
that announced the Inner Mongolian autonomous movements decision to unit under the
leadership of the Lianhehui and the CCP. The Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Government
and the “Eastern Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party” to be dissolved (although, the
IMPRP continued a “hibernating” existence (Liu 2006: 185; Qi Zhi 2010: 47 – 48.)
1947
395 This is according to Qi Zhi (2010: 47). Atwood (1992: 65) mentions Ulanhu and the East Mongolian
government delegation having met in Ula’ankhada (Wulanhada? in nowadays Wulanhaote. There’s also
an Wulanhada sumu in Chaha’er Right Rear Banner (youyi houqi) in nowadays Ulanqab municipality, but
the location in middle/western Inner Mongolia seems unlikely for a meeting with East Mongolian
leaders.)  first and then “rendezvousing” at Chengde on March 30.
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May 1, The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Government is established. Ulanhu as its chairman,
Hafenga the vice-chairman. (Hao 1991: 20)
1953
January 1, Suiyuan People’s Government is merged with the IMAR People’s Government, the
Meng-Sui Military Region (established as a result of a merger in August 1952) changes its name
into Inner Mongolia Military Region (Hao 1991: 516).
1952
September, The CPC Central Committee Inner Mongolia Branch Bureau and the CPC Suiyuan
Province Committee are joined together to form the CPC CC Meng-Sui Branch Bureau, with
Ulanhu as secretary.
1954
March 6, Suiyuan province is officially merged into the IMAR.
April 25, The iMAR People’s Government changes the name of Guisui into Hohhot
(Huhehaote).
July 27August 4, the First People’s Congress of IMAR convenes for the first time in Hoohhot.
1955
July 1, The Centre decides to the CC Inner Mongolia Branch Bureau, establishes the CPC Inner
Mongolia Autnomous Region Committee (Neimenggu zihziqu weiyuanhui) with Ulanhu as its
secretary.
July 30, The State Council decides to incorporate 12 banners and counties from the former
Rehe province into the IMAR.
1956
April 3, The autonomous Mongol prefecture (zhou) Bayanhaote (巴彦浩特) and autonomous
Mongol banner Ejina (额济纳) of Gansu province are incorporated into the IMAR and Alashan
(阿拉善) league is established. The IMAR reaches its modern frontiers. (Hao 1991: 517)
1965
November 10, ”On the New Historical Play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office’ by Yao Wenyuan is
published in the Shanghai Wunhui bao. On the same day Mao dismisses Yang Shangkun as the
director of the party center’s General Office , replaced by Major General Wang Dongxing, the
director of the Central Bureau of Guards. (Macfarquhar et al. 2006: 17 – 20.)
1966
May 4 to 26, Politburo expanded/enlarged session held in Beijing, presided by Liu Shaoqi to
purge Peng, Luo, Lu, and Yang and to launch the CR. (Macfarquhar et al. 2006: 36 – 39)
May 16, The May 16 Notification (declassified on May 17, 1967) passed at the expanded
session. (Macfarquhar et al. 2006: 40)
May 21 to July 25, The CCP CC North China Bureau holds the Qianmen hotel meeting to study
the May 16 Notification and expose and criticize Ulanhu’s ”errors” (Tumen et al. 1995: 319).
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August 4, Inner Mongolia Party Committee Cultural Revolution Small Group is set up, Gao
Jinming as its leader and Quan Xingyuan as his deputy (Tumen 1995. 319).
August 8, Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (”Sixteen points”) is
approved by the Eleventh Plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee and published in the
People’s Daily the next day (Schoenhals 1996: 33). The same day, the CCP Central Committee
approves dismissal of Ulanhu’s office as the First Secretary of the IMAR Party Committee
(Tumen et al. 1995: 319).
November 2, The CCP Central Committee approves the dismissal of Ulanhu as the commander
and political commissar of the IM Military Region and as the president of the Inner Mongolia
University (Tumen 1995: 320).
1967
February 5, “The first shot of the Inner Mongolian Cultural Revolution”. Han Tong, a Teacher’s
College student, is shot by Liu Qing, a PLA officer, outside the IM Military Region south gate in
Hohhot compelling the CCP CC to take action to regain control of the escalating conflict. (Qi Zhi
175 – 181.)
February 10 – April 13, CCP CC representatives led by Premier Zhou Enlai meet with the
representatives of IMAR Part Committee, Inner Mongolia Military District, Third Headquarters,
and Hongweijun in Beijing to discuss the situation in the IMAR (Tumen et al. 195: 320).
April 13, The CCP CC decision on handling the Inner Mongolia problem (also known as the
“Eight red points” or the “13 April decision”) is issued labeling the IMAR CC secretaries Wang
Duo and Wang Yilun capitalist roaders and Ulanhu’s agents, expresses support to the
rebellious mass organizations and accuses the Military District for supporting the wrong line
(conservatives) (Tumen 1995: 321; Qi Zhi 2010: 181).
April 16, The Central Military Affairs Committee appoints the Beijing Military District deputy
commander Teng Haiqing acting commander of the IM Military District and the head of the
Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee Preparatory Small Group. (Tumen & Zhu 1995: 321).
May 26, The CCP Center downgrades the Inner Mongolia military region to a military district
subordinate to the Beijing MR (Qi Zhi 2010: 208 - 209).
June 18, The Preparatory Small Group of the Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Committee is set
up, Teng Haiqing as its leader, Wu Tao as his deputy, and 17 members including Gao Jinming,
Quan Xingyuan, Gao Shuhua etc. (Tumen & Zhu 1995: 321).
August 29, Inner Mongolia Daily publishes the editorial “Strike down Ulanhu”(打倒乌兰夫！),
launching the AR-wide public denunciations of Ulanhu (Tumen & Zhu 1995: 322).
October 3, Ulanbagan presents Teng Haiqing’s office with Concise Report on Ulanhu’s Black
Gang’s Crime of Covering Up for a Great Treasonous Clique bringing up the Neirendang
problem for the first time in the IMAR CR (Tumen & Zhu 1995: 54).
November 1, The IMAR Revolutionary Committee is set up, Teng Haiqing as its leader, and Wu
Tao, Gao Jingming, Huo Daoyu as deputies. A total of 19 standing committee members and 85
committee members. (Tumen & Zhu 1995: 322, MacFarquhar & Schoenhals 2006: 533).
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February 13, The Core Small Group of the IMAR Revolutionary Committee is established, Teng
Haiqing as its leader, Wu Tao and Gao Jinming as deputies, becoming the de facto highest
leading organ in the IMAR (Qi Zhi 2010: 215).
July, The third expanded meeting of the IMRC and the “Report on opinions on handling the
‘Neirendang’” (passed on 20 July) marks the official start of the all-campaign to “dig up” the
New Neirendang (Qi Zhi 2010: 312).
1969
April 4 – 24,The 9th National Congress, where Mao declared the problem of Inner Monoglia CR
having been the “excessive zeal of some Revolutionary Committees in ‘cleansing the class
ranks’” (quote by Schoenhals in Woody 1993: Editor’s Introduction).
July 5, The CCP CC approves the dismemberment of the IMAR. Most of the territory of the
IMAR is incorporated into the neighboring provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Gansu, and
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.
December 19, The “Decision on placing Inner Mongolia under total military control” by the CCP
CC places the remaining part of Inner Mongolia under the Beijing military region led by a
command post established in Hohhot (Tumen & Zhu 1995: 330).
1971
May, The total396 military control is declared ended and the withdrawal of troops is completed
the second half of the following year (Qi Zhi 2010: 440) .
1973
August 24, Ulanhu is elected CC member at the 10th National Congress of the CCP and is made
the CC United Front Department Chief after the congress (Tumen 1995: 332).
1979
May 30, The CCP CC and the State Council decide on returning the IMAR its pre-CR borders
(Tumen 1995: 334).
396 Qi Zhi specifies that the ”total” military control (全面军官) was the second time the IMAR was placed
under military control. The first ”key point” military control (重点军官) took place in April 1967 when
military officers were sent to Hohhot to lead the IMAR CR with Teng Haiqing, the deputy commander of
the Beijing Military District, as the highest authority (Qi Zhi 2010: 440; Tumen & Zhu 1995:321).
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9.3 Map 1: IMAR
Present Day IMAR Administrative Divisions and Locations of Administrative Centres
(Map created with ArcGIS Online: https://www.arcgis.com/home/index.html)
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9.3 Map 2: Inner Mongolia , 1928  ̶ 1932, 1945 ̶ 1949
(Source: Bulag 2010. Map 2)
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9.4 Picture 1: Strike Down Ulanhu
Picture 1: ”Strike Down Ulanhu – Selected Poisonous Weeds”. A part of the cover page of a
compilation of Ulanhu’s “poisonous weeds” by the Inner Mongolia United Front System
Criticize and Struggle Ulanhu Liaison Station (Neimenggu tongzhan xitong pidou Wulanfu
lianluozhan) ,September 1967.(Yang 2012: 490).
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9.5. Picture 2: Ulanhu on Ulanhu
Picture 2: “Ulanhu on Ulanhu”. A subtitle in the Compilation of Ulanhu’s Reactionary Views
(Yang 2012 (10): 820).
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9.6 Qianmen Hotel Report
This translation of the Qianmen Hotel Report is based on the copy provided in Qi Zhi (2010: 154
– 164).
Chairman, the Centre:
In May, at the work conference convened by the North China Bureau, the 146 comrades from
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (including banner and county party secretaries),
following the Center’s and Chairman Mao’s instructions on the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, with the great red flag of Mao Zedong thought raised high exposed and denounced
the anti-Party, anti-socialist, and anti-Mao-Zedong-thinking errors of Ulanhu.
The exposing and denouncing of Ulanhu’s errors lasted a total of 43 days, from 7 June until 20
July. In addition to the small group meetings, eight conferences of the Regional Party Committee
Standing Committee were held; six Standing Committee expanded conferences with the league
and municipal Party secretaries, sixteen plenary sessions, and four self-criticisms [jiantao jiaodai]
made by Ulanhu (once in both the Standing Committee and the expanded Standing Committee
sessions, twice in the plenary sessions).
During this period, the offices and institutes of higher learning directly under the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region launched the Cultural Revolution movement and set off the high tide of da
ming, da fang, dazibao, and da bianlun397, collectively exposing the errors of Ulanhu and his
gang.
Based on the multitude of facts that have been exposed, the error of Ulanhu is that of anti-Party,
anti-socialism, anti-Mao-Zedong-thinking. The splittist revisionist error that destroys the
national unity and strives to set up an independent kingdom. In essence, [Ulanhu is] the biggest
power holder within the Inner Mongolian Party organization taking the capitalist road. Exposing
and denouncing Ulanhu’s errors, has been an excavation of a time-bomb hid within the Party, it
has been a magnificent victory of Mao Zedong thinking.
The the main cases of Ulanhu’s errors are as follows:
1. Opposing Mao Zedong thinking, hoisting another flag, setting up a system of his own
Ulanhu wantonly distorts and twists Mao Zedong thought. On August 8, 1963, in his “Statement
in support of the righteous struggle of American blacks against the racial discrimination of
American imperialism” Mao Zedong says: “Racial struggle, in the final analysis, is a problem of
class struggle.” Ulanhu opposes this brilliant thesis of Chairman Mao. He has called secretaries
to search in the works of Marx, Engles, Lenin, and Stalin whether these words of Chairman Mao
are well-grounded. In December 1965, in the forum to prepare the 20th anniversary of the
establishment of Inner Mongolia he again stated: “The nationality question is the people’s
question”; “Mao Zedong thought is minzu tuanjie”; “The basic concept of Chairman Mao
regarding the nationality question is to consolidate national unity, to strengthen minzu
tuanjie…”; “I think as long as these two points are grasped, the core of the nationality question
is in our grip”. He even declared, that “the nationality question is the true essence of class
struggle”. “If we depart from the concrete reality of the nationality question, prattle about class
struggle is mere empty rhetoric.”
397 joku pikku selivitys tarvittaneen
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In March 1958, hearing Ulanhu’s report at the Chengde conference, Chairman Mao gave major
instructions on the nationality question: “The Mongol and Han nationalities must work closely
together and believe in Marxism. …It doesn’t necessarily have to be people of the respective
provinces who are in power, no matter where they are from  whether from the north of from
the south, this or that nationality, the only question is whether that person has communism and
how much communism he has. This must be made clear to the minority nationalities “; “Are they
eating the rice of nationalism, or the rice of communism. Are they eating the rice of localism, or
the rice of communism? First of all, they need to eat the rice communism. Local is needed, but
not localism.” However, Ulanhu not only didn’t pass on these instructions, but overtly put on a
rival show. The emphasized “the gradual realization of minoritization [minzuhua] of the leading
organs of the Party is a fundamental task.” Not only did he say but actually has done it.
Give prominence to politics, means giving prominence to Mao Zedong thought, giving
prominence to class struggle. Instead, Ulanhu has opposed giving prominence to politics and
Mao Zedong thought with the nationality question. February 1966, at the Tumed banner Four
Cleanups reorganization and training conference and some other meetings repeatedly [Ulanhu]
emphasized that ”the nationality question is the major means of giving prominence to politics”.
Comrade Mao Zedong is the greatest contemporary Marxist-Leninist. Mao Zedong thought is a
universally applicable truth and the guiding principle of all work in the whole of our Party and
country. But Ulanhu has attacked the works of comrade Mao as “dogmatist”. According to him:
“Studying the selected works of Mao starts from reality, must have a definite target. …not
starting from reality, not solving the issues to be addressed, how is this not dogmatism?” “The
study of Mao Zedong thought must be combined with the Inner Mongolian reality.” “The core
of studying Mao Zedong thought is to establish a Mao Zedong thought nationality view
[minzuguan].” April 1966. In the “Decision on further developing the movement of (great) study
the works of Chairman Mao” written based on his [Ulanhu’s] ideas on the Autnomous Region
and Party committees, it is said that: “Only by really understanding the Inner Mongolian reality
and solving the problem of starting from reality, can our work have new accomplishments and
step on our own path.” In reality, he is trying to establish his own “Ulanhu thought” in Inner
Mongolia and make the cadres study his views on the nationality question. (He has a five-book
collection of speeches, mimeograpgh [youyinben] copies, first distributed to a small number of
people, and then recalled.) On March 3, 1966, the Autonomous Region Party Committee issued
the “Main points of work for the first half of 1966” that demands “combining [theory] with the
reality of the Autonomous Region”. While “studying the views on the nationality problem and
the Party’s nationality policy”, the “major speeches of comrade Ulanhu on the nationality
question and related writings” must be studied.
In January 1965, at the Third expanded plenum of the Inner Mongolia Autnomous Region Second
Party Committee [Ulanhu] brought up the idea of “consolidating and developing the three
foundations of minzu tuanjie and national unity: politics, the economy, and culture. That means
developing the Party’s organization and the majority members  and the Mongols of the Poor
and Lower Middle Peasants Association [pinxie], build the political foundation for class ranks;
Implementing the principle of combining agriculture and pastoralism, Mongols can herd cattle,
the Han can also herd cattle, the Han can farm land, Mongols can also farm land, [that’s the]
economic foundation of agriculture and pastoralism supporting each other; Practicing the
cultural foundations of using two languages and writing systems in the Inner Mongolia
Autnomous Region. He says:”When there’s the political foundation, the economic foundation,
and the common language,… as a result a common heart/state of mind is reflected. … And when
there is a common state of mind, minzu tuanjie has a reliable foundation in culture.”
Furthermore, he sees them as the three foundations for ”the merge of nationalities”
in ”transition from socialism to communism”.
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Ulanhu’s ”three foundations” stands on the side or bourgeois nationalism. It willfully
misinterprets, distorts, and belittles Mao Zedong thought. It is not at all socialist or communist,
it doesn’t talk about classes, class struggle or proletarian dictatorship. It’s revisionist from head
to tail.
2. Opposing class struggle, opposing the socialist revolution
The basis of Ulanhu’s opposition to Mao Zedong thought is the denial and nullification of class
struggle. He has advanced the revisionist road of “three peacefuls and one replacement” [三和
一代] with ideas of peaceful transition in pastoral regions, peaceful coexistence with nationality
and religious upper strata, peaceful competition with revisionist Mongolia [the MPR], and
replacing class struggle with the nationality question.
He has replaced the Four Cleanups and class struggle with the nationality question. He has
denied the most important struggle between socialism and capitalism, the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie and magnified the nationality conflicts into a primary conflict arguing that that the
current major threat in Inner Mongolia is Han chauvinism. Moreover, he has used this as an
excuse for large-scale action against Han chauvinism. He has also said: “Form start to finish, the
Four Cleanups must resolutely tackle the nationality problem”; “To take the lift off the struggle
between two roads also means taking the lift off the nationality question.” He has arrogantly
added an additional point to the six points to successfully execute the Four Cleanups put forward
by Mao Zedong: “The nationality problem is yet to be solved.” And added: “If this point is not
accomplished, even finishing all the other six merely means finishing a half of the Four Cleanups”.
He has taken made his native Tumed banned into a stronghold from where he has summarized
what is known as the five manifestations of Han chauvinism, and has been prominently pushing
his anti-Han chauvinism. In December last year [1965] in the report-back meeting of the Tumed
banner Four Cleanups publicly stated that “I’ve been fighting Han chauvinism for decades. Being
60 years old this year, I have another 20 years of fight in me and won’t stop until I’ve fought
them down.” He even attacked some Mongol cadres saying: “Even Mongol cadres have
committed Han chauvinism, not local nationalism”; “Mongol cadres committing Han chauvinism
is even more dangerous than Han cadres [committing Han chauvinism].” By this, he has been
invoking nationality sentiment, trying to turn the Tumed banner Four Cleanups movement into
an anti-Han chauvinist movement. Some revolutionary leftist Mongol cadres have been isolated,
suffered attacks, and treated as “Han running dogs and Mongol traitors”. This way Ulanhu has
changed the nature and focus of the Four Cleanups movement: Not a conflict of socialism and
capitalism, but a conflict of nationality nature; Not taking class struggle and struggle between
two roads as a guiding principle, but focusing on the fight against his so called Han chauvinism.
The summary of these “experiences” he has transmitted down in the name of the Autonomous
Region Party committee and urged them [the other banners and counties] to follow suit.
Ulanhu opposes the execution of socialist revolution in pastoral regions advocating ”peaceful
transition”. He insists that in pastoral regions the reform must proceed with firms steps, with
lenient treatement, and take a long time, implementing policy of ”firm, lenient, and slow” [wen
kuan chang]398, and that this ”principle of peaceful transformation” has to be be thoroughly
implemented from up to down and from beginning to end in the pastoral regions’ socialist
tranformation. He thinks that revolutioon will destroy production, until there’s no livestock left,
suggestting that ”revolution until there’s no livestock left will make the herdsmen change their
minds”.399 He has also been against the suppression of revolts in minority regions. In September
1955 when the Central Committee discussed the issue of suppressing revolts in XX in Sichuan,
398 The original text:步子要穩，處理要寬，時間要長的“穩、寬、長”的政策
399 Etsi koko pätkä! Oletuksena on, että Ulanhu sanoo, että vallankumous siihen pisteeseen, että kaikki
eläimet tapettu, saa paimentolaiset menettämään uskonsa vallankumoukseen/vaihtamaan leiriä.
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he said: ”Going to battle against the minorities is an bad move.” The Central Committee did not
share his view. In June 1956 during a meeting he persevered with his standpoint, stating that ”I
told in the meeting, that going to battle is a bad move but some attending comrades did not
agree.” And he also said: ”If we have made an error, we should admit it, only so can the public
be calmed.”
Ulanhu has opposed class labeling in pastoral regions and adheres to the democratic revoution-
era policy of no (property) distribution, no (class) struggle, no class labeling in pastoral regions.
In a meeting in December 1965 argued that this policy ”aroused the enthusiasm of herd lords to
develop production. Whether they’re herd lords or herdsmen, rich or poor, they all increased
livestock production”. ”Today its still like this, it’s a guiding principle in pastoral reginos.”
Therefore he thiknks that ”as long as the production is growing, we’re perfectly fine without
class labeling.” Due to his repeated obstruction, the majority of the Inner Mongolian pastoral
economy still lacks class labeling and the proletarian dictatorship is not strong at all.
Ulanhu has been beautifying the nationality upper strata, herd lords, and religious upper strata,
advocating ”peaceful conexistence” with them. In April 1962, in the National Nationalities Work
Conference he stated: ”At the moment a lot of our cadres are princes and princesses/…/ an they
have been very successful in their work. Therefore, members off each nationality, each social
stratum, the religious upper stratum adn all the peopler of every stratum who are patriotic and
suppport the nationality autonomy, we rallied them all and ideologically transformed them and
at the same time let them be useful to the best of their abilities.” He also said: ”Protecting the
Autnomous Region is protecting the Mongol people and is also protects the religious belief.”
He’s been all over telling about this herd lord in Hu meng [Hulunbuir] who grew his herd to
twenty thousand heads and now doesn’t take the train going to Ha’erbin but flies on a plane.
But he never talks about how the herd lords’ money have come from exploitation. During the
Four Cleanups, he even advocated ”negotiation with the minority leaders”, and ”listening
attentively what the minority leaders have to say, by rallying the minority lreaders, the masses
will come along too.”
Ulanhu has not targeted political struggle against revisionist Mongolia, but advocates “peaceful
competition”. His so called anti-revisionism doesn’t stand for engaging in head-to-head struggle
in politics, but for winning the head count of cattle; it’s not about fighting revisionism in pastoral
regions with political education, but emphasizing material incentives. Therefore, in pastoral
regions, especially in border regions, many of the masses have weak notion of motherland and
are unable to loathe the revisionist Mongolia.
Ulanhu is still a typical economic nationalist [jingji zhuyizhe]400 and pragmatist [shiyong zhuyizhe].
He argues:”Among the thousands of causes, increasing carrle is the nuber one cause”;
“[Developing] Production is a matter of life and death, the difference between a true and a
bogus revolution”. Therefore, he has replaced class struggle with production, placing the class
struggle at odds with struggle in production. Last year the Middle-rear joint banner of Bayannaor
league 401 was hit by a windstorm and the livestock suffered loses. This year on 8 January, Ulanhu
sent a telegram criticizing the Four Cleanups movement being the main reason to cause livestock
losses under the attack of the windstorm, arbitrarily ordering a halt in the Four Cleanups. In this
year’s March, the IMAR Party Committee published “The main points of work for the first half
400 Baidu defines the jingji zhuyi as an opportunist ideology that is characterized by the short-sighted
seek profit. It sees the proletarian movement as a means of economic growth and opposes the struggle
to overthrow the capitalist class?
401巴盟中后旗, presumambly meaning the Wulate (Urad) middle-rear joint banner (乌拉特中后联合
旗) in Bayannaor league. For information on the changes in administrative divisions of the Bayannaor
league (nowadays Bayannao’er shi) on the official site of the Bayannaor shi, see:
http://www.bynr.gov.cn/sqgk/lsyg/.
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of 1966”, that went as far as to/that actually stated, that “agricultural and pastoral production
that centers in fighting droughts and natural calamities is presently the central task of all the
Party and the people, a common mission for all trades and professions, and must be tackled with
all one’s strength. Not a word was said of class struggle or anti-revisionist struggle among the
tasks.
When it comes to class struggle, the idea of “socialist nationality/nationalities”, “minoritization
of offices”, and suppressing revolts in minority regions, Wulanhu shows no difference with Li
Weihan’s402 views. They mutually support and make use of each other, openly oppose the Party
and the Party Center.
3. Servilely bowing to revisionism
Internally Ulanhu yields to the pressure from princes, the nobility, and the herd lords, externally
he yields to the pressure from the revisionist.
Regarding the reform of the Mongolian script Ulanhu insisted the slavicization [the use of Cyrillic
script] of the writing, completely adopting the Outer Mongolian script, stating: “Unifying the
language and script with Outer Mongolia is for the purpose of influencing them”. He promoted
the slavicization of Mongolian writing in the whole of Inner Mongolia starting from 1955, not
stopping until Premier Zhou proposed latinization [the use of Latin aplphabet]in Qingdao in 1957,
but to this day has yet to implement the latinization.
In external relations Ulanhu is servile. In July 1961 he led the Party and government delegation
of  China  to  take  part  in  the  celebration  of  the  40th anniversary of the establishment of the
Mongolian People’s Party and the 14th Congress of the Mongolian party. During the speech of
the representative of the Yugoslavian Tito, Ulanhu took the initiative to stand up two times
(there was no applause), thus isolating the Albanian representative. When the Mongolian
revisionists broadcasted and published the congratulatory greetings of our party and the speech
of the head of the delegation, the part “our friends are spread all over the world” was altered
to “there are our friends in the world”. After the members of the delegation became aware of
this, it was reported to him [Ulanhu] twice, but he still ignored it. The revisionist Mongols were
absolutely unreasonable when our delegation going to visit the Ulaanbaatar department store,
intentionally giving us the cold shoulder. Before the arrival of our delegation, the Mongols called
all the employees to go welcome their Polish guests and the store door was tightly closed. But
he willingly endured this humiliation and persisted in visiting this “self-service store”. When
Zedengba’er403 was hit by a car and was hospitalized, Ulanhu suggested visiting him. The Mongol
revisionists agreed on Ulanhu and Wang Weizhou 404 visiting but Zedengba’er’s wife (from the
Soviet Union) only allowed Ulanhu alone to enter the sickroom. Wang Weizhou left in anger,
and not only did he [Ulanhu] he not act in concert, but was all smiles instead, indifferent to what
had happened, entered alone to visit Zedengba’er. Afterwards, before returning to China, when
402 Li Weihan (李维汉, 1896-1984). Spent time in France on a work-study progam from 1919 to 1922 and
along with Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping was a member of the activist group that established the
Chinese Youth Communist Party in Europe (旅欧中国少年共产党). An important figure of the-Long
March and the first head of the Central Committee United Front Work department (中共中央统一战线
工作部). Criticized for his views on United Front work in the early 1960s, stripped off his post as the
head of the department in 1964 and imprisoned for over eight years from 1966. (Dillon 2004: 19 – 20.)
403 Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal (1916-1991), Prime Minister and General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Mongolian People’s Party at the time (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yumjaagiin_Tsedenbal,
22.1.2018).
404 Most likely Wang Weizhou (王维舟, 1887-1970), a PLA senior commander, member of the standing
committee of the Central Commission for Inspection (?, Nowadays the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (jilv ei kuulunut ilmeisesti tuolloin nimeen, siksi tuo käännös muoto, tsekkaa vielä).
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Wang Weizhou expressed his dissatisfaction with this unreasonable conduct to the Mongolian
person in charge, he was also present but expressed no concern whatsoever.
Since last year, just when we have been in head-on confrontation with revisionism, Zedengba’er
has been fiercely attacking China and provoking discord between China and Mongolia, Ulanhu
has taken down the flag of anti-revisionism and forcefully fought Han chauvinism in the IMAR.
This fully meets the needs of foreign revisionists.
4. With the 1935 “declaration” as his program, engaging in national splittist activities, trying
to establish a kingdom of his own
Ulanhu cannot forget the 1935 “Declaration/Manifsto of the Chinese Soviet Central Government
to the People of Inner Mongolia. Since the latter half of last year, he has been carrying the flag
of the Declaration engaging in national splittist actitivities.
The 1935 Declaration promoted: “Preserving the glory of the Ghengihis Khan era, avoiding the
extinction of the nationality/ethnic group [the Mongols], stepping on the road of national/ethnic
rejuvenation”. It ruled: “The whole area of the original six Mongolian leagues, 24 bu405, and 49
banners, the two Tumed bu’s in Chaha’er, and the three special administrative banners of
Ningxia, . . . are considered territory of the Inner Mongolian people”. “Only the Inner Mongolian
people themselves have the right to solve all of their internal problems, no-one has the right to
use violence to interfere with the habits and customs, religion and ethics, or any other rights of
the Inner Mongolian people. At the same time, the Inner Mongolian people can organize
themselves  as  they  wish,  have  the  right  to  organize  their  lives  and  decide  for  their  own
government. They have the right to unite with other peoples to form a federation, and also the
right become a completely independent entity. . . .”
This Declaration, then wrongly issued in Chairman Mao’s name by dogmatists within the party
is just what Ulanhu’s present national splittism needs. After the liberation, based on the territory
drawn in the declaration, he demanded “repayment” [of lost territory] from the Center, seized
territory, refusing to give up an inch of land to the adjoining provinces and regions. January this
year, the printed the Declaration to the whole region [the IMAR], demanding the lower levels to
use it to “investigate the problems in nationality work within our region”, and further demanded
all the region’s cadre to study [the Declaration] vigorously.
Ulahu’s excuse to distribute the 1935 Declaration is fighting Han chauvinism. In reality, he is
using autonomy as a pretext for trying to establish a kingdom of his own. In today’s Inner
Mongolia Han chauvinism is not the principal threat. The principal threat is local nationalism.
Since the founding of the nation [the PRC], local nationalism has never been seriously opposed
in the IMAR. Therefore, [the problem of] the local nationalism is rather serious. The activities of
the splittists are rather aggressive and cases of treason surface time and again (between 1960
and June 1966, total of 160 cases and 938 people, of which 68 cases and 624 people were
accomplished [yisui] offences. He has hanged back on handling some major cases of national
splittism and even turned a blind eye to them thus aggravating the problem. Even more serious
is that during this work conference of the North China Bureau, the Chifeng Military Branch
Region chief of staff Yun Chenglie (a distant nephew of Ulanhu), suddenly came to Beijing from
Huhehaote to engage in underground activities, claiming he was entrusted by Yun Shiying
(deputy head of the AR public security department) and others to pass on the message that “all
the people from Tumed banner need to hold out, and make Ulanhu hold out as well”. Hea also
said “’revolution’ is continual, even going up the mountains to wage guerilla warfare must have
‘revolution’”
405 A Qing-dynasty unit between league (meng) and banner (qi).
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The facts are crystal clear. The main root of Inner Mongolian local national splittism is Ulanhu
himself. With the 1935 Declaration as his programme and fighting Han chauvinism as his pretext,
he has engaged in anti-Party and anti-socialist national splittis activities, trying to establish a
kingdom of his own.
The national splittist activities and kingdom ambitions are no coincidence. He has a strong
“desire to be a leader”. He has disguised himself as the “leader” of the Mongol nationality,
bragging about “having always been correct”, and solemnly claiming to be the Party’s “expert”
and “authority” on nationality problems. He raises himself above the organization, practicing
“patriarchal/paternalistic” leadership, having no conception of democratic centralism and no
self-criticism whatsoever. He only listens to praises and is deaf to even the slightest critique,
trying to build up his personal prestige by all means possible. After the founding of the IMAR,
for a considerable time, the shouts of “long live chairman Ulanhu” were heard and large
amounts of Ulanhu’s portraits were distributed to pastoral areas. The portraits of Ulanhu were
hung on a level with the portrait of Chairman Mao, and even today in some places they still hang
his portrait. Hao Fan [浩帆] (Ulanhu’s trusted follower), the deputy secretary-general of the AR
Party Committee, in the presence of the cadres at the office openly said: “In the Center one
listens to Chairman Mao, in Inner Mongolia one listens to Ulanhu”, “the whole country studies
Mao Zedong thought, Inner Mongolia is to study Ulanhu thought”, and “the documents of the
Party  Committee  are  to  reflect  Ulanhu  thought”.  He  Yue  [何躍] (Ulanhu’s trusted follower),
officer at the Party Committee office for investigation and research, said in his presence,
that: ”Comrade Ulanhu is the leader of the people of all nationalities in Inner Mongolia”. Ulanhu
revels in all this [praise], and never makes an effort to stop it.
The directives from the Center, Chairman Mao, The Central Military Commission, and the North
China Bureau that he does not agree with, Ulanhu rejects or delays their implementation. In
addition to the aforementioned refusal to transmit Chairman Mao’s directive from the Chengdu
meeting and not implementing Premier Zhou’s directive on the Latinization/Romanization of the
Mongolian script, when comrade Lin Biao instructed to pass the army horse farms previously
delegated to lower levels on to the General Logistics Department, Ulanhu insisted on keeping
the Huhe horse farm. He also categorically opposed the Center’s and the North China Bureau’s
[plans on] land reclamation of Inner Mongolian land for cultivation. He has left the Center and
the North China Bureau under tight [information] blockade. His many speeches and reports that
cannot bear the light of the day were left undelivered to the Center and the North China Bureau;
even some documents the North China Bureau requested, he would not submit.
5. Placing trusted followers to key positions and seizing authority
In order to actively proceed with his national splittist and revisionist political conspiracies, for
over a year he has intentionally been practicing factionalist cadre policy.
His standard for assigning cadres is based on whether they are able to implement his revisionist
line, whether they actively oppose Han chauvinism, and promote national splittism. Moreover,
his unprincipled favoring of the Mongols, is actually favoring the rightists among the Mongol
cadres. The Mongol cadres he further divides to East Mongols and West Mongols; Tumed
Mongols and non-Tumed Mongols; students of the Yan’an Institute for Nationalities and the
ones not from the Yan’an Institute for Nationalities – his relatives and trusted followers have
the better posts. Therefore, anyone who praises Ulanhu and opposes Han chauvinism is placed
in an important position or promoted; anyone who persists with the Party’s principles, who does
not cater to his [Ulanhu] taste, is rejected, attacked or even framed-up.
This way Ulanhu has recruited a group of revisionists, national splittists, ultra-individualists, and
people with severely problematic political backgrounds (including Han cadres), creating a rightist
force and scheming with a handful of trusted followers as his core group. Especially some
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important personnel assignments have been secretly prepared by them in advance. Ulanhu
himself has confessed: “This is a ‘small secretariat’ outside the secretariat.
Since the latter half of last year, Ulanhu has been impatiently placing his trusted followers in key
position, [thus] seizing the authority over important departments.
1) Using the scheme of setting up a “substitute Standing Committee”, seized authority over the
AR Party Committee Standing Committee.
In January, Ulanhu took advantage of many of the AR Party Committee Standing Committee and
Secretariat members engaging in grassroots work or suffering from illnesses, ignored the
opposition  by  comrades  Wang  Duo  and  Gao  Jinming  from  the  Secretariat  and  set  up  a  13-
member “substitute Standing Committee” consisting predominantly of his trusted followers.
Nine of the members were Mongols cadres, six of them from Tumed banner. This [substitute
StandingCommittee] was a means to promote his revisionist line. The “substitute Standing
Committee” replaced the Standing Committee, forcefully promoting Ulanhu’s national splittist
line carried out by his trusted followers.
2) Placing a number of trusted followers in important positions, took control of key departments
within the Party and the government.
Under the pretexts of trimming organizations, setting up the “five committees” [?], and
strengthening authority, he placed trusted followers in key positions and seized authority in the
General Office, Organization Department, and the Investigation and Research Office of the Party
Committee, and the Culture, Planning, and Agriculture Committees of the People’s Committee,
the Public Security Department etc. key departments.
3) Staged a revisionist coup within the Hohhot Municipal Party Committee
Ulanhu used the revisionist anti-Han-chauvinism spearhead figure Li Gui [李贵] (Han nationality,
first secretary of the Hohhot Party Committee), together with a secretary of the Hohhot Party
Committee Secretariat Chen Bingyu [陈炳宇], to exaggerate the faults and errors of the second
secretary of the Municipal Party Committee Zhao Rulin [赵汝霖] and accused him of being “anti-
Ulanhu” and “not implementing the Party’s nationality policy” etc, labeled him “anti-Party
factionalist” and got rid of him. After Li Gui and a handful of revisionists gained “victory”, carried
away by complacency, only last autumn, Li Gui made reports in Hohhot eight consecutive times
and also went to report twice in Baotou municipal cadre meetings. In the reports he advocated
revisionism and anti-Han chauvinism in loud voice; praised Ulanhu for being brilliant and right,
opposed Mao Zedong thought; with a stroke of a brush he wrote off the Hohhot Party
Committee’s ten years’ achievements. The whole municipality carried the [movement] “take off
the lids, dig the roots, and change the guard”406, staged a revisionist coup. Ulanhu praised Li
Gui’s coup highly, speaking of it as the “founding of a Marxist-Leninist leadership group”.
4) Using the Hohhot Municipal Party Committee as a model, has actively been staging revisionist
coups in other leagues and municipalities.
In December 1965, in the name of the AR Party Committee chaired by Ulanhu, the Hohhot Party
Committee approved for distribution a description of a coup called “Report on some of the
problems regarding nationality work”. It is a typical example of a revisionist coup d’état program.
The document starts by praising him [Ulanhu] for being always right that he “led the people of
the whole [Autnomous] region to liberation , . . . is held in esteem  and supported by people of
all nationalities in the region”. It then argues, that “these bourgeois nationalists (editors note:
Han chauvinists) are at present glaringly concentrating their attack on some of the old Inner
406揭盖子，挖根子，换班子
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Mongolian Mongol leading comrades headed by Ulanhu”. “The nationality problem of Inner
Mongolia, that is the problem of revolution in Inner Mongolia. Resisting the leading comrades
of Inner Mongolia led by Ulanhu is actually resisting the leadership of the Party and the Party’s
nationality policy, it is resisting the Inner Mongolia nationalities’ socialist road”. “It is the present
trend within the AR Party regarding the nationality problem”, “Here the present class struggle
and struggle of two roads within the AR forcefully manifests itself on the nationality problem.”
This document showed the green light to the evil activities of national splittists and revisionists
in many places. They take this document and go bustling all around, working hard preparing to
stage a counterrevolutionary conspiracy coup. First they extend their activities into the local
Party and government organs, then reaching to the military.
5)  Launched  a  concentrated  attack  on  the  Han  leading  cadres  within  the  regional  Party
Committee to remove obstacles from advancing national splittism.
On  April  1,  this  year,  in  the  name  of  giving  prominence  to  politics  at  the  meeting  of  the
“substitute Standing Committee” Ulanhu launched a “small airing of views” [小鸣放]. He took
initiative to attack the AR Party Committee secretaries Wang Duo, Quan Xingyuan, Gao Jinming
(Manchu nationality) and other comrades by name. Their contributions he kept to himself but
made their errors public to others. He said that Wang Duo “wasn’t willing to give up a hair” when
it came to agriculture. Quan Xingyuan had left industry “without an inch of steel in hand”. Gao
Jinming was not implementing nationality policy and slandered the AR commerce “dashengkui”
[大盛魁] (name for the business of the old society exploiting Mongols). Following this, the
“substitute Standing Committee” prepared the files of these comrades according to Ulanhu’s
intent. Outside the meeting, Yun Liwen, Hao Fan and others were spreading the word about
these secretaries and leading cadres of the AR Party Committee opposing Ulanhu , manipulating
the general opinion [against them].
Late April, this year, in the name of putting the decisions of the North China Bureau conference,
giving prominence to politics and class struggle, Ulanhu convened the AR Party Committee
Standing Committee expanded meeting, took matters to his own hands, sent men to his mission
to fan the flames, giving prominence to anti-Han chauvinism 407 , attacking Wnagduo, Quan
Xingyuan and other comrades, attempting to carry out a “palace coup”. At the time the North
China Bureau already had its doubts [about Ulanhu] and sent its men to criticize and stop him.
Luckily, it was also at that time the Center summoned him [Ulanhu] to Beijing to attend the May
Politburo Extended Meeting pre-empting Ulanhu’s conspiracy this time. Following this the Great
Cultural Revolution was launched and Ulanhu’s errors were exposed. His conspiracy fell through.
Ulanhu’s errors are no coincidences. He was born to a landlord family, received a bourgeois
education. After taking part in the revolution, he was engaged in nationality elite work for long
periods and seldom engaged in mass movements and arduous class struggle. Since the liberation,
he has been high above the masses, living like a prince divorced from reality. Therefore, despite
being a Party member for over forty years, his bourgeois views stand and world view have never
changed. He has always shown rightist inclination, far from the “right all along” he boasts himself
to  be.   He  is  a  bourgeois  nationalist  to  the  core.  The  intensifying  class  struggle  and  ever
advancing socialist revolution home and abroad worried him deep in his soul. Especially since
the latter half of last year, he could wait no more but brazenly raised his own flag, openly started
to fight the Party, socialism, and Mao Zedong thought, engaging in national splittist activities.
Ulanhu is a representative figure of the bourgeoisie within the Party, a conspirator obsessed
with ambition. He wants to transform Inner Mongolia and the Inner Monoglian Party
organization with his bourgeois nationalism.
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The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region is the frontier of the motherland, the frontline against
revisionism, and a strategic key area. The Center trusted Ulanhu assigning him this major duty.
But Ulanhu lwas unworthy of the Center’s and Chairman Mao’s trust and expectations. Giving
priority his own bourgeois ambitions, Ulanhu truned his back on the benefit of the proletarian
revolutionary cause, up to the point of breaking the unity of the nation and advancing bourgeois
restoration in Inner Mongolia. Ulanhu’s errors have already done serious damage and left deep
evil trails to the strength of the frontier of the motherland, to the great unity of the
nation(alities), and to the socialist revolution and construction of the IMAR.
There were signs of Ulanhu’s erroneous thinking already before. The Chairman and the
comrades in charge of the Center have talked criticized and tried to bring him around. For the
past couple of years, the North China Bureau has started to become aware of his errors, warning
and criticizing him not only once. But he has never criticized himself, and before criticism he
shows a different face to the outside from what he thinks within. Despite him having begun to
recognize some of his serious mistakes after hearing the severe criticizms and struggles by
comrades at the meeting this time, he is still unwilling to completely dissociate himself from the
errors and has not changed his erroneous stand at all. The attending comrades are furious with
Ulanhu and his errors, one by one demanding to deal with the matter strictly and thorougly
eliminate the influence of Ulanhu’s errors.
We arconfident that more than 95% of the cadres and the masses of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous Region are revolutionary and have faith in the Party Center and Chairman Mao.
Under the brilliant leadership of the Paty Center and Chairman Mao, in this Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution, we will surely be able to eliminate the influence caused by Ulanhu’s errors.
The great red flag of Mao Zedong thought will surely raised higher than ever in the IMAR, and
the IMAR socialist revolution and socialist construction will take a new leap forward.
We ask the Center to examine the report above. If the Center agrees, we suggest it to approve
this  report  for  distribution in  the local  government  and army Party  organizations,  as  well  as
publish it within revolutionary mass organizations.
The North China Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee
July 27, 1966
